

[illegible]

**Borrower's
No.**

**Issue
Date**

**Borrower's
No.**

**Issue
Date**

STUDIES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Volume VI

THE FRONTIERS OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

[illegible]

THE FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

JOHN M. GAUS

Professor of Political Science, The University of Wisconsin

LEONARD D. WHITE

Professor of Public Administration, The University of Chicago

Member of the United States Civil Service Commission

MARSHALL E. DIMOCK

Associate Professor of Public Administration

The University of Chicago

NEW YORK / RUSSELL & RUSSELL



ALLAMA IQBAL LIBRARY



212614

223
38

MR4

KASHMIR UNIVERSITY

Iqbal Library

Acc. No. 212641

Dated..... 22.5.89

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1936 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

REISSUED IN 1967 BY RUSSELL & RUSSELL

A DIVISION OF ATHENEUM PUBLISHERS, INC.

BY ARRANGEMENT WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

L. C. CATALOG CARD NO: 66-27077

ISBN 0-8462-0981-0

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE

THE student of public administration is now confronted with a literally overwhelming torrent of new administrative agencies and new problems to be assimilated and appraised. This torrent comes when the study is a relatively youthful one. It was in 1888 that Woodrow Wilson, then a young instructor, pointed out that while the study of politics in the United States had hitherto centered largely upon questions of constitutional law, the new emphasis would increasingly be placed, or should be placed, upon administration. His words were prophetic. Pioneers in this field have already made tentative generalizations, and have formulated some general principles based upon the varied and extensive developments that have marked the half-century since Wilson's essay was published.

The authors of these essays recently enjoyed a period of congenial association in teaching and research in public administration while members of the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. While their training and experience are varied, they found that they were in agreement upon the value of attempting an appraisal of certain phrases and concepts widely employed in the study of public administration. So many currents of experience—from industry, from psychological research, from the study of comparative government, especially of the war and post-war period, to name but a few—are now adding their contribution to the main stream that not only is the ordinary citizen confused but also those devoting their major attention to public administration.

These essays, therefore, represent at once the pleasure which the authors have taken in discussing among themselves problems of mutual interest and also their belief that the governmental problems revealed by the depression and the efforts to deal with it require for their solution both improvements in

administrative techniques and equally more accurate ideas concerning the nature of administration. We are under no delusion that the views expressed in these essays represent the best, or even original, definitions and formulations. We do believe, however, that it is most important that public administrators and students of public administration should attempt such formulation, and we shall be happy if this attempt helps to stimulate other and more valuable contributions from our colleagues.

THE AUTHORS

CHICAGO
July, 1936

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ESSAY	PAGE
I. THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION . . . <i>By Marshall E. Dimock</i>	I
II. THE MEANING OF PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION . . <i>By Leonard D. White</i>	13
III. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION <i>By John M. Gaus</i>	26
IV. THE RÔLE OF DISCRETION IN MODERN ADMINISTRATION . . <i>By Marshall E. Dimock</i>	45
V. A THEORY OF ORGANIZATION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION . . <i>By John M. Gaus</i>	66
VI. AMERICAN SOCIETY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION <i>By John M. Gaus</i>	92
VII. THE CRITERIA AND OBJECTIVES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION <i>By Marshall E. Dimock</i>	116
APPENDIX	135
INDEX	141

[illegible]

I

THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By MARSHALL E. DIMOCK

WHENEVER people associate for common purposes, the problem of administration presents itself. The execution of agreed-upon policies is a necessary responsibility of all institutional activities. Whatever the object—be it commerce, statecraft, or fraternity—an administrative agency of some kind must needs exist if a program is to be carried out and if the association is to be a continuous one. In the administration of every recognized association there are the common factors of organization, personnel, leadership, and finance. As between the various kinds of groups which persons join, there are, of course, vast differences in the degree of importance attached to administration. The difference corresponds fairly closely to the formality or informality of the relationship, the nature of its objectives, and the size and permanence of the group.

When a government is organized for the effectuation of community business, we have what has come to be called "public administration." The serious nature of government, its permanence and formality, make a study of public administration particularly important. The basic problems with which public management is concerned are as old as social groupings. Not until fairly recently, however, has the administrative side of government been sharply defined for the purpose of study.

The present-day emphasis on governmental administration is due to a variety of causes. Basic, of course, is the fact that government's functions and responsibilities have been greatly expanded. The insistence upon good administration has followed naturally in the train of increased demands for service

and protection. Such a large part of the national income now goes to public expenditures that taxpayers are moved to demand increased economy and efficiency. Another contributing factor is the relative neglect of administration in the past, resulting in a social lag which governors and governed are now trying to rectify. With more expected of it, government has been driven to a greater division of labor and to a more critical examination of its own housekeeping activities. In order to control or to help others, public agencies have first had to organize themselves and to improve their own efficiency. Governments, like individuals, are not likely to do well for others what they cannot achieve for themselves.

Still another general recognition of the importance of administration is found in the oft-repeated observation that the future of American society depends upon the development of the right kind of leaders in government and business. In other words, the personnel factor in administration is beginning to receive the popular recognition it deserves. As characteristic of the new viewpoint regarding public administration, we may note with great interest the statement of W. N. Kiplinger in *Nation's Business*, an official journal of organized business men in the United States, to the effect that government can carry any load if its administration and its personnel can be made to measure up to the responsibilities which citizens place upon it. If you can get the right kind of men and use sound administrative methods, this writer observes, there is no reason why government cannot do anything that private business does.

Conceded, then, that there is this generally recognized need for good administration, the important question is: How are we to fulfil it? Can public administration be defined and delimited, or is it as broad and as complicated as government itself? Is public administration a subject that can be taught and on which research can be done?

Public administration, as an integral subject for academic study, has received increasing recognition as the rôle of administration in the entire political process has become clearer.

In early governments the formation of policy and the carrying-out of law were placed in the same hands. Bureaucracies grew up under monarchies, and in most cases efforts were made to make these hierarchical state services efficient and capable. But a clear line was not drawn between the formulation of law and its execution, nor did public administration receive particular notice or study as such. However, the development of democracy and representative government has meant a division of governmental labor and a specialization of function. The presidential, as contrasted with the cabinet system of government, has further attempted to differentiate politics and administration. Then, too, on top of these developments there has been built a professionalization of the civil service, a professionalization which took root, to be sure, in the early period when the officers of the king's household and his advisers carried on the government, but which has grown into fruition in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. Under monarchy a clear line between policy and execution was hard to draw. Action was frequently capricious, and the outlines of administrative organization and procedure were necessarily vague. But with the recognition of a definite distinction between policy formulation and execution, with the growth of a professional administrative class and the development of the notion of responsibility of governors to the governed, formal study and research in public administration naturally became more necessary and feasible than in earlier times.

The danger today is in going too far in the formal separation between politics and administration. Scholars working in the field of public administration must take care lest by unduly separating the techniques of execution from the content and problems of government they make public administration detached and unreal. In the growing tendency to draw a sharp line between politics and administration there is constant danger of giving too little weight to the propulsions, policies, and

attitudes which run throughout government and which influence administration as well as legislation.

Research and teaching in public administration involve more than a mere study of techniques and general principles, which may be thought to be applicable to all levels and conditions of administration. Public administration is to be isolated from the whole process of government only for the sake of convenience in research, teaching, and training. Admitting that the formulation of hypotheses and principles is necessary and desirable, the worker in the field of public administration should be constantly on his guard against generalizations which bear no close relation to the solution of the particular problem and situation which he is exploring. Public administration, like government, is a human activity and, like the activity of humans, is complex and often unpredictable. So much depends upon the personal factor. Public administration is not an end in itself, but is merely a tool of government and the servant of the community—as such it may be expected to grow and to change as society itself changes.

Generalizations relative to public administration are hazardous. Although there are common elements in every type of administrative situation, such as organization, finance and personnel, it should always be recognized that the requirements of a given situation and the differences in subject matter should be given a great deal of weight in prescribing solutions in the field of public administration. Then, too, the functions of government are growing rapidly both in scope and in extent. Allowances frequently have to be made for distinctive conditions obtaining in the performance of a new governmental function or arising from the increased size and areal variations of old functions. Finally, as those who have made administrative surveys soon discover, there are important differences in place, time, local tradition, and objective which need to be given their full weight by a realistic researcher in public administration. Instead of expecting standardization, simplicity and complete parallelisms, a student of public administration should expect

to find a great variety of problems and likewise varying formulas. Public administration should be elastic. Its principles are convenient guides to future action, but they should be conditioned in their application by time and place factors, by sound judgment, by intuition, by willingness to experiment, and by regard for the distinctive conditions and differing objectives of the particular case.

Public administration is what the successful co-ordinator does in getting a job done. What are the conditions of his success? In many cases the leader's personal qualities seem to provide the only clue to the explanation. We know that a competent executive inspires his followers, that he has good judgment, that he views matters broadly, that he has a mastery of detail without getting caught up in it. There is such a thing as administrative genius. A man does not need to be formally educated in order to have it, for his principal endowment is apparently natural. Moreover, the administrator of outstanding ability is frequently unable to explain how he does it. Administrators are notoriously poor at writing down explanations of how they operate. This has led some psychologists to conclude that the principal characteristic of the executive is "temperament."

Are we to conclude, then, that successful administrators do not follow rules? Are there no positive things that all executives must expect to do? I believe there are. Some men have flaunted recognized methods and have succeeded, but in general there are certain procedures which must be followed. The co-ordinator must organize his own force. He plans; he is a tactician. The head of an organization makes provision for staff assistance; he cannot do all the planning and co-ordinating himself. Moreover, he delegates as much responsibility as possible. All administrators say they delegate, of course, but the great ones actually do. Obviously there are other steps the executive takes, but the foregoing analysis of typical administrative procedures is sufficient to show that personality alone is not the complete explanation of administrative success.

One way of determining what we mean by public administration and how the field should be circumscribed is to consider the several possible approaches to the subject. This involves a brief consideration of public administration as law, as institution, as experience, as theory and invention, and as problem and relationship. By this classification we do not mean to suggest that these facets of the subject are, or should be, completely separable. We do wish to point out that at various times in the past one or another of these approaches has received such strong emphasis that other component parts of public administration have been neglected in comparison. At no time have the various approaches to public administration been drawn closely together and made into a complete synthesis. The development of such a synthesis is the task of the future.

The legal approach to public administration is the oldest one in the United States. Just as political science grew out of the study of public law, so the various aspects of public administration, such as organization, governmental relationships, personnel, and finance, were considered at first almost exclusively from the legal point of view. It was approached from the standpoint of judicial rules and decisions, and of statutory and constitutional limitations and requirements. The result was that the principal emphases which one finds today—namely, on methods, concrete experiences, and, generally speaking, the human side of administration—were almost completely neglected. The situation was rectified to a very great extent by the work of Frank G. Goodnow, who was not only one of the first to deal with public administration in this country but also the first political scientist in the United States to emphasize practical politics, municipal reform, and the necessity of improving particular administrative services. With the revolt against the legal approach to government the legal aspects of public administration were, as a direct result, given insufficient attention for a considerable time. This was obviously unfortunate because the administration of law necessarily begins with an understanding of the law and the policies which are to be enforced.

A more recent emphasis upon public administration and the one which has been dominant in recent years may be called the "institutional" approach. Here the underlying conception is that administration is a distinct department of government, and that the problem of the student is to examine its organization and operation. This point of view is to be discovered particularly in the writings of Mr. W. F. Willoughby. Needless to say, this approach to the problem emphasizes mechanics, organization, procedure—what the lawyers call adjective law—rather than the substantive law itself and the problems out of which such policies and rules grow. Hence, it may be said that the emphasis is shifted from legal rules and cases to the formal framework and procedures of the administrative machine.

This approach to the problem has been significant because, if for no other reason, it has emphasized the problem of overhead organization and control. It has dealt with administration in the large—with the rôle of the chief executive, the organization of departments, the co-ordination of administrative services, the central place of finance and budget-making in the administrative process, the staffing of administrative units, and the forms of control brought to bear upon the administrative department. The underlying objective has been efficiency, and the ideas of those who have developed this approach to public administration have been influenced primarily, especially since the war, by the ideas of the Taylor Society and of those concerned with industrial management. Those who have taken this approach to the problem of public administration appear to believe in the possibility of formulating general principles relative to administration with the resulting simplification and formalization of the subject matter.

A third interpretation of public administration which needs to be recognized studies administration as experience. This is the empirical, pragmatic method. The so-called "practical" approach is dissatisfied with both the legal and the institutional interpretations. Needless to say, persons who are most closely identified with this phase of public administration are those who are engaged in the actual conduct of governmental serv-

ices. They have not written as much about the field of public administration as have some other groups, but when they do so it is to emphasize the practical, routine aspects of public business. Except among the better educated and more experienced of those who take the so-called practical view, there is a tendency to be highly critical of any other approach to public administration—although without knowing it, of course, their actions and prescriptions are influenced and controlled by those whose ideas and researches have molded the ideology and assumptions of American administration.

Still another emphasis upon public administration is that which approaches the subject from the standpoint of theory and invention. This is the rational, analytical method of dealing with public administration, and the purpose is clearly that of reconciling the various concepts and methodologies of public administration, both in and for itself, and also in relation to the broader field of the social sciences. It will be found that the purpose of this approach is largely to uncover false assumptions and to invent new ideas and ways of doing things for the administrator. This approach to the problem is probably less exclusive than any other. If the so-called theorist in public administration is to perform a valuable function, he must be familiar with the several approaches to public administration and with the data of the field.

A final means of understanding public administration is through the problem and relationship method. This is the instrumentalist approach of John Dewey. The view here is that public administration is not primarily a self-contained entity, but that it is simply a means, a tool by which problems of society can be solved. The proper technique, therefore, is first to analyze the problem which awaits solution and this necessarily involves the sociological approach to administration. The law relating to the subject must, of course, be considered, but in addition the economic situation, the pressure of political parties, and vested interests must be given consideration, and the accepted hypotheses and methods of public administration

must then be modified, if need be, in the light of the tradition, setting, and influences acting upon the actual administration of the government. If this view of public administration be compared with the institutional approach it will be seen that, whereas public administration according to the institutional view is considered more or less a self-contained entity, in the eyes of the student taking the problem approach to the subject it is simply relative. It is a tool which must be molded and sharpened for the particular purpose which is to be served. This is not to say that standardized tools cannot be fashioned because in actual practice, as everyone knows, there is a great deal of repetition, parallelism, and uniformity in the conduct of public business.

Having considered these several points of view, namely, public administration as law, as institution, as experience, as theory and invention, and as problem and relationship, we may attempt to formulate a comprehensive definition of our own. In doing so, we must attempt to pull together the various emphases which we have been briefly examining. Public administration includes the problems, powers, organization, and methods of management employed in enforcing the law and in discharging governmental responsibilities. This definition would appear to encompass all of the approaches to public administration analyzed above. In the first place, when we deal with powers and problems, we must take into consideration the law, because law in the broad sense of the term is the form which governmental policy takes. Statutes set the tasks and provide the means for administrative agencies. Moreover, we have taken into account the sociological, economic, and political conditions out of which administrative powers grow. In the discussion relative to approaches to public administration we have called this the problem and relationship method. The second part of our definition deals with the organization and personnel of the administrative machine. Within this general rubric we also include financial administration and budgets. Hence, most of the subject matter usually considered with-

in the institutional approach to public administration is taken into account at this point. This part of the field of public administration probably permits more useful generalization and the formulation of more reliable principles than any other. Thus, it comes nearest to being what is generally considered "scientific." Finally, it has been suggested that public administration is concerned with the methods of management. Here we refer to methods of integration, techniques of improving morale, rules relative to discipline and discharge, public relations, and related subjects.

Public administration from beginning to end must deal with concrete social and economic problems, such as health, public utilities, regional planning, and all the other fields of governmental activity. If, as we have assumed, public administration should always be thought of as an instrument or tool, then a consideration of the social, economic, and political problems with which the laws deal must inevitably be a matter of consideration for public administration. Unless the student relates his theories about public administration to the problems which government is attempting to solve, he will not be able to keep his feet on the ground or be assured of a salutary solution of the administrative problems involved.

Public administration, as it is found today in the United States, needs to be humanized. Just as public administration is an instrument, so its ultimate effectiveness is to be tested by the results it produces for the whole community. Hence, public administration should be thought of not only in close relation to government and to the other social sciences, but also as a force serving citizens and giving consideration to the efforts of the individuals who comprise the public service.

If what has been said about the meaning and scope of public administration be accepted, it would appear that certain definite needs of the art and science of governmental administration require recognition and clear emphasis in the future. In the first place, the development of public administration requires a large number of special functional studies in fields

involving economics, public welfare, medicine, engineering, and similar technical subjects. Such studies dealing with the numerous and diverse functions of governmental administration would appear to be necessary before valid generalizations can be made with regard to the administrative process as a whole. It may be assumed that general principles relative to overhead organization and control have had, and still possess, a great deal of validity in many cases. But before general principles relative to the "line" services can be formulated and before we can be sure that our assumptions concerning overhead administration are entirely defensible, a great deal more needs to be known about the practices and problems of administration in concrete situations.

In the second place, public administration, if it is not to become stereotyped and authoritarian, should be fertilized with ideas obtained from business, educational, military, and quasi-governmental administration. Studies in the last-mentioned field are particularly important because new relationships between government and industry are rapidly taking form, with the result that new devices and methods of administration have already begun to appear. Others may unquestionably be expected. Furthermore, in connection with the view that public administration is not a narrow discipline but that it must draw widely from other fields, it may be suggested that the work of the psychologist on personnel management and of the accountant on financial administration needs to be more effectively utilized.

A third suggestion relative to the needs of public administration grows out of considerations which have already been touched upon. It embodies one of the most important issues arising out of the attempt to define the scope and content of governmental administration. Public administration is not merely an inanimate machine, unthinkingly performing the work of government. If public administration is concerned with the problems of government, it is also by the same token interested in fulfilling the ends and objectives of the state.

Hence, public administration, in its larger sense, involves those considerations once encompassed by the term political economy. Public administration is planning. More and more our higher administrative officials are called upon to originate economic programs, to draft laws relative to economic reconstruction, and to plan the conservation of natural resources, as well as to determine the mechanism of the government itself. This planning, constructive, purposing aspect of public administration needs to be clearly and strongly emphasized in the future.

Public administration may be said to be a synthesis. The boundary of the field should not be drawn too narrowly. Its scope must be broad—almost as broad as all of government itself. Public administration is the state in action, the state as builder. The scope of administration is determined only by whatever is needed to carry out the policies and purposes of government. Public administration should emphasize theory, because the most fruitful political theory, in the writer's view, comes from the administrative approach to government. Public administration is not entirely empirical. It must foresee future needs and formulate solutions in advance of the actual demand. In a word, public administration must be inventive and purposeful.

II

THE MEANING OF PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By LEONARD D. WHITE

NO CONSCIENTIOUS administrator would fail to insist that in his official decisions he was strictly governed by principle. Contrary to the politician, whose principles might be tempered to the changing winds of opinion, the administrator cherishes the pattern of consistency. Administration like law has been described as principle broadening down from precedent to precedent. Administration is consistent, not capricious; and the administrator, it is said, has an eye to the permanent interests of the state. Nor does the conscientious civil servant mean merely that he is aware of moral principles of right conduct in his official decisions or in his private life. He believes himself guided by general views, by settled tradition, by established knowledge of appropriate methods in administrative operations.

Certainly no student of public administration neglects the principles of his subject. The magic word sprinkles the pages of modern writing in this field, and with its occult power to signify anything from a mere observation, a guess, or a hope, on the one hand, to a generalization based on a broad range of evidence, on the other, it lends zest to many a difficult page.

So well known an authority as Dr. W. F. Willoughby commences his admirable *Principles of Public Administration* with the forthright assertion:

The position is here taken that, in administration, there are certain fundamental principles of general application analogous to those characterizing any science, which must be observed if the end of administration, efficiency in operation, is to be secured, and that these principles are to be determined and their significance made known only by the rigid application of scientific method to their investigation.

This surely ought to give pause to easy reference to principle—the sort of reference which often conceals, or obscures, failure to pierce to the fundamental aspects of administrative truth which Dr. Willoughby celebrates in this passage.

Clearly Dr. Willoughby has in mind something other than laws in the sense of legal enactment, which one suspects is what some administrators mean when they assert that they are governed by principles. The proposition stated in the law is necessarily their rule of action; but administration is more than the law—it is not less than the discretionary application of the rule of the law to every relevant instance which comes to the attention of the administrator. Hence arises the possibility, indeed the necessity, of discovering and applying principle in a different and a more subtle sense. Law, moreover, at best is a coarse network, whose interstices must be filled by administrative action of one kind or another—an order in council, a *réglementation d'administration publique*, a rule, an order of individual application, an administrative decision. Here principle cannot mean legal enactment, or sound personal morality, or mere consistency. But we insist that administration must proceed on principles, and in the systematic volumes on administration we find repeated reference to these principles. What is meant, if anything, by this term in this field?

One answer to such an inquiry may presumably be found in the use of the term by contemporary authorities. If inspection shows a uniform, intelligent, and harmonious use of “principle,” then our quest comes to an early end. Let the doctors speak.

The sagacious secretary of the International City Managers' Association arranged—dare we suggest with a secret belief that he might protect his colleagues in the managerial world from future sermons on the subject of “Principle” by allowing a judicious amount of light to shine upon some cases?—for the first public discussion of principles of public administration at a recent convention of the Association. It is just to pay homage to the Association and Dr. Ridley for this enterprise, which

might rather have been expected from the Academy of Political Science, the American Political Science Association, the Social Science Research Council, or Section K of the A.A.A.S.

But to the round table on "Principles of Public Administration." Dr. Luther Gulick, its leader, sounded a preliminary note of warning to his group:

During past years there has been a great deal of discussion of principles in the field of public administration. Every newspaper editor, every college professor, every politician, every reformer, every civic secretary, has, on occasion, when he was pushed with his back to the wall to defend a program, resorted to "fundamental principles" just as in past years the politician has wrapped himself in the flag.

The members of the round table were then each summoned in turn to state one principle of public administration, as briefly as possible. Here the transcript may better speak for itself.

EMORY E. OLSON [director, school of citizenship and public administration, University of Southern California]: I think that the policy which authorizes an administrative act is safe only when law, economic principles, and political theories are found to harmonize.

WILLIAM E. MOSHER [director, school of citizenship and public affairs, Syracuse University]: It seems to me that it is important to define what is meant by administration. . . . With respect to city administration, the first principle is the determination of the object or thing you are driving at. Next come planning, departmentalization, and the problem of coordination through conference, committees, and the like. Finally, there is the task of reporting achievements to inform the administrator continuously whether the object or plans are being realized.

WALTER MATSCHEK [director, Civil Research Institute, Kansas City, Mo.]: Is it not an elementary first principle of administration that there should be an appointive, single chief administrator?

J. CATRON JONES [secretary, Kentucky Municipal League]: I think the principle of coordination is most fundamental, in fact, it is the starting point.

S. GALE LOWRIE [professor of political science, University of Cincinnati]: We should not lose sight of the importance of informing the public about administration with a view of maintaining sustained citizen interest in government. If administrative problems cannot be set forth in such a way that the public can follow them intelligently and know what the administrator is driving at and the obstacles that he has to overcome, I am afraid that however good the administration may be, sooner or later it is likely to get out of gear with public sentiment in the community.

These observations, somewhat rudely torn from their context, should be taken as no more than a somewhat impromptu effort to state a principle by men who have certainly given much thought to public administration. Their incongruity suggests at least that the speakers did not have a common understanding of what is meant by a principle; and that some exploration of this ground might consequently be useful.

This confusion of tongues is not confined to our side of the Atlantic. References to principles of public administration are scattered about in the contemporary English literature. The leading journal in this field, *Public Administration*, offered its readers a few years ago a "Note on Administrative Principle," which in the words of its author was "an effort to discern what administrative principle is." The author eventually reached the admission that "we cannot say quite clearly what administrative principles are [or] what they are not," and accepted a definition of method as the best kind of a definition we are likely to get. He concluded, however, that "the principles, whatever they are, which govern the transaction of business apply to all business, administrative or other; that they recognize no frontiers; that they have a definite identity and the widest application; and that business is business whether it is done in the City or in Whitehall, in Johannesburg, or in Pretoria." At least here is an assertion of faith!

In one of his recent volumes Professor Carl J. Friedrich observed that "it is an almost hopeless task to cleanse words, which are essential for our work, of the layers of surface associations which deft orators have heaped upon them." The word "principle" clearly stands in need of the scrubbing brush.

The search for an appropriate meaning of the term may commence by noting that it is not in current use in the physical sciences, in contrast to its position in the social sciences. The chemist does not speak of the principles of chemistry, nor does the physicist refer to the principles of physics. In the early history of the natural sciences the term "principle" was commonly used to signify an original element. Thus Thales taught

that water was the principle of matter. The modern world of science, however, has almost abandoned the use of the term; the social sciences still make much writing in its image.

In order to seek a useful meaning for a word which in the literature of public administration seems at times to be meaningless, we may well begin with its standard connotations. Here we learn of the ancient origins of the word as well as three separate meanings. The term is used to indicate (1) an origin, source, or source of action; (2) a fundamental truth, law, or motive force; (3) a rudiment or element. Clearly writers in public administration use the second of these meanings; and their confusion is in part justified by two senses of this general signification. On the one hand, the *New English Dictionary* offers the definition, "a fundamental truth or proposition; a primary truth comprehending various subordinate truths; a general statement or tenet forming the (or a) ground of a system of thought; a fundamental assumption forming the basis of a chain of reasoning." Here the dominant note is truth, generality, primacy, comprehensiveness. But the *New English Dictionary* also gives a further meaning in these words: "A general law or rule adopted or professed as a guide to action; a settled ground or basis of conduct or practice; a fundamental motive or reason of action." Here the dominant note is not truth or primacy, but action—a standard accepted as a guide to action. These two meanings are obviously not synonymous, and might conceivably diverge to the point of contradiction.

Now American students of public administration have been par excellence advocates of action, rather than searchers for fundamental truths or propositions. The need for reform of the American system of public administration has been so urgent that most men interested in the field have thought it essential to busy themselves putting props under a shaky structure here and there, meanwhile anxiously watching other sagging beams and leaking cornices, rather than to survey the foundations on which a stronger structure might be erected.

Principles have become, in consequence, guides to action;

and so urgent has been the need for remedy that the soundness of the rule of action has often been asserted without respect to its essential validity or to its underlying consequences. By way of illustration, the commission form of municipal government, a plan which had merit from the point of view of popular control of public policy but which created an indefensible administrative organization, was proclaimed up and down the land in the days before the World War as a solution of the problem of city administration. Again by way of illustration, the program for an itemized budget and segregated appropriation act was assiduously cultivated by the leaders in the budget movement for years, going far thereby to destroy any real operating responsibility on the part of administrative officers and confusing appropriating bodies in general and in particular.

Principle in the sense of a guide to action may mean little or much. Everyone has some guide to action, more or less explicit; every official makes his discretionary decisions with some object in view which for the moment becomes his guide to action. He may be motivated by a hunch, by a snap judgment, by some personal behavior peculiarity, by association with or repugnance for other individuals or groups. These are real guides to action, as any observer of events will agree. They are not principles in the sense of fundamental truth or proposition, or even in the sense of a general rule professed as a guide to action.

Is it not possible to envisage a fruitful union of the two senses of the word "principle" to guide thinkers and writers and practitioners in the field of public administration? Would it not be desirable to restrict the use of the term to mean a hypothesis or proposition, so adequately tested by observation and/or experiment that it may intelligently be put forward as a guide to action or as a means of understanding? Without expecting experimental or laboratory verification as a *sine qua non*, would it not be desirable to understand that a principle implies (1) an original hypothesis, (2) adequate verification, and (3) in consequence the statement of a proposition possessing the quality

of generality and conforming to truth at least in the pragmatic sense? In such a sense a principle would be a safe guide for responsible students and leaders of public administration to suggest as a rule of action.

If principle may be thought of in terms of hypothesis and verification, then the frequency of its reference will be greatly reduced, but greatly defined. An intuition will be called an intuition and recognized as such—something personal, the outcome of a unique experiential history, but pointing perhaps to insight and truth. A hypothesis will be accepted as a formal statement of a possible relationship, not as the demonstration thereof. An opinion or an assertion, however positively set forth and persuasively supported, will be taken as an opinion, weighed with its author, and used for its real value rather than accepted as a principle. A dogma or doctrine will be viewed as an organized body of opinion, held by its proponents to be true and taught by its professors as truth to their disciples, but not necessarily as verified truth.

In this view, also, the unique event or the unique observation of the event will not suffice to proclaim a principle. The quality of generality must be given its due. It is easy to slip from the proposition that the merit system has broken down in city A to the general proposition that the merit system cannot be enforced in any large American municipality, without the intervening evidence of proof. As a hypothesis—a statement to be proved—the statement is possible; as a principle it can hardly pass muster.

This view of the meaning of principle was broadly that defended by Dr. Herman Finer at the round table alluded to on page 14. Dr. Finer expressed the opinion that "a principle is just a statement of a causal relationship: if you do *a*, then *b* follows." Later in the discussion he agreed with the restatement made by Dr. Arnold B. Hall: "The scientist will tell you that *a* follows *b*; he does not tell you whether or not it is good for *a* to follow *b*." He also indicated that none of these principles can be complete and finite. "Any attempt to discover a

completely and mathematically accurate principle of public administration is from the first doomed to absolute failure." With these observations we are in accord, but it hardly seems necessary to go as far as Dr. Finer suggested to use synonymously the terms "principle" and "law" in the scientific sense, since law still indicates to most people a certainty and precision of causal relationship which principle need not connote.

How then may a hypothesis in public administration be so adequately tested as to justify one to recommend it as a principle? Clearly the informed observation of the practitioners or the students of administration dealing with an adequate number of cases over a substantial period of time and a wide span of space, checked by discussion and a discerning discrimination, is a proper means of verification. If, for example, in a succession of cases here, there, and elsewhere it should happen repeatedly that the effort of a municipal executive to deal directly with more than a given number of subordinate officials fails, we may conclude that an original hypothesis as to the effective span of personal supervision by a superior over his subordinates has by demonstration acquired the status of a principle. We do not thereby proclaim the existence of a law, but we have announced a guide to action sufficiently verified to deserve responsible attention. The wider the observation and the more uniform the concurrence of results, the greater confidence will be attached to the principle.

Here the objection may be raised that it is impossible to state what degree of verification by observation suffices to warrant calling a proposition a principle. There may be no ascertained mathematical degree of verification which separates principle from non-principle. All we desire to insist upon here is that too many hopes, assertions, and opinions have been called principles, and that too few hypotheses have been subject to conscious verification in their making.

Observation of the practitioner is not the exclusive avenue of hypothesis verification. In some instances investigation and experiment may be resorted to; an exceedingly illuminating

case is the controlled experiment in the stimulation of voting reported by Dr. Harold F. Gosnell under the title *Getting Out the Vote*. Another illustration is found in the verification of certain hypotheses about the prestige value of public employment. Broadly speaking, a change in emphasis from merely descriptive studies of administration to those which seek significant hypotheses and then proceed to their verification would readily uncover many important avenues of inquiry.

For the sake of clarity, may it again be said that, in our view, principle must be understood to mean a hypothesis so adequately tested by observation and/or experiment that it may intelligently be put forward as a guide to action, or as a means of understanding. The framing of hypotheses may be undertaken by anyone with a fertile imagination, but their relevance is affected by a sense of reality on the part of the inquirer. The testing of hypotheses is an elaborate and often a difficult task, involving the painstaking collection of data, the analysis and arrangement of the data, and the statement of the precise generalization which may result from its study. The whole process is one redolent of the laboratory and the research bureau, rather than of the hurrying world of events; but, on the other hand, depth of insight in the formulation of hypotheses and understanding of the relevant data come from participation rather than from mere observation. Hence in recent social research the invention of the "participant-observer."

The history of government reveals a constant series of great figures who out of experience formulated hypotheses and came to personal convictions as to principles. Richelieu, Burke, Hamilton, John Stuart Mill, Charles Francis Adams, Lord Haldane, Graham Wallas, Henri Fayol—these are among the great names who in their day developed programs of public administration. Theirs was, however, essentially a personal divination, an intuition certainly not shared by all and not understood by many. That demonstration of validity and generality which must inherently carry conviction to others was absent. While, therefore, the importance of the rich contribution of

statesmen-administrators must be acknowledged, their contribution in the modern age of mass administration is no longer enough.

The great advance which the twentieth century is in way of making lies in the institutionalization, the depersonalization, of the testing of hypotheses in the establishment of principles. The personal declaration of conviction about principles, arising out of personal experience and reflection and essentially introspective in character, is giving way before the demonstration of principles based upon mass facts handled under conditions intended to neutralize the personality of the student of the facts.

Not, however, the discovery of hypotheses. This is essentially personal, although it may apparently spring out of conference or conflict as well as from the seclusion of the study. What would one not give for certain knowledge of the tangled web of circumstances from which sprang the insight into administration of Graham Wallas or Lord Haldane?

However, the verification, the testing, may be institutionalized to the advantage of principle. It is being institutionalized on a world-wide scale.

In Great Britain a brilliant suggestion by Lord Haldane, speaking in 1918 through the Machinery of Government Committee of the Reconstruction Ministry, outlined a national Ministry of Research which would have fulfilled essentially the function under examination. The Ministry would have been primarily an agency of co-ordination and guidance, but it would have been in a position to undertake research in administration of a fundamental character, testing the hypotheses which underlie the British system of administration. Unfortunately this new arm of government died still-born, a victim of retrenchment and economy.

The need remained great; and it has been fulfilled in part by the admirable initiative of the Society of Civil Servants, which in 1920 formed the Institute of Public Administration and later founded the *Journal of Public Administration*. Through the Institute the wisdom of the administrative experience of the

higher ranks of the civil service has found expression for over a decade, and in the discussions of its summer conferences much earnest and intelligent thought has been directed to the problems and principles of public administration.

Here again, however, the essential need for verification and testing has been urgently felt, and the unreliability of personal conviction has been understood. Recently the Institute has commenced to institutionalize its search for principle, securing a research fund and embarking upon a formal program looking toward the testing of hypotheses.

In Geneva the International Scientific Management Institute, organized in the first instance to spread the doctrine of scientific management in industry, was at the point of launching a program of research into principles of public administration when it was overcome (in 1934) by the fall in value of its American contributions. The inquiries of the director, Major L. Urwick, into the pure theory of organization, are a brilliant sample of future work to be realized.

The task of discovering principles of public administration is also the objective of the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration in Budapest, presided over by an eminent civil-servant professor, Dr. Zoltan Magyary. In Berlin the Deutsches Institut für wirtschaftliche Arbeit in der öffentlichen Verwaltung sought in a concrete way to apply principles of organization to the daily operations of public offices. In the realm of national administration the Institut International des Sciences Administratives, whose headquarters are in Brussels, is developing through a preliminary stage of exploration and discussion to a more mature phase of the search for principle.

In the United States the most significant effort in the search for principles is that of the Taylor Society, representing the scientific management movement. Substantial work has also been done by the American Management Association and by other management groups.

Side by side with these groups are two other types of active organizations: on the one hand, the bureaus of municipal and

governmental research, an American invention now scattered as widely as Japan and Ireland; and on the other hand, the service-informational agencies such as the International Union of Cities and its far-flung associated national unions and leagues of cities, Public Administration Clearing House, and the Interstate Legislative Reference Library.

Without exception these and other similar agencies are products of the twentieth century. Collectively they represent a world-wide movement which seeks the strength of co-ordinated effort in the difficult search for underlying working hypotheses in government and administration. The same movement may be discerned in the great American universities, where social science institutes or councils have sprung into existence since 1920 to plan co-ordinated inquiries into the manifold problems of human behavior, including the problems of public administration.

On a world-view all this signifies a profound modification of the technique of identifying and using principles in administration. The first German analysis of public office in modern times is said to be the book written in 1665 by Ludwig von Seckendorff, *Teutscher Fürsten Stat.* No systematic analysis of the British system of administration has yet been produced, and only within the last fifteen years has the effort to present systematic studies of the American system as a whole been undertaken. New resources, literally on an unexampled scale, place students of administration and practitioners in a fortunate position for the development of their art and their science.

All these broad vistas open into a world which at first thought may seem to be not only indifferent but hostile. Amid the clash of armed forces, the tumult of revolution, and the economic competition of nations where is the haven for principles in public administration? True it is that the free search for truth suffers grievous handicaps in many quarters of the globe; it is equally true that every state imperatively requires an organized public administration, and however revolutionary

in origin or radical in purpose, needs as strong and intelligent an administration as can be devised.

It is significant to remember that it was Lenin who favored the introduction of scientific management—an invention of an American engineer—into the Russian state enterprises. It is significant to recall that the symbol of success widely memorialized in Fascist Italy is the prompt running of the trains. It is significant to realize that, despite the Nazification of the German public service, the National Socialist dictator is welding a stronger national bureaucracy than any which Germany has yet possessed. Nor is it without significance that doubts for the success of the New Deal in America largely turn on the issue of administrative competence.

A principle, considered as tested hypothesis and applied in the light of its appropriate frame of reference, is as useful a guide to action in the public administration of Russia as of Great Britain, of Irak as of the United States. True, administrators cannot always await the search for principles before deciding upon action; true, also, that even where experience or experiment make clear the principle, administration may close its eyes to discovered truth; but in the long run practical recognition of principles is not easily avoided. New agencies and techniques for the discovery and dissemination of principles in public administration may well mark the twentieth century as the first in which this phase of government emerged from the twilight into the consciousness of society.

III

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By JOHN M. GAUS

THE Romans had a word for it; they needed the word—and the fact—in their business of empire. Murray informs us in his *Dictionary* that the English attach to the word “responsible” such meanings as “answerable,” “accountable,” “liable to be called to account”; or, “capable of fulfilling an obligation or contract,” “trustworthy.” An earlier, now obsolete meaning, was the use of the word for “corresponding to,” as when one might speak of a death “responsible to” the crime. Those interested in politics may note that the first application of the term in English to political affairs is found by Murray in the writings of Hamilton (*The Federalist*) and Burke (*The Regicide Peace*). Their period was indeed one in which conceptions of political responsibility were being forged. They were not least among the craftsmen engaged in that enterprise.

The relationship which the word would convey is of the essence of government. For government is an act; a bridge is built, a road surveyed, a thief punished, a dispute adjudicated. The person doing this, the public officer, is doing it as an instrument of something or someone—a law, a superior officer with authority to command him. Even though he act wilfully, even though he may be a “dictator,” yet, unless he is a madman (and thus beyond the patterns of conduct of a political society), his act is related to other acts; it is not isolated; it conforms to some purpose. And thus even here we find it must be appraised in terms of a system or program which the man himself may have established, but which is conditioned by the surrounding factors of which he must take account if he would obtain his end.

There is in the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago a replica of a monolith now in the Louvre, but excavated at Susa, in Persia, whence it was taken from its Babylonian origin by a victorious king. This monolith has carved upon its face the Code of Hammurabi, of the First Dynasty of Babylon—about 2000 B.C. Above the code is carved a relief picturing Hammurabi receiving from the Sun-God Shamash, the great judge of heaven and earth, the command to establish just and righteous laws. The earliest conception of political responsibility is well symbolized by this record, paralleling as it does the Jewish tradition of the handing down to Moses by Yahweh of the laws by which Israel was to be governed. Somewhere in the ultimate wisdom of God was to be found the absolute code, the fixed standard, which the ruler was to follow. Irresponsible to the people of the nation, yet responsible to God—here clearly was a recognition of the fact that government is not a matter of the private whim of the wielder of force and power, but of regular and consistent principle.

Yet the inadequacy of such a conception of responsibility is obvious. Responsibility is accountability; but who, under such conditions, could call power to account? Is God's will always so clear? Should not, then, His vicar interpret Him? But can one be sure that the vicar is correct in his interpretation?

From the Roman republic came the idea, founded upon actual institutions and practices of the simpler city-state, that political responsibility to the people of the republic was enjoined upon the administrator. This latter idea continued to be held, in theory, by the Emperors. We must remember that while Ulpian had written that what pleases the ruler has the force of law, he has also added—what is sometimes forgotten—that this is because the people have intrusted authority to him.

The rise of the Papacy seemed to provide the means whereby the responsibility of the ruler for the exercise of his powers might be enforced. From the tribal laws of the barbarians, also, there was derived the principle that the customary law was superior to the ruler—that he could not change it by his

own choice. Government was associated with land and status; and while a vague authority to rule was attached to kingship, this authority could not rightfully invade the customary rights of the citizen in his property. Thus feudal custom and the ecclesiastical interpretation of fundamental justice were limitations upon the exercise of power by rulers. McIlwain asserts that the Middle Ages would have no absolute monarchs and that the political relationships of the period are well summarized in the statement, "government was limited, in modern times it is also controlled."

The new national state challenged both church and feudalism. Neither the international systems of the Papacy and the Empire, nor the local and circumscribed feudal system, gave adequate political expression to the rising middle class of the towns. It formed the basis, in part, of a new political system, in which the geographic unit was the national state, and in which political authority crystallized about an aggressive dynasty through marriage, conquest, election, and diplomacy. These dynasties rounded out land holdings roughly coterminous with the growing national sentiment, and, indeed, partly created that sentiment through the administrative services developed in the royal household. They were superior to the other systems of government of their time in supplying the kind of administration desired by their people and appropriate to the developing technology. Broadly speaking, these early monarchies had a sense of responsibility to the new national interest. Their early battles were waged with ecclesiastical or feudal groups, which sought to limit or destroy their authority. Out of these conflicts there developed the conception of sovereignty characterizing the modern national state. On the one hand, in order to destroy any basis which might justify intervention from without, it was held that the monarch—and consequently the state of which he was the head—was completely independent of any external authority. He derived his authority directly from God without the mediation of any person claiming to represent God on earth. On the

other hand, the monarch—and again, consequently, the state—claimed complete authority over groups within the state. This concept of the state, which was developed by the *Politiques* in France and by those with somewhat similar objectives in England and the other states of Europe, did seem, on the face of it, to destroy the idea of responsibility completely. Examined more thoroughly, we find that the ruler is justified in exercising this sovereign power only in so far as he rules on behalf of the nation. There developed actual institutions whereby this vague responsibility might be given concrete enforcement.

This development had two major forms. First, there was a persistent effort to bring the major administrative officials and advisers of the monarch under the control of the dominant groups in the nation, in order to prevent any considerable exercise of discretion by the monarch. The administration emerged from the king's private household and became the public offices of the state. The Great Seal "goes out of Court." A guild spirit develops. Responsibility for administration becomes one of the major stakes of domestic political strife as governmental services become public.

Next, the activities of these officials, protected at first by the concept of the sovereign power of the ruler and the theory that they were his private servants, are brought within the review of the courts in which the traditional and customary law, long held to be fundamental and beyond the power of rulers to change, was administered. Even where the actions of these officials were removed from review by the ordinary courts, there was established some special procedure whereby they might be reviewed to prevent abuse of power, or in order to secure more substantial justice. Thus on the Continent special administrative courts for restraining the discretionary power of administrative officials, and for awarding adequate damages in the event of injury to the citizen, developed despite (perhaps because of) the absence of a political control through the responsibility of the chief administrative officials to a representative legislature. The English, after destroying those courts in

which a kind of administrative law had been evolved, developed their characteristic doctrine of the responsibility of the public official to the ordinary courts. The political supplement to this, achieved through revolution and evolution, was the political responsibility of administration to the legislature.

The contribution of the United States to the idea of responsibility in administration was made by requiring the chief executive—and later, many minor executives—to submit directly or indirectly to popular vote. At the time of the Revolution and of the Constitution-making which the Revolution made necessary, the responsibility of the major executive officials to the legislature in the older states of Europe, including Great Britain, was not yet established. Indeed, in the very decade of the Revolution, Edmund Burke, in his *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*, was describing for the first time a consistent theory of party government in which the responsibility for the direction of administration is vested in the leaders of the majority party of the legislature. When the American leaders rejected the responsibility of their governments to the King of England, they did not transfer the responsibility of the executive to the new legislatures which were set up. Thus we developed a kind of triple responsibility in our administration. It is viewed as responsibility to the people through the elective chief executive. It is also responsible to the ordinary courts for observing both procedural and substantive requirements of the fundamental constitutional law and of the statutory law, through which the administration is established and empowered to act. It is responsible also to the legislature for the proper use of the powers conferred upon it by the legislature through statutes, and for the proper expenditure of the money granted to it by legislative act. Whereas responsibility to the people is enforced through elections, and to the courts through judicial review, secured through various forms of procedure, the responsibility to the legislature, although not so obvious and complete as in the forms of the cabinet system which have evolved in Europe, particularly in France and

England, is nevertheless enforced through financial measures and control of the establishment and organization of administration by statutes, through legislative investigations, and through the confirmation of appointees.

The rise of the party system has added a further complication. While in theory it may be held that popular election of a chief executive makes the administration responsible to the people directly, and indirectly also that responsibility is enforced through the action of the legislature in law-making and other forms of control, actually the immediate master is a party or a factional machine. This situation is similar to that in the medieval system when a theoretical responsibility of the government to God was actually enforced—when it was enforced—by an interested Papacy.

Nor is this the only complexity. The responsibility of an individual civil servant to the hierarchy of his superiors—to the legislature, to the courts, to citizens generally—is confused. Are the particular acts called into question in a particular dispute discretionary or ministerial? Does the issue involve a political question? Does the public servant hold an office or an employment? Is he personally liable for a tort, or is his employer, the state? Is the function which he is performing governmental or proprietary? While the French administrative tribunals have developed a case law in which these issues have been given some definition, our own law, at least, is complex and confused.

Thus, the concept of the responsibility of public administration after this development of the centuries is not clear-cut and consistent. The characteristic functions of government today are such that neither the electorate nor the legislature can express in concrete detail the specific policy which it desires the administrative organization to enforce. Suppose, for example, we wish to regulate the movies or the radio in the interest of public morals. Neither the electorate nor the legislature can anticipate the kind of situation for which detailed provision should be made. If we assume that it will, at least, be possible

to submit the action of the administration to a judicial review, we are met with fresh difficulties. Neither the electorate nor the legislature in their desire to regulate the movies in the interest of public morals can go much beyond fixing a general principle which is to be applied to all specific cases by an administrative staff which will preview every movie which the producers wish to present to the public. If these producers feel aggrieved at what they believe to be an abuse of this discretionary authority given by the electorate and the legislature to the administrative officials, the theory is that they may appeal to the courts for a review of the decision. If the power delegated to the administrative authority is too general, the theory is that it may be attacked as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive.

But what, actually, do we find? Confronted with this situation, with the claim that the general principle laid down in the statute is so broad that it practically confers legislative power, the Supreme Court has held, through one of its members, that in any event such general principles must get their meaning from "the sense and experience of men." Thus one may ask again what responsibility the administrator has today in view of the relinquishment by electorate, legislature, and court, at so many points, of the power and the function of determining or defining policy. While recent decisions of the courts have challenged this trend, the nature of our problems of government prevent its reversal.

Indeed, it is hardly desirable or possible for the electorate to determine policy except in the most general way and on the most infrequent occasion. At best it can only indicate which of various competing political leaders it would prefer to place in office over a period of time. This means that so far as the responsibility of the administration to the electorate is concerned, it will at best be vague. At the next election the electorate will have a general notion as to whether or not the administration of the public business during the preceding electoral period has, on the whole, been acceptable as compared to what it might be

under the alternative rival leadership during the next electoral period. We choose the ins or the outs. There is here an element of responsibility which is not to be ignored, and which must remain an essential attribute of any system of representative government. Yet it will be agreed that this form of responsibility is, nevertheless, very general and, on the whole, clumsy unless other forms of responsibility are developed whereby the ultimate responsibility of the great mass of public servants to the state as a whole can be made vivid and effective.

Legislatures are in a more effective position for giving content and meaning to the responsibility which the Constitution vests in them. There is general agreement among students of administration that generally legislatures have done far more harm than good by too detailed control of the organization of administration. Legislatures have been forced, from the nature of the problems concerning which they legislate, to confer wide discretion upon the administration in the enforcement of statutes. This has been true, regardless of the political party controlling the legislature or of the cultural complexion of the state. It was during the Harding administration, for example, that Congress conferred upon the President the power to raise or lower tariff rates upon the advice of the Tariff Commission, in accordance with changes in the differences of the cost of production between the United States and any foreign country. One does not need to be a trained economist to know that differences in cost of production are not so clear-cut as to offer a usable standard that can be impartially applied. Within the past few years similar wide discretionary authority over tariffs has been conferred upon a British administrative agency. In 1934 the Reciprocal Tariff Act gave a Democratic president powers to make international tariff agreements. In both countries, in other words, the legislatures without regard to party have turned over to the executive a wide range of power to change taxes—the power which historically they wrested from the executive at the cost of civil war. This policy is even more striking in the many fields of governmental regulation forced

by scientific and technological developments. With every increase in governmental intervention in the past hundred years it has been necessary to develop a form of intervention in which emphasis might be placed upon a sensitive and flexible adjustment of a general principle laid down in the statute to the peculiar circumstances of a trade, a locality, or other contingent and differentiating factors. Thus, the responsibility of administration to the legislature, while not so vague as toward the electorate, is nevertheless best confined to general policy, and it is the specific application after all which really counts with the average citizen affected by the enforcement of the law in question.

Time has dealt harshly not only with the responsibility of the administration to the electorate and to the legislature. It has laid an unholy hand upon responsibility to the courts as well. Indeed, certain administrative agencies have been established for the purpose of avoiding the inadequacies of judicial treatment of the problems concerned, and we are likely to see more of this transfer. There is, for example, the development of such special administrative agencies as those dealing with the problem of industrial accidents. Probably we shall have a development of administrative agencies which will replace the work of the courts in dealing with automobile accidents and traffic problems generally. The advantage of administrative treatment of certain questions (already forced by technological developments, as in transportation) would be rendered impossible if controversial cases were to be reopened *de novo* by the courts generally. Should this occur, as was pointed out by one harassed member of the United States Supreme Court, "the wheels of government would be stopped." It is, indeed, because we wish to have the advantage of the special knowledge of experience of experts, and the simplicity and economy of investigation and procedure of the administrative agency, that we have turned over many problems of regulation to the new administrative tribunals. Thus there has grown up a wide area of discretion in which finality of decision by the adminis-

trative authority is accepted. The courts may, on occasion, indeed, intervene, to "try the trial." They may intervene from time to time to substitute their judgment as to what the law requires in the way of factors in valuation or appraisal generally, of which the administrator must take account. But in the day-to-day work of most administrative agencies the administrative decision is likely to be final.

But why, it may be asked, does the problem of administrative discretion concern us in our inquiry into administrative responsibility? The connection between these two aspects of administration is very clear when we examine such an argument as that advanced by Brand Whitlock in his discussion of *The Enforcement of Law in Cities*. In that little book the former mayor of Toledo discusses the difficult problem of the enforcement of laws which may conflict with customary views concerning alcoholic drink and Sunday observance. As a matter of fact and of common observance, we know that policies of enforcement of such legislation vary widely within a single political area, under different administrators. To whom is the administrator responsible in this situation? The assumption is that he is not responsible to the legislative authority since this very flexibility in the application of the statute is applauded. If we then say that he is responsible to the electorate, we are only confronted with the question, what portion of the electorate? And if we say, finally, that he is, in any event, responsible to the courts in this matter, we are met again with a wide range of attitudes taken by and through the courts, which, indeed, try to avoid this issue by withdrawing from their jurisdiction those questions which they conveniently designate as "political." We find that problems of discretion and of responsibility are intermingled from the very beginnings of public administration in the modern national state.

It was the very fact of the wide discretionary power first exercised by the employees in the king's household which led to an effort to control their selection, and hence their use of the great seals of state, by jealous and rival powers among the

feudal barons or the high officials of the church. On the whole, the monarchy was victorious in this struggle until the time when a powerful government had helped to bring into existence, through its administrative services and its furthering of a national instead of a local sentiment, a reasonably orderly and unified national state. But it accomplished this, in part, through inspiring and instigating the development of local and central judicial and legislative institutions, through which members of the middle class could be recruited as an offset to the feudal and ecclesiastical nobility. There came a time, as we know, in the English revolutions of the seventeenth century and the French Revolution of the eighteenth century when the control of the discretionary powers of the administrative organization was desired by this middle class. It established that control through the devices of cabinet and ministerial responsibility, or by popular election whereby the administration was made ultimately dependent upon the legislative or the electorate.

It should be noticed here that the administrative hierarchy, which had developed under the powerful monarchy, with the passage of time was not servilely dependent upon and responsible to the monarch as a person. One of the most striking aspects of this development of public administration that warrants pondering at the present time is the steady professionalization of the civil service, the development of a guild of administrators, of special courses of study such as that in "Dictamen" at Bologna or those offered in "Camerarism" in the German universities. It is true, however, that from the latter Middle Ages down to the nineteenth century there is a general shift in the responsibility of administration from the monarch to the dominant party in the legislature and the electorate in the effort to circumscribe the range of discretion to be exercised in the business of government.

Perhaps the most striking example of these intermingling problems of discretion and responsibility to be found is offered by the National Industrial Recovery Act and Administration.

At best, the Act was the expression on the part of legislators of a general intent to permit industries to organize for the purpose of fixing a minimum plane of competition so far as hours, wages, and competitive trade practices are concerned, with the object of protecting and enlarging the consuming power of the mass of people in this country. This objective was to be viewed in the light of two other factors: first, the provision in the same Act of a public works program aimed at stimulating re-employment and thus also aiding in creating consuming power; and second, the agricultural relief program, which inevitably involved a rise in the price of the cost of living. Having indicated a general objective and equally general measures for establishing the principle of the right to collective bargaining on the one hand, and the right to the protection of the consumer from monopolistic practices on the other, the President was then left with a very wide discretionary power to enforce the Act—a discretion too wide, indeed, to survive the scrutiny of the Supreme Court. To whom, then, was the National Recovery Administration responsible, or, should one rather ask, to what? Certain administrative devices employed are worth noting, despite the collapse of the entire structure. There were established, within the administration and as an integral part of it, the Industrial Advisory Board, representative of management, the Labor Advisory Board, representative of organized labor, and the Consumers' Advisory Board, representative of the interest of consumers. After criticism by members of the Senate, still another agency, representative of the smaller units in industry and business, was established.

In a state in which the powers of government intermesh widely with those of industry, commerce, and finance the traditional restraints upon the discretion of the administrator through making him responsible to the electorate, the courts, and the legislators are inadequate. The injurious policy or action is taken long before review can attempt to undo the damage. It is only by having the interest which might be injured present and on the spot when the policy is determined

and the action taken that substantial justice can be secured. And even more significant is the fact that increasingly public administration concerns itself directly with seeing that that interest is organized, so that it may resist coercion. Labor is given the right to organize, and the state polices the election in order to safeguard its fairness. The state has had to create consumer organization, hitherto non-existent, and has drawn upon the small number of those who have concerned themselves with the consumer's interest and point of view and associated them with the day-to-day administration. Thus, in the end, we find this fundamental problem of the formulation of policy out of the clash of group interests and their reconciliation woven into the fabric of administration because of the inadequacy of traditional forms of securing administrative responsibility.

The effort to establish within the National Recovery Administration agencies whereby the interest groups directly affected may be consulted and the administrators reminded of their responsibilities to them is not, of course, the only example of this effort to solve the problem of responsibility. In a valuable review of the employment of private associations and interest groups and their representatives in collaboration with public administration Lane Lancaster remarks that

much of our public administration is conditioned by the attitude of so-called private associations in fact a substantial portion is actually conducted by such organizations. . . . The work of society is in reality the task of a collaboration; it is not accomplished by "public" agencies if, in using that term, we carry in our minds notions of sovereign commands and willy-nilly complicity. And a realistic view of the administrative machinery of a state reveals not an official group on the one side and an obedient public on the other, but a situation in which the community in its helplessness turns to those with competence and confirms, by making them officials, a social responsibility which is not in fact increased by the conferring of an official status.

This method of creating standards and policies to "fill in the gaps" in statutes is akin to the "creative experience" which Miss Follett emphasized as the essence of productive adminis-

tration, and which led her to a view of "authority as illusory." Authority, in short, follows the successful exercise of function; the rôle of the administrator is to achieve a reconciliation of the interests involved, and requires the winning of consent by the accumulation of exact and relevant knowledge.

In tracing these institutional changes I may seem to have lost sight of the lone civil servant upon whom, in the last analysis, responsibility falls. If, out of necessity, there has developed so wide a measure of discretionary power for an administrative organization, what has been his fate? Does this discretion fall to him, and, if so, to whom is he responsible? Traditionally and legally he has been responsible to his superior officer and to the law. But here, again, there is a tendency to make the political head dependent upon his staff, as the nature of the problems increasingly require for their solution an experience and training which the political head rarely possesses. Just as administration has been invaded by the interest group in order to secure an effective responsibility to the knowledge and experience of the groups most affected, so the individual civil servant is at last wondering whether he may not need some protection in an organized way for the responsibility which his knowledge and professional training place upon him. The responsibility of the civil servant to the standards of his profession, in so far as those standards make for the public interest, may be given official recognition. Thus, through his superior officer and through the consultative committees of interest groups associated with his department, his responsibility to the electorate and legislature is enforced; while, through some organization representative of the civil servants and of the professional groups from which they are recruited, his responsibility to a profession is also given recognition.

In recent years a combat has been waged in various literary journals in the United States between various factions over the use of the term "humanism." One aggressive band, upholding its own style of humanism, employed the term, "the inner check." Without committing ourselves to any position in the

literary struggle we may, at least, borrow this term for application in the present discussion. Certainly in the system of government which is now emerging, one important kind of responsibility will be that which the individual civil servant recognizes as due to the standards and ideals of his profession. This is his "inner check." This is not so new or rare an attitude as the average person might seem to suppose. More than a quarter of a century ago John R. Commons pointed out, in a discussion of "Unions of Public Employees," that, in this country, with universal suffrage, the workingman in public employment does not need to strike. He forms a clique and goes in with the politicians. He has the suffrage. We cannot get away from organization. These employees will organize, in one way or another. The real solution is, not to try to destroy the organizations of public servants, but to give them official recognition, to give them a part in the administration of the department, and then to hold them to that responsibility.

An illustration, which Professor Commons is able to supply from the Seth Low administration in New York City, is the valuable co-operation in improvements in administration achieved through the organization of the Street Cleaning employees, encouraged by Colonel George Waring, the distinguished engineer appointed to the Commissionership. Through the ten members of the Board of Conference, which included five executive bureau chiefs and five spokesmen chosen by the organization of the employees, over eleven hundred grievances, which ordinarily would have been the materials from which the local factional boss would develop an irresponsible organization, were dealt with through a procedure which stimulated a new and creative attitude on the part of the civil servants toward their work. One is inclined to agree with Professor Commons' statement, "I consider that this invention of Commissioner Waring in the Street Cleaning Department of New York is the most important practical contribution that has been made to Civil Service reform in a democratic government." The statement of employment policy adopted by the Tennessee Valley Authority is a recent illustration of the same principle.

During the past twenty-five years we find many other indications of the growth of this new type of responsibility in public administration. There is, for example, the rise of new professions such as that of social work. The American Association of Social Workers has for many years fought to raise the standards of training, recruitment, and working conditions of social workers throughout the United States. A relatively new profession of this kind is peculiarly dependent upon the "inner check" of the pride of its members in undertaking pioneer work and developing, of their own initiative, higher standards of all kinds, because the general public and its average representatives on a lay board or legislature are likely to have very little knowledge of the possibilities and conditions in this field. Equally striking is the rise of such organized efforts at improving administration from within as the many state leagues of municipalities now federated into the American Municipal Association, the International City Managers' Association, and kindred groups; or the valuable co-operation in improvement of administration that is achieved by the United States Public Health Service, through its joint conferences and exchange of research and information through publications and other means with the state and local public health officers.

The great improvements of the past fifteen years in personnel administration in the federal government are largely due to the efforts of the National Federation of Federal Employees, under the intelligent leadership of its president, Luther Steward. In the development of its program it has employed as expert advisers outstanding men in the field of personnel administration—men who thirty years ago could have made their knowledge and public spirit available only through the somewhat sporadic reform organizations. Throughout the country the professional organizations of public servants of the kind mentioned above are similarly working in close association with university departments of political science and with governmental research organizations in the effort to improve the quality of administration and to introduce the note of re-

search, inquiry, and self-examination into the day-to-day life of the public servant. In Great Britain the development of the Institute of Public Administration and of the National Association of Local Government Officers, allowing for the differences in national culture and the political system generally, are equally significant. Substantial achievements in public administration in Germany and the Scandinavian countries reflected in a similar development of responsibility to the standards of the administrative profession may also be cited. In the new administration, marked by the necessarily wide discretionary power left to the political chief and the professional civil servant, the responsibility of the civil servant to the ideal of professional obligation must now be put alongside political and constitutional responsibility as one of the safeguards of the public interest.

We have by no means reached the limits of possibility of experimentation in the older types of responsibility. Indeed, we are only beginning to study carefully questions of public opinion and problems of political responsibility generally. Much more effective methods and instruments of civic education and political control are needed as administrative discretion increases. It may be that in the United States, for example, we may find it desirable to return to the system of party and political responsibility of the period prior to Jackson, in which party organization was found in the members of the party having membership in elective legislative and executive positions; that is, those possessing responsibility with legal power to make that responsibility good in actual legislation and administration. Such a division of party organization would be an improvement over the present convention system, and one could retain the use of a primary election as a means of general control over the personnel selected to represent the party in these posts. This would meet the legitimate criticisms aimed at the perhaps overcircumscribed and rigid governing class which the party conventions displaced, yet it would avoid the even more serious aspects of irresponsibility.

bility because of complicated convention and committee arrangements within the party, which the Jacksonian movement introduced. Also, we could undoubtedly improve greatly the relations between the administration and the legislature in the direction of clarifying their respective shares of responsibility. Those of us who have been, perhaps, unduly critical of our own system may well note that parliamentary countries are also dissatisfied on this point. The late Senator Bronson Cutting proposed, at the Progressive Conference held in Washington in 1931, that in view of the wide delegation of power by Congress to administrative agencies, there should be established a continuing joint committee of Congress for the purpose of watching the application of these general provisions by administrative authorities. This and other detailed proposals that might be mentioned have much value. They would reduce the risks of narrow and selfish professionalism in the civil service.

There are possible developments in the field of judicial review whereby the responsibility of the civil servant and the administrative department respectively, or of the state, may be clarified either by the ordinary courts or by special administrative tribunals. I refer only briefly to these matters, not because I think them unimportant, but rather because I feel that it is in the attitude of the civil servant as an individual toward his work and his profession, as an integral part of the complex society gradually taking form before our eyes, that the most important aspect of responsibility is to be explored in this period of the development of the state.

The note of a corporate sense pervading the whole administrative organization is to be found not only in government as the term is usually employed, but also in the supplementary governments and civil services of business and industry, particularly where internal pressures of participating groups have been given regular and stable channels through which to be registered and adjusted. Jennie Turner, in her discussion of "Democracy in Administration" has emphasized this, as have

Commons, Perlman, and other students of economic institutions. Just as the officials in the medieval chancery developed into something of a guild, thus limiting the arbitrary discretion of king or minister, so the machinery of negotiation over hours, wages, and conditions of work in the clothing industry, for example, elevates the casual relationship of employer and employee into something of the public status of persons engaged in the responsible conduct of joint enterprise which has public implications. "The state is as its officials are," says Dewey. The fact of being an official has its own overtones. They may be detected, also, in an interdependent economy and society wherever some stability and security, some stake in a kind of property right to a job properly done, have developed. Unless this sense of responsibility is encouraged, the responsibility of administration is incomplete, negative, and external.

I think that it is not altogether fanciful to look upon this movement as in line with the great tradition of administration in the earlier period. I think that Pierre du Bois or William of Wykeham would have understood and have approved the work of contemporary public servants in the Interstate Commerce Commission, a municipal park board, or a state public health department, and I am struck by the presence, in the new and valuable *Dictionary of American Biography*, of the sketches of so large a number of men and women whose inventive and creative work was done in and through the public service. Let us hope that this "usable past" is evidence of a rich future in which the public servant will be responsible to American society in part through his responsibility to the ideals and achievements of his own profession.

IV

THE RÔLE OF DISCRETION IN MODERN ADMINISTRATION

BY MARSHALL E. DIMOCK

IN MOST of the countries of the world administrative discretion has increased rapidly in scope and in importance. "Administrative discretion," as Laski has said, "is of the essence of the modern State." The history of modern government reveals the successive transference of discretionary power from legislature to judiciary to administration. This is not to suggest that there has been an absolute relinquishment of discretionary power as between the three departments of government. Discretion is common to all activities and agencies of the state. The transference which has been referred to, therefore, applies to the relations of one focus of discretion to another. In short, the discretionary power of administrative officials has grown relatively to that of courts and legislatures. This historic process is in line with Dean Pound's observation with reference to institutional developments in the United States. In his address to the American Bar Association in 1919, Pound said:

In the beginning of our political history the legislative department was the leader. . . . Next for a time, and notably from the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the first decade of the present century, the courts achieved a definite leadership. . . . The hegemony of the executive is at hand. As the eighteenth century and the forepart of the nineteenth century relied upon the legislature and the last half of the nineteenth century relied upon the courts, the twentieth century is no less clearly relying upon administration.

The passing of skeleton legislation has become the order of the day in the United States, particularly since the "recovery" administration of President Roosevelt. Recent judicial set-

backs, such as the Supreme Court decisions relative to the National Recovery Administration and the conservation of petroleum, although curtailing executive discretion in important instances, are exceptions to the advance on a broad front. The evolution of American government has been "from generic legislation to administrative power to carry such legislation into effect by specific requirements." Administrative officials are not only empowered to fill in the details of general laws, but increasingly they have been given permissive power—authority which may or may not be used, depending upon future circumstances. Hence, within the realm of higher policy, as well as within the field of day-to-day administration, official discretion has grown rapidly in recent years. It is not surprising, therefore, that actual practice has outstripped the theoretical formulations of the courts.

There is clearly a need for reconsidering the historical assumptions which have heretofore delimited the field of administrative discretion. Old theories must be brought up to date, even if this means the creation of new formulas. Any analysis of the meaning and nature of discretion is bound to raise some fundamental questions, such as the modern meaning attached to law and to the doctrine of separation of powers, as well as to the relative competence in certain circumstances of the judicial and the administrative departments of government. Administrative discretion, an elusive subject, needs to be treated with the utmost realism.

The term "discretion" is used in two different senses. Frequently it suggests prudence, discernment, judgment—what may be called self-limitation. Again, the word clearly conveys the meaning of liberty to choose between alternatives—suggesting the presence of an outside umpire who fixes the rules and sees that they are observed. It is in this latter, technical sense that the question of a lawful discretion usually arises before courts of law. This is only natural, because the ordinary act involving the exercise of judgment or choice never comes to the attention of anyone except those immediately affected;

ordinarily it is only when the courts step in that we pay any particular attention to discretion. Discretionary acts of the "garden-variety" type occur so frequently and so naturally that we usually give them little consideration. Yet, from the standpoint of the administrator, these undisputed exercises of discretion are of the most vital importance—of greater practical significance than the precedents established by the courts. In order to get a realistic view of discretion, we must see the whole picture—including the unnoticed species of discretion as well as the kind that attracts popular attention. Heretofore, discretion has been viewed through the lawyer's eyes; let us try to observe it from the perspective of the administrator as well.

Various levels of discretion may be distinguished, depending primarily upon the type of public business being conducted; there may be said to be routine, emergency, control, and social-conflict situations which call into being discretionary power. There is nothing final or inescapable about this suggested classification of discretionary situations, but it does seem to cover the principal types of administrative activity fairly well.

The most common level of administrative discretion is that which is tied up with routine duties. Where the service is a large one and relations with the public are very close, as, for example, in the postal service, the number of discretionary problems arising in the daily routine is naturally very large. The postal clerk, in scores of cases arising each day, must decide whether letters are on the point of being, or are actually, overweight. His experience and skill guide him in deciding which letters should be weighed. In this case discretion is a matter of long experience, amounting almost to intuition. Where it is possible and practicable to do so, rules are usually laid down, but minor discretions inevitably remain.

Frequently minor discretions are matters of common sense, convenience, or courtesy. What to do about a misdirected letter is an example in point. When a postal carrier is certain that no person by the name indicated at the given address actually resides there, he may simply drop the letter in the

mailbox and leave any further action to the householder. In metropolitan areas, where postmen have large routes and people live in apartments, such action is normal and probably necessary. In other postal jurisdictions, however, the postman may ring the occupant's door bell and inquire concerning the proper disposition of the misdirected letter. In such cases the delivery man usually has more knowledge of the people on his route, and other circumstances make inquiry practicable. Now if the postal authorities should decide that inquiries at the time of delivery save time and administrative expense, a general ruling might be laid down, and then the field of discretion would be more circumscribed. Discretion sometimes leads to experiment; improved practices may follow; and the final result may be a new rule.

In the second type of discretionary situation which we have distinguished, namely, the emergency matter, the necessity and freedom of administrative discretion are more clearly recognized than in any other case. Under the general head of emergency situations are included such acts as the establishment of quarantines, the destruction of diseased cattle, the demolition of unsafe buildings, the razing of adjoining buildings in case of serious fires, and the establishment of martial law. Emergency powers almost invariably involve public safety, and frequently they are also concerned with the protection of health and property.

In emergency situations speed is of the essence of the matter. Hence a combination of experience, instinct, and judgment may be the only restraint upon the official in determining upon a course of action. In the initial stage of the proceeding, at any rate, the only check is an administrative one—the supervision and control of the officer's superior. In many instances this type of control is possible, as, for example, when a building inspector considers necessary the demolition of a building, or when the discovery of a hoof-and-mouth disease calls for a state-wide quarantine and the slaughtering of infected cattle. But the individual's judgment is controlling in most emergency

situations; it must be if the public is to be protected. If the hand of the administration could be stayed by an affected individual's appeal to the courts, prior to the execution of an emergency measure, society would soon seriously suffer and the police functions of the state would become demoralized. Hence, as a rule, court proceedings have wisely been permitted only after the emergency act and then, generally, the question of liability has been confined to matters of jurisdiction and law as distinguished from questions of discretion and fact.

A third field of administrative discretion encompasses what may be called "control" situations. Examples of administrative powers arising in this field are the licensing of stores and professions and the inspection of businesses and factories. As a subsection in the same category may be included control situations within the framework of the government itself—cases involving the dismissal or disciplining of employees, for example. Needless to say, these aspects of governmental housekeeping—financial as well as personnel controls—involve frequent and important manifestations of discretionary power. As a matter of fact, it would be possible to classify discretionary powers into those which are internal and those which are external.

In the field of licensing and inspection a large degree of discretion is necessary and permissible. These governmental functions involve the granting of privileges, the protection of safety and health, and the maintenance of minimum standards. Naturally, then, a choice between alternatives and the development of administrative standards are essential parts of the process of effective administration. The question of fact involved in the "reasonable cleanliness" of an eating establishment, the "satisfactory ability and experience" of a barber, or the "safe condition" of a circular saw is one which cannot be precisely established by legislative definition. The intent and purpose of the act can be fulfilled only by the exercise of a sound discretion on the part of qualified administrators.

The control situations involved in running the administra-

tive machine, the internal discretions, also call for freedom to decide between alternatives. Legislative standards are created in the form of budget acts, appropriation bills, civil service laws, and administrative codes. Within the interstices of these formal patterns there are invariably, and desirably, discretionary problems which must be worked out by the craftsman, the administrative chief. The general terms of the law must be observed and certain procedures must usually be followed, but decisions relative to judgment and fact are usually untrammelled. The improvement of public administration during the last generation is explained in large part by the growth of freedom on the part of responsible officials who have been given the power to direct the housekeeping functions of government, free from the interfering hand of the legislative and the judicial branches of the government.

The fourth field involving administrative discretion is that which deals with social-conflict situations, as represented by the work of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, state public utility commissions, industrial accident commissions, and labor boards. More has been written about administrative discretion in connection with these social-conflict problems than about discretion on any other plane of administration. This is to be expected because the social issues involved are so important and affect so many interests. Then, too, the legislatures merely lay down general standards for the administrative officials to follow, such as "reasonable," "fair," or "necessary." The exercise of expert judgment by enforcing officials is implicit in the framework of regulatory legislation. The legislature sets up general guideposts; the commissions then gradually work out supplementary standards and principles of their own; and in the development of administrative standards, as well as in the solution of new problems, discretion is the constant factor in the expansion of law and administration.

Discretion, then, does not always assume the same external appearance nor is it equally essential in all realms of adminis-

tration. Its *raison d'être* varies in degree, depending upon the object of the act and the nature of the administrative duty. Routine, emergency, control, and social-conflict situations, as we have seen, raise different problems for the administrator. But just as discretion is common to all departments of government, so is it found in all forms of administrative activity.

It is usually true as a general proposition that higher officials are granted more room for discretion than are minor officials. On the other hand, it would not be true to say that discretionary power is in direct ratio to rank. The amount of discretionary power falling to the lot of certain minor officials is certainly impressive. For example, a chief of police may decide to put only one-half as many patrolmen in a certain section of a city as in another; or he may resolve to reduce the number of traffic officers and to increase the detective force. These are clearly important discretionary acts—decisions of policy involving a choice between alternatives. At the same time the average patrolman is confronted by the necessity of making scores of important decisions involving judgment and discretion. Do the actions of a slightly inebriated person constitute disorderly conduct? Should traffic violators be automatically ticketed instead of giving the seemingly conscientious ones another chance? At the point at which the official and the citizen frequently meet, large numbers of discretionary questions are likely to arise. On the other hand, the cashier in a municipal water department may deal with hundreds of citizens every day and almost never come across a case involving discretion. If questions or complaints arise, he may be instructed to refer the customer to a special officer.

When a case involving administrative discretion is brought before the court, the decision is likely to turn on the question of the "ministerial" as contrasted with the "discretionary" nature of the act. A ministerial act is said to be one wherein the law has prescribed the officer's duties in detail, leaving him no opportunity for failure to perform or for an alternative course of action. A discretionary act is one wherein jurisdiction has

been conferred upon the officer by legislation, but the particular act in controversy has not been made mandatory; rather, a choice between alternatives or even no action at all will be upheld as coming within the officer's right.

But the signposts which judges follow are seldom expressly provided. Legislatures do not have a way of saying, "This power is discretionary; let it alone!" Rather, the courts are usually called upon to decide whether "public convenience," "public safety and welfare," "reasonable return," and other vague terms are adequate-enough standards to justify the exercise of a particular discretionary act. In addition to these jurisdictional questions, controversies regarding the manner in which discretionary power is exercised in a given circumstance provide the second large class of cases for the courts. Is the action reasonable and fair, or is it arbitrary and unreasonable? Needless to say, the deciding of most discretionary cases involves a judicial weighing of what the court thinks is prudent and proper in comparison with what the legislature has authorized and the officer has done.

There have been several legitimate grounds of complaint at the way in which courts have dealt with administrative discretion. At the present time, as we shall point out, some state and federal courts behave in an enlightened manner when controversies arise involving discretion. But in many jurisdictions judicial reasoning relative to the fundamental problems underlying modern administration is unreal and uninformed. Judges still talk about law as if it were the monopoly of the legal profession. They assume that all judge-made law consists of rules and principles, whereas administrative discretion is arbitrary in its very nature. These Blackstonian judges derive satisfaction from constant reiteration of the belief that the judiciary is the "supervisor" of the entire governmental machine. They turn the separation-of-powers theory into an administrative strait-jacket.

Historically the courts have been extremely hostile toward administrative discretion. In large part this state of mind can probably be explained by the jealousy and antagonism which

were engendered during the period in which the common-law courts were struggling with the executive power in England. Then, too, the common law has been so staunchly attached to private rights of person and property that official action has been regarded as a natural enemy; administrative discretion is still usually regarded as a matter of private law rather than one of public law. But probably the principal difficulty which stands in the way of a more enlightened and liberal judicial reaction to administrative discretion is the ignorance of most judges of the requirements of and improvements in modern administration. Many judges seem to be as prejudiced and as uninformed on this subject as the average business man.

The failure of judges to apprehend the requirements of administration is due in large part to unwillingness or inability to view the picture as a whole. The average judge apparently considers only the particular act complained of, and hence he fails to see that this discretionary power is a vital link in a chain. As Dean Pound and the sociological school of jurisprudence say, social rights should be weighed against individual rights. Or as Karl Llewellyn and the legal realists point out, administrative discretion is not an end in itself—it is relative to the objects which the government is attempting to secure. Unfortunately, judges like Justice Brandeis and Chief Justice Rosenberry (of Wisconsin), who see the ends, the relationships, and, indeed, the whole process, and who make the complete picture crystal clear in their opinions—such judges are all too rare.

Wide differences of result in cases involving administrative discretion will be found by anyone who studies the judicial decisions. The results in similar cases range all the way from reactionary to ultra-liberal, depending seemingly upon the situs of the tribunal and the personnel of the court. One is reminded of Laski's observation to the effect that "the test, indeed, of institutional fitness is, above all, simplicity; and the growth of administrative discretion has been attended by a complexity that is usually unnecessary and not infrequently dangerous."

The general rule which the courts have laid down is that,

before administrative officials will be permitted to exercise a discretionary power affecting an individual's rights, the legislature must have created a standard. A standard of what? How much of a standard? A standard involves a comparison, and frequently it is reached by a subjective process. It is not surprising that the law on the subject is elusive, and that judicial behavior frequently appears to be a process of legerdemain. In a typical leading case the court held that the power given to the commissioner of public safety by the legislature whereby he could revoke a license to run a restaurant whenever "public morality, health, peace, or good order demanded" was arbitrary and hence void for lack of a specific standard. How specific must a standard be? Illustrative of a line of liberal decisions, and somewhat comparable to the above case, is an important decision which upheld the power of the Public Utilities Commission of Connecticut to grant licenses to run buses "when the public convenience and necessity require it."

The number of liberal decisions is growing. Some of them go so far that the gap between them and reactionary opinions is glaring. For example, an Illinois banking act was upheld which gave the auditor discretion to withhold certificate "when he *has reason to believe* that the bank is organized for any other purpose than that contemplated by the act." Would that we had had more such acts sooner! Modern administrative problems cannot be solved, in some instances, unless such large powers are granted to officials. The public utility law of Wisconsin exempts public utilities from paying the cost of investigations "when the public interest requires it." Is this a reasonable standard? Many courts would say no. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld it, holding that fixed, rigid standards are not necessary in order to make a delegation of power administrative rather than legislative. "When a law is looked upon as very expedient," a recent commentator on this case has said, "the courts somehow find a way to work out a standard." To which may be added the observation of the late Ernst Freund, who stated, "Administrative action will be preferred

by those who believe in regulation, legislative action by those who consider regulation a necessary evil."

From most of the cases which have just been cited it might be thought that the courts are fully cognizant of the necessity of permitting large grants of discretionary power to administrative officials and that hence any serious attention given to the older conservative view concerning discretion is like kicking a dead horse. But the old view is not dead; it lives on in most jurisdictions, and frequently it comes to life where least expected. If we are to secure realistic, consistent thinking about administrative discretion, we must examine the assumptions which have heretofore influenced judicial action and compare these theories with our modern critical conceptions.

The starting-point of the unfriendly attitude toward administrative discretion is in the view that law is the monopoly of the legal profession. There are several corollaries of this original premise. Law is held to be inherently reasonable, while administrative discretion is by its nature arbitrary. According to this view, law means "rules" whereas discretion involves the very antithesis of legal certainty. Thus, Freund, writing a generation ago, stated that "in a government by law discretion ought to have a very limited place in administration." The development of political institutions in America, he continued, emphasized and strengthened what may be called the "irresponsible elements in government," i.e., discretion by officers and commissions. The legal profession apparently sought to achieve Harrington's goal—a government of laws and not of men. Like Coke, American judges believed that the courts should be "superintendents of the realm," and they looked fondly toward Bentham's *General View of a Complete Code of Laws*, which would standardize all governmental action and by so doing eliminate the last traces of administrative discretion.

But Bentham's utopia grows constantly dimmer. Law, when stripped of its transcendentalism, is found to be a unity running throughout all governmental processes. The importance of the

common law has diminished as human activity has come to be regulated primarily by enactments of the legislature. The common law of a state can be, and in some cases has been, radically altered by a new general code adopted by the legislature. Historical research on the common law and greater attention to Continental practice have both established the close-working relationship between the judiciary and public administration. The initial responsibility for enforcing the law falls to administrative officials; it is only when extraordinary circumstances require it that the enforcement agencies of the judicial department are brought into operation. There is no intrinsic difference between the law which the administrator carries out and the law which the judge enforces; the principal difference is that the judge usually has the last word in case of a conflict of interpretation. In other words, law is a means rather than an end; it is a means whereby the interests and desires of society are subserved. In the sum total of activity, administration has more duties to perform than has the judiciary. Such a functional interpretation goes a long way toward dispelling the exalted notion that the judiciary is the regulator of the business of everybody else in the government family. It also indicates that there is no fundamental reason why the totality of discretion should be monopolized by the legislature and the courts; all branches of the government operate through law and all are means to an end. Any ancillary power of the three departments of government which is needed in order to make the work effective should clearly be granted. This means, as we have already seen, that the growth of administrative discretion is indicated.

A great deal of the confusion arising from decisions regarding administrative discretion is attributable to the widely different interpretations put upon the separation of powers. Some judges still talk about the "inherent nature" of a power and whether one act is "intrinsically" legislative, judicial, or administrative. How judges can write such things after reading Holmes's dissent in the case of *Springer v. Philippine Islands*

is hard to understand. As Mr. Justice Holmes so truly said, there are no sharp divisions between black and white—between legislative and administrative, or judicial and administrative, powers. The performance of certain administrative functions, such as railway regulation or the settlement of industrial accident cases, involves the manifestation of legislative and judicial power in the same hands. In his exhaustive study of the Interstate Commerce Commission, I. L. Sharfman has concluded that

as a functioning tribunal it oversteps at almost every turn the so-called separation of governmental powers. While apparently, as an administrative body, the Commission is but executing Congressional mandates, in its determination of controversies it is exercising judicial authority; and in its prescription of future adjustments it is itself enunciating legislative policy.

Indicative of the present confusing situation relative to discretion and the separation of powers are the statements of three authorities on administrative law. McFarland in his treatise dealing with the Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission concludes that "the term 'legislative' serves to describe subject-matter which the courts leave to the discretion of administrative agencies. Every 'fact' found by the Federal Trade Commission," he continues, "is treated as a matter of 'law' in the courts." Relative to the same subject, John Dickinson has pointed out that "discretionary administrative action is 'judicial' and so beyond the reach of civil liability." Finally, the late Ernst Freund attempted to resolve the logical difficulty with reference to administration and the separation of powers by saying, "The real significance of administrative ruling authority then does not lie in any diversion of genuine judicial power, but in relieving the judiciary from functions in their nature more or less legislative."

Fortunately some of our bolder judges have been willing to call a spade by its true name. They say that the classical theory of the separation of powers is unworkable under modern conditions and that it leads to endless confusion and to judicial

sophistry if efforts are made to apply it strictly. The traditional view that each of the three governmental powers has an inherent, indelible nature and that each is exclusive of the other two belongs to the limbo of governmental fundamentalism.

In several instances the theory of the "inherent nature" of governmental powers has been cast aside and in its place has been put emphasis on expediency and the effectual carrying-out of necessary functions. Dean Pound has made a very fruitful suggestion in proposing the phrase "division of labor" as the equivalent of separation of powers. No apology for such a realistic interpretation is necessary; this view—the functional, pragmatic one—should be made vocal and dominant. If the philosophical cobwebs were cleared away, we should then probably observe that the choice between alternatives is a problem which is common to legislators, judges, and administrators.

The judiciary's willingness to sustain discretionary acts will undoubtedly increase as there is a wider awareness of the requirements of modern administration. Quick decisions by skilled officials are imperative elements of government today, at least in some of the most important fields. Other realms of administration, such as health inspection and the immigration service, depend for their success upon almost complete administrative finality—as well as upon speed and expertise. The courts merely reserve the right to "try the trial."

The principal reasons which account for and justify administrative discretion are the limits of time and limits of aptitude of the legislative body, plus the fact that its procedure is slow and it is not always in session; then, too, administrative discretion takes care of urgent matters such as quarantine, provides opportunity for local variety and detail, makes leeway for unknown future conditions, affords the indispensable means of handling complex and technical affairs, and tends to obtain freedom from party strife.

But too much generalization about the *raison d'être* of discretionary power is almost sure to be misleading. One of the most important points for reviewing tribunals to keep in mind

is that striking differences in the character of work done by administrative departments also account for vastly different problems of discretion. In some cases discretion is life blood, while in other departments it is merely a useful appendage. Would that all courts could conscientiously affirm the dictum of a Missouri tribunal, which prefaced its consideration of a case involving discretion by saying:

In a general way the decisions involving the questions of validity of a granted discretion recognize the differences in the nature of the subject of regulation or the circumstances under which the discretion is to be exercised, so that sometimes on account of the nature of the subject it is impractical to lay down a definite or comprehensive rule.

The fields in which administrative discretion is most frequently challenged are those which depend most upon freedom of decision and technical definitiveness. The administrative functions which immediately come to mind are taxation, public utility regulation, control over business and financial operations, and various exercises of the police power designed to protect health and public safety. Where property rights are involved, the courts are usually particularly attentive to complaints against discretion. But now that population is congested, urban dwellers are dependent upon governmental protection, and maladjustments in one branch of social activity so quickly affect all the others, the work of our most important administrative departments would soon collapse if the dispatch, discretion, and finality required were withheld or frustrated. The prevention of a hoof-and-mouth epidemic requires that health officers have power summarily to order the destruction of diseased cattle; the effective regulation of banks and public utilities involves discretionary power to investigate financial practices and thereafter to enforce necessary changes; the speedy demolition of tenements underlies the success of housing schemes; expert knowledge alone can determine what constitutes a dangerous drug or false and misleading advertising; the government could not long operate if ad valorem taxes and other forms of taxation involving administrative

judgment and experience could be held up by constant appeals to the judiciary.

The United States has traveled a long way from the situation of seventy years ago described by Dean Pound. After the middle of the nineteenth century, he says,

we had developed a system of judicial interference with administration. Law paralyzing administration was an everyday spectacle. Almost every important measure of police or administration encountered an injunction. We relied on taxpayers' suits to prevent waste of public funds and misuse of the proceeds of taxation. In many jurisdictions it was not uncommon to see collection of taxes needed for the everyday conduct of public business restrained by injunction. Our government was one of laws and not of men. Administration had become "only a very subordinate agency in the whole process of government."

The question is not whether discretion should be granted; clearly large amounts of it must be made available in many cases. The important problem is the manner in which discretion is exercised and the safeguards against abuse of power which are provided.

In appraising the justifiability of granting an increasing measure of discretion to American administration, two factors should be considered, namely, personnel and techniques. On the first point there is a great deal of misunderstanding and lack of appreciation. If judges had a high opinion of the public service, they would not be nearly so suspicious of discretionary powers. But they have not. One reason is that the judiciary probably overestimates its own superiority. There is still likely to be the feeling that judges are entitled to be the supervisors of the governmental machine because they are members of a superior class. They find it very hard to believe, as Jerome Frank and others have recently shown so convincingly, that "judges are human," too. Of course, the great judges know this to be true, and their appreciation of their brethren in the administrative field is, therefore, greater.

Very few judges have studied the progress of public administration which has taken place in the last generation. They still think of the graft and corruption which was far more common

in their youth than it is today. To them bureaucracy means mediocrity. Like the public generally, most judges do not seem to be aware that the caliber of the American public service has improved by great strides in the lifetime of the average living person. Nor are they aware that most of the persons who are intrusted with important discretionary powers—the physicians, the public utility commissioners, the police officials, the insurance commissioners, the labor department executives, higher administrators generally—come from the same social stratum and are equipped with as ample preparation as are judges themselves. More and more they will find college classmates holding administrative positions of honor and responsibility. By what mysterious process do these men become essentially arbitrary while judges take on the cloak of strict impartiality?

Some may answer that the difference is found not so much in personnel as in the contrasting temper and processes which distinguish adjudication from administration. Here, again, candid analysis reveals that the differences are not so great as they are usually assumed to be. True, courts attempt to follow rules, principles, precedents; they strive for consistency and certainty. But as writers like Pound, Cook, Llewellyn, and others constantly point out, the degree of certainty is not so great in practice—nor should it be in theory, they say—as defenders of mechanical jurisprudence have assumed. A state of flux, what may be called “judicial legislation,” is to be expected particularly in those fields where economic and social changes are occurring rapidly. These are the same points, for the most part, at which the exercise of administrative discretion is the most necessary and important. The work of the Federal Trade Commission is a case in point. Rigid rules of law certainly have not been fixed for this field. Here, as in other realms of administration, trial and error and the gradual development of administrative standards relative to competition, a fair price, advertising—this is the process which has been used and which, experience indicates should be followed in the future. The

whole success of such a plan depends upon the co-operation of the courts. The administrative agency must have discretion in order to lay out new paths, and it must have greater freedom from judicial review and reversal in order to create and maintain workable standards.

Administration, too, is guided by rules and principles. And the more study that is devoted to so-called judicial rules as compared with administrative standards, the less fundamental difference do we find to exist. The objectives sought and the methods used by courts in arriving at the rule that a father is liable for the torts caused by members of his family when driving the family car do not differ fundamentally from the process by which an industrial accident commission establishes a standard relative to liability growing out of, but not actually in the course of, employment. The development of common-law rules, such as the concluding of a contract with the posting of a letter, is cut out of the same cloth and follows the same experimental stages as does the administrative tribunal when it creates a standard for the interchange of freight cars in all parts of the country.

There are many varieties of administrative discretion, to be sure. Not all discretionary acts result in the formulation of what may be dignified as a standard, a rule, or a principle. Some *ad hoc* decisions involving discretion are laid down from case to case—they are not repetitions; others necessitate formal or informal hearings, where the proceeding is much like a court of law and where rulings and orders gradually build up a set of standards; in still other cases rules have already been laid down or have crystallized, so that the application of the general rule to the specific case does not require so much deliberation and inventiveness. Here, again, we must return to the reminder that the requirements and necessities of particular administrative tasks vary greatly. In some cases the establishment of an iron-clad standard would defeat the major purpose of the act, while in most instances it is convenient and natural to clarify rules. In so far as judges insist that adminis-

trators should create definite signposts for the citizen whenever possible, such action is commendable; if, however, by failure to comprehend the purposes of the law and the exigencies of administration they insist upon over-rigidifying administrative standards, then such ignorance should be frankly rebuked. Moreover, the present tendency in certain fields to try the case which has been brought up from an administrative tribunal *de novo* instead of merely "trying the trial," as appeal courts are supposed to do—this invasion of administrative finality cannot help but tear down administrative standards and render ineffectual legitimate discretionary power.

The best safeguards to the individual against the abuse of discretionary power are to be found in the personnel and procedural elements just considered. There is no reason why we should not be able to recruit judicially minded (i.e., impartial) administrators as well as fair-minded judges. As the caliber of persons attracted to the administrative service improves, additional discretionary power may well be granted. The human factor is certainly the most important one. Likewise, the individual and society are protected by the growth of administrative standards which have as much chance of being understood and appreciated by the public as have rules of law.

Other important safeguards are found in the customary rules of procedure and conduct which accompany the exercise of discretionary power in this country. If, in certain realms of administration, officials are to be given large discretionary powers, if legislative and judicial characteristics are to be assumed, if interference from the courts is to be almost completely withheld, then the best features of court procedure should be required in such administrative proceedings. Fortunately this condition exists in a highly developed state already, as illustrated by the proceedings of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the industrial accident commissions, and various other administrative bodies. The essential factors of a fair and democratic administrative procedure have been discussed so fully in numerous places that mere enumeration will suffice.

Here, again, it is hazardous to generalize, because a summary proceeding such as quarantine would not be subject to all of the considerations bearing upon, say, a workmen's compensation case.

Generally, however, it may be said that in an administrative procedure involving discretion and affecting someone's rights, several important conditions should be present. In the first place, there should be adequate notice; affected parties should be given knowledge beforehand of the proceeding affecting them. There should also be publicity; rights should not be alienated in proceedings which take place behind locked doors and barred windows. As a general rule, all interests affected, even ancillary ones, should be consulted or be given an opportunity to appear. Everyone is entitled to a hearing; but this need not be a judicial hearing and it will not always be possible to suit everyone's convenience. The procedure followed at the hearing should be adequate; the technicalities of court procedure are to be avoided, but all fundamental rules guaranteeing a full hearing and fairness to all parties should be sought. Means should be provided whereby orders arrived at which are arbitrary or capricious can be set aside; the best way of accomplishing this is usually the creation of administrative reviewing machinery. Finally, no man should be the judge in his own cause; this statement should be construed broadly rather than strictly, however, or else administrative reviews would be automatically eliminated. As a matter of fact, the United States unquestionably needs special administrative courts for the hearing of important cases involving a controversy between an administrative service and a citizen. Such courts would provide another effective safeguard against the possibility of abusing large grants of power.

From every indication, then, the discretionary powers of administrators may be expected to increase. It is important that judges should become acquainted with the needs and the competence of modern administration. The problem of discretion is different for almost every function performed by ad-

ministrative officials. Due consideration should be given to this fact by the courts. Discretion is not an unusual thing; it is not primarily a legal concept—it is the very stuff of daily duties in all branches of government. The best defense against the abuse of power is to attract the right kind of people to administration. The judicial temperament should be held up before public servants who will be called upon to administer delegated legislation and regulatory laws. The best features of adjudication can be incorporated into the administrative process. The most effective guaranties are those of competence and corporate discipline—control from within rather than compulsion from without. Administration should be aware of its shortcomings, conscious of outside controls which will interfere if necessary, and confident of its own ability to perform a public trust in a satisfactory manner. The judiciary must not be thought of as an administrative prop—much less as the official regulator. Administration can and must learn to solve its own problems. “Not all government can be standardized,” Ernst Freund once wrote. “In the ordering of public as of private affairs, there is a legitimate place for wisdom and judgment, and even, where there are hidden or imperfectly understood forces and agencies, for speculation and chance.”

V

A THEORY OF ORGANIZATION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By JOHN M. GAUS

MOST of us in middle-class residential neighborhoods in the United States are familiar with the institution known as the "Book Club." The Book Club arises out of the desire of various individuals in the neighborhood for an opportunity to read a number of current books although handicapped by an income too small to permit each person to purchase the books which he would like to read. This handicap is overcome by a very simple but effective arrangement whereby a club is formed, officers elected, and contributions made to a single fund sufficient in size to purchase a number of the desired books. These are then circulated during the course of the year, and at the end they are generally auctioned off to the members. The funds that are obtained from the auctions are usually used as a part of the capital for the purchase of the books for the next year.

I mention this simple and casual device because it offers us an example of the rôle of organization. That rôle is one of creation. Organization is sometimes viewed as a limitation—occasionally a necessary limitation—upon the freedom of the individual who is a member of or who is otherwise affected by it. This view is based upon a superficial notion of its nature and meaning. Its function is to widen the opportunities and resources of those for whom it is established. Thus the members of the Book Club can obtain books otherwise denied them. Organization is the arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed purpose through the allocation of functions and responsibilities. It is the relating of efforts and capacities of individuals and groups en-

gaged upon a common task in such a way as to secure the desired objective with the least friction and the most satisfaction to those for whom the task is done and those engaged in the enterprise.

The word "organization" is frequently used in such a way as to imply a mechanical, non-human quality. But the human beings who are the units of an organization are supposed to act in accordance with some predetermined objective standard so that their subjective desires and wishes will not interfere with the ultimate attainment of the purpose of the organization. Let us remember also that this objective standard is the product of human deliberation and choice, and not of some external, non-human, and mechanical force.

Since organization consists of people brought into a certain relationship because of a humanly evolved purpose, it is clear that it should be flexible rather than rigid. There will be constant readjustments necessary because of personalities and other natural forces and because of the unpredicted and unpredictable situations confronted in its operation. This flexibility is complementary to the very nature of the organization, namely, the achievement through collective effort of some purpose or objective which a number of persons have evolved.

Now the introduction of purpose raises problems of administration that are far-reaching. Each member of the organization must have as good a comprehension as possible of the relationship of his particular function and responsibility in the organization to that ultimate purpose if his work is to be done intelligently and effectively. There is evidence from many quarters and from many kinds of activity and experience supporting the further conclusion that the best effort of the individual is not put forth unless he feels that he has some share in the creating of that purpose or some participation in determining how that purpose shall be made effective by the organization of which he is a member. A casual example of this has recently come to my knowledge. One of my students employed as an unskilled worker in a gang loading and unloading meat

at a conveyer in a packing plant occasionally noticed a low-grade meat being included in an order calling for a higher quality. This occasionally happens in this particular plant when the person responsible for this action feels that the firm to which the meat is being sent is careless in its inspection and has a clientèle which is not sufficiently educated to differences in quality. When this misclassification of the meat occurs, my friend informs me that a change in the morale of this group of unskilled workers, drawn from the slums of a great city, is registered at once. Significant looks are interchanged. The men relax, shrug their shoulders, and make cynical comments. Within their own limited, almost mechanical, minor part in the elaborate organization of the plant they nevertheless are sensitive even to this relatively minor disharmony, if it is assumed that the purpose of such an organization is to supply meats of a given quality at a related price.

It is important for each individual to know his function and responsibility in the organization so that there will be no uncertainty and hesitation in the integration of his actions with those of the other members of the organization. It is also important from the point of view of the morale of the organization that he have some sense of being a part of the total organization through having a pride in the purpose which it serves and a right to participate in determining the way in which that purpose may best be achieved so far as the area of his own responsibility is concerned. It is for this reason that the most successful administrator is revealed as possessing leadership in the sense that he effectively wins the active consent and support of a substantial part of the members of his organization. It will be found upon analysis that even the so-called "driver" who is rated as a successful administrator is influential really because some positive and assertive quality which he evinces secures response and consent. This situation (which has been explored by Ordway Tead and others) needs here no further discussion. It is enough to point out its decisive importance in developing a point of view concerning the nature and meaning

of organization. Organization must provide, that is, through its principles and their application, for the continuous winning of consent of a great number of people in the formulation of and movement toward a purpose.

The immediate bearing of this winning of consent upon organization is the importance which is thereby attached to the function which we may call co-ordination. By definition we have found that organization includes persons who are related in their efforts to achieve some agreed purpose. Co-ordination is the task of obtaining this active consent of these persons in their day-to-day activity through the careful allocation of functions, the co-operative evolving of working policy, the securing and making available of relevant knowledge, the determination of priorities in processes and activities, the delimitation and focusing of efforts and resources, and the recruiting and canalizing of the ideas and energies of the persons in the organization. Obviously as the organization grows not only larger but more refined and detailed with an increasing division of labor, this problem of co-ordination becomes increasingly difficult. It requires both an art and a science challenging intellectual effort of the highest quality. The simplest organization of personnel is to be seen in the everyday task of lifting heavy objects with the aid of some rhythmic system where a simple, almost inborn rule-of-thumb scheme of co-operative effort is adequate. But the Book Club may involve more difficulty if the tastes of the members vary greatly. If the Book Club in turn becomes a great metropolitan library system, the problem of organization becomes increasingly difficult. What is one to say, then, of the difficulty of the task of administering all of the functions of collective or civic housekeeping of a great metropolis of which the library system is only one of a multitude of activities? Here the problem of organization may be seen as of first-rate importance, and its creative rôle obvious.

In the simpler organization of the Book Club it is possible for a single individual, or perhaps a committee of three or five, to handle all the necessary work. A secretary, let us say, sends

out cards for the annual autumn meeting, arranges to have the meeting at his home, collects the annual dues, proposes a list of books to be purchased after having made a study of the book reviews and publishers' lists for the current season, purchases the books, and distributes them weekly. The members may reimburse the secretary by adding a small sum to their contribution for the purchase of books. There are obvious limitations in this arrangement, and more probably the function of determining policy, such as the selection of books to be purchased, will be retained by the club as a whole through some system of balloting. But when we come to a metropolitan library system, the sheer increase in the size of the problem quite apart from its qualitative change forces a more elaborate organization. It may be necessary, for example, to assign the purchasing function not only to one part—the purchasing unit—of the organization but to subdivide that part on the basis of the subject matter of the books. Thus one person will be charged with keeping informed concerning books relating to engineering, selecting those most suitable for purchase by the library system from the point of view of the citizens using the library, and the general responsibility for this particular function. As this process of division and subdivision continues with the increasing size and the more varied purposes of the organization, a new functional element may be recognized. The organization itself may become so large in terms of the number of persons employed, their functions may become so specialized in terms of subdivisions of the content matter dealt with, that the effective co-ordination of these activities requires of the responsible administrative head more knowledge concerning his organization and the problems that confront it than he finds time to secure. He is unable to know, for example, that Jones who is employed down in subsection C of section A is breaking down in his part of the work of the organization because he feels that he has not had the same treatment in the matter of hours or wages or recognition that Brown in another subsection has received. He may have a vague sense that something is

holding up effective work in that particular unit; beyond that he is unable to go. Again, he may have no means of determining whether the expenditures in one unit for certain materials are out of proportion with expenditures for the same materials in another unit. In short, he has no accurate standards by which he can appraise and evaluate the activities of the different units and maintain a standard of work which will be so obviously objective and impersonal as to convey a sense of its fairness and justice so essential to good morale.

Thus, as the organization has grown in size and become subdivided in structure, in addition to applying the principle of direct delegation of authority in a line which leads from the highest officer to the lowest, a new principle has come to be applied—the principle of the auxiliary technical staff service supplementing the line service. The arrangement of personnel in terms of the line of authority, responsibility, and importance of duty in the realization of the purpose of the organization includes both those who are concerned primarily on their respective levels with the content matter of the purpose of the organization (such as libraries, highways, or forest preservation) and who thus constitute the line services, and those whose major function it is to facilitate the work of the first group and enable them to do their work more effectively and with less cost and effort and hence are the staff and auxiliary services. In this latter group are two classes. There are those who have to do with finance, personnel, materials, and the preparation of reports, who may be called the “auxiliary” technical staff officers, and those who assist the chief administrative directive officials and who may be called the “general” staff officers. We may borrow the usage of Urwick and refer to them as administrative staff officers in contrast to (and yet also supplementary to) the auxiliary or technical staff officers of the first group.

Obviously the task of formulating a concept of organization now becomes more complex as the analysis is pushed further. We must make great effort to keep the argument as clear as possible for the purpose of this discussion, just as the concept

must be as clear as possible in the minds of the members of any organization if each is to be able to visualize his own place, function, and responsibility. The guiding principle which is necessary here is, as Taylor emphasizes, function. In an organization based upon the principle of function Taylor and his followers have stated that relationships are determined by the problems confronted, the types and capacities of the persons who are in the organization, the need for a clear yet flexible line of authority and responsibility, the assignment of a limited function with unlimited authority within its area to each individual member of the organization, the co-operation of these specialized parts, and the inventing of means of measuring the operations performed. In essence, as Farquhar has noted, such a scheme of organization may be termed "instructional organization." He adds that this conception of functional or instructional organization has for its fundamental idea "expert knowledge coupled with authority to make that knowledge effective in practice."

With this rise of the importance of such auxiliary technical staff services, two problems appear. What is the authority of the director of personnel, or of purchases, or of finance, or of reporting in relationship to the authority of a bureau chief in one of the line departments? Related to it is the second problem: Will any one administrative chief have the time or ability to co-ordinate so many different units of government reporting to him?

A reconsideration of the principle of function does much to clarify the possible conflict in responsibility and authority between the line official and the auxiliary official. In the administration of personnel functions, for example, it is the function of the director of personnel to be accurately informed concerning the needs of the various departments, on the one hand, and the market supply of available, adequately equipped recruits, on the other. It is also his function to see that the detailed application of personnel policy in one department does not create dissatisfaction on the part of members of another

department who may feel themselves less favorably treated. There may be concrete differences in interpretation by a chief of bureau in the line department and the director of personnel as to salary standards or as to the effectiveness of the recruiting system in supplying adequately equipped persons. This, however, is largely not a problem of organization as such but either of the quality of the particular persons in the organization and their own capacity to reach a mutually acceptable compromise, or of the ability of higher administrative chiefs if necessary to adjust the conflict.

There may come, however, differences of opinion between the line officer and the technical staff officer which involve more than may readily be measured by the accepted standards adopted for that particular auxiliary service. A dispute may arise, for example, between the director of finance and the head of the Navy Department as to the amount of income to be allotted to naval expenditure. The director of finance has the problem of making preliminary estimates for a balanced budget, while the naval authority must meet the responsibility placed upon him by reason of the general international policy of the state and the existing state of affairs internationally. Hence a third department is directly affected also, namely, the State Department, or Foreign Office, and of course other departments have an intimate interest since their budgets may be—and indeed must be—affected by the decision to be reached.

The determination of this dispute should now pass from the two departments concerned, if we accept the principle of function. It should be lodged with the highest political authority in the organization, the Cabinet, with its presiding chief executive, whether Prime Minister, President, or by whatever title he may be called. A decision having been reached by this responsible authority, as is functionally correct, there remains to the director of finance the sole function and responsibility of executing the decision so far as the financial function is concerned, and to the line officers the execution of the substan-

tive policy in naval and foreign affairs. Thus the auxiliary officer is performing the function of facilitation and implementation with a body of knowledge and a point of view important to and, it is to be hoped, influential upon the formulation of general policy by the line department, but not decisive. The budget officer will be responsible for providing in the financial plan for funds sufficient to enable the naval authorities to build and maintain the ships which it is politically determined are necessary for effectuating the national foreign policy.

The other difficult problem arising out of this increase in specialized agencies within the organization due to the principle of function is that of the effective, ultimate co-ordination of all of these parts into a coherent, unified, working program directly related to the major purpose of the organization. The problem may be stated thus: Is it humanly possible for one man or a group of colleagues to administer wisely the duties which have been placed upon the government of the United States, the British Empire or the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, or the American Telegraph and Telephone Company or the Standard Oil Company? Is it possible so to arrange the flow of business and responsibility that, however great in size the unit and however complicated its problems, one man or a group of colleagues can successfully administer the whole? Even if we were to accept the view of one school of observers who state flatly that there is a maximum limit in terms of size for an efficient organization, and turn to the smaller units, we should still find it, I think, no easy task to suggest the solution of this problem for a modern metropolis or one of the department stores or chain of grocery stores operating within it. There are able students of this problem who reject the view that there is a size limitation in operation here. Concerning this controversy the evidence seems to be, certainly at the present time, inconclusive. But whatever the size of the unit, the problem remains in the great number of large organizations such as our national states and metropolitan cities.

It is here that the function of the second type of staff service, which relates to and partakes of both the auxiliary technical staff service and the line department, may be discerned. The administrative staff has the function of clarifying the issues and materials involved in any final decision on policy as presented to the highest policy-making authority, and reporting back to the technical staff and line officials the policy agreed upon in consequence. Those who perform such functions have an importance often concealed by their titles. Sometimes they are called private secretaries, sometimes they are called administrative assistants or executive assistants; but whatever their title (and this should be recognized as an important problem in itself), they are general administrative staff assistants or aids to the chief executive. As Urwick points out, drawing upon the studies of Graicunas, there is a limit to the "span of attention" which is psychologically possible for the individual administrator and an administrative counterpart which has been termed "the span of control." Hence if the organization grows more refined and complex, it might become ineffective because too many auxiliary and line units are reporting to the person or persons with the function of central co-ordination, whose span of attention and of control would become too far extended for wise decisions. It is the function of the general administrative staff assistants to prevent this by canalizing the reports and communications of the numerous line and technical staff officers into fewer channels.

Light is thrown on this problem by the administrative experience in the World War of the British and the American governments and by the administrative problems which have developed at Washington during 1933-36. When Mr. Lloyd George outlined, as prime minister, the plan of his new coalition government to establish a War Cabinet, in a speech in the House of Commons in 1916, he remarked that it was impossible to wage a war through a Sanhedrin. Even before the War the British Cabinet had become dangerously large in numbers, and the difficulty of exercising the final control of national policy

was serious. When to this organization the new war agencies were added, the result was disastrous. Not only was there confusion and uncertainty in the determination of priorities and the points on which effort should first be concentrated, but there was even a lack of clarity as to the decisions which might have been taken at a Cabinet meeting, and no adequate means of insuring the execution by various departments of decisions affecting them. The new War Cabinet which was established was small in numbers (having at most seven members). Its function was more strictly confined to the determination of ultimate policy and co-ordination of the numerous departments, since its members held no departmental portfolios and thus could devote all their time and energy to the single function of policy formulation and co-ordination and the expression of this policy in Parliament.

Even more suggestive, however, was the adoption for the first time in British history of the practice of keeping regular records of the business transacted at the Cabinet meeting, the preparation of agenda for each meeting, and the provision of means of following up the decisions taken by transmitting the decisions to the departments concerned and reporting back the subsequent action taken. Thus a Secretariat was established to perform these functions. The utility of this staff of the Secretary and his ten assistant secretaries is revealed by the following paragraph in the first report of the War Cabinet (1917):

In addition to these primary duties the War Cabinet Secretariat provides the British Section of the Secretariat of the Inter-Allied Conferences, of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, the Secretariat of the Imperial War Cabinet, and the Secretariat of the majority of the Sub-Committees working in connection with the War Cabinet. The War Cabinet Secretariat is built up on the nucleus of the Secretariat of the Committee of Imperial Defense, which provided a system of liaison officers between the Committee and the Admiralty, War Office, India Office, and Colonial Office. This system has now been extended. Additional officers have been added, so that a liaison is now established between the War Cabinet Secretariat and all the Departments of the Government. This provides yet another means of securing touch between the War Cabinet

and the various Government Departments. The Secretariat has also developed an organization for the rapid distribution of documents dealing with inter-departmental matters of all kinds, which is by no means the least important branch of its work.

In addition to the War Cabinet Secretariat there was created a small Prime Minister's Secretariat to assist the Prime Minister in the discharge of the heavy responsibilities which fall upon him under the War Cabinet system.

How great an innovation this organization was in the British system is indicated by the objections made to its continuance at the close of the war and during the period in which the Lloyd George Coalition gradually lost political support. Nevertheless, successive governments have continued the institution and it has without doubt established its usefulness as a part of the normal administrative system. Indeed, in recent years another Cabinet staff agency for research and the formulation of economic questions has been added—the Economic Advisory Council.

The problem of obtaining definitive final statement of policy, which was so acute in Great Britain because of the nature of the Cabinet system, was, of course, not so pressing at Washington where the presidential system rests on the practice of vesting in the President final authority in determining the policy of the administration; nevertheless, here, too, in the early days of the War, as war agencies increased rapidly, it was found necessary to improvise new administrative devices. Thus, in addition to the regular Cabinet, there was established the Council of National Defense; and with the rapid increase in the number of departments with major responsibilities relating to civilian mobilization, and particularly with the use of various essential war materials and manufactured goods, there eventually developed the War Industries Board as the central policy-formulating agency for dealing with American industry, organized on the basis of the various commodities. Meanwhile President Wilson called for the presentation of a weekly "Conspicuous," as he termed it, of the state of the nation and of the war preparations in particular, to be prepared by Edwin F.

Gay and a staff of economists and statisticians, and based upon pertinent data supplied by all the departments of government. It is interesting to note that the title of this unit (assigned to the War Industries Board) was the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, and that the term "Planning" was inserted in this title at the suggestion of Mr. Henry S. Dennison, a disciple of Frederick Taylor.

Although this administrative structure was dismantled at the accession to power of the Harding administration, eight years later when Mr. Hoover was elected to the presidency he secured legislation authorizing the establishment of three major secretaryships in the Executive Office. Henceforth the business from the departments, relations with the public, and the preparation of materials useful to the President in formulating his documents and addresses were canalized through these secretaryships.

This arrangement was continued by President Franklin Roosevelt when he entered the White House. At the same time, as a result of his Recovery Program, there was a great increase in the number of major government departments. Soon he was substituting for one of the two weekly Cabinet meetings a meeting of the group which he entitled "The Executive Council," subsequently merged with the National Emergency Council, which included the older Cabinet posts and the heads of the new, important Recovery departments, and also the Director of the Budget. He also established a secretaryship of this Council. There were created, as evidence showed the importance and necessity of co-ordinating many activities, a number of interdepartmental committees. Among these was the Committee on Statistics (now by statute the Central Statistical Board) which soon developed, under its Chairman, a function of interpreting the various observable and recorded tendencies that recalls the work of Dr. Gay and the Bureau of Planning and Statistics during the World War. The chairman, Dr. W. H. Riefler, was also named as Economic Adviser to the Executive Council. Increasingly the Secretary of the Council and the

Economic Adviser were called upon to formulate policies requiring the co-ordination of agencies and powers distributed widely through many departments.

It should be noted that one of the bases of criticism advanced against the continuance of the Cabinet secretaryship in Great Britain at the time of the fall of the Lloyd George Coalition Government was the view that this official had become more powerful, through his preparation of business for the Cabinet and the execution of its decisions, than most of the departmental heads. This was due not only to the nature of his duties, as just mentioned, but also to the close association with the Prime Minister necessitated by those duties. It is significant that the Executive Secretary of the Executive Council also apparently, and equally of necessity, bore a share of the task of gathering the materials to be used in formulating political policy by the President. We see here a position corresponding closely to that of the chief secretary in the ancient king's household—a position at once ministerial and circumscribed by the decisions of the political chiefs whom he serves, and yet also with a region of discretion in which his powers or, more accurately, his influence is determined by the tempo of the events, the situation within party ranks, the relationship of the presidency (or crown) to other governing institutions and his own personality. One may come across similar positions of more limited importance and scope in many more humble organizations. By nature of its relationship the secretaryship must always be a place of decisive importance either in a small commercial enterprise or in the League of Nations.

An important function complementary to that of preparing the materials from which co-ordinated policy may be formulated by the responsible political leaders is that of following up the decisions taken. This includes their transmission to the agencies charged with their execution, and the recording and measurement of results in quantitative and qualitative form. The invention of units of measurement of the work of line departments is no easy matter, yet upon it rest the chief possi-

bilities of progress, not only in administration, but also in the substitution of more objective data from which political opinion may develop. It is interesting to find a recognition of the importance of this staff function in a report by Joseph Stalin on the operation of the central government in the U.S.S.R.

The proper organization of supervision of fulfilment of decisions is of decisive importance in the struggle against bureaucracy and routine. Are the decisions of the leading organizations carried out by the bureaucrats, or do they pigeonhole them? Are they carried out properly, or are they distorted? Is the apparatus working honestly and in a Bolshevik manner, or is it running at a loose end? These things can be learned in time only if supervision of the fulfilment of decisions is properly organized. The proper organization of supervision of the fulfilment of decisions is like a searchlight which throws a flood of light on the manner in which the apparatus is working at any time, and drags the bureaucrats into the light of day. We can say with certainty that nine-tenths of our failures and hitches are due to the lack of a properly organized system of supervising the fulfilment of decisions. There cannot be any doubt that had there been such a system of supervising fulfilment, the failures and hitches would certainly have been averted.

But, in order that supervision of fulfilment of decisions may achieve its purpose, two conditions at least are necessary: first, that the supervision of fulfilment of decisions be systematic and not sporadic; second, that the work of supervising the fulfilment of decisions in all the links of the Party Soviet and business organizations shall be in charge, not of second-rate people, but of people with authority, the leaders of the organizations themselves.

The organization of supervision of the fulfilment of decisions is of supreme importance for the central leading institutions. Owing to its form of organization, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection cannot satisfy the requirements of a well-organized system of supervising the fulfilment of decisions. Several years ago, when our economic work was simpler and less satisfactory, and when we could expect that it was possible to inspect the work of all the commissariats and of all the business organizations the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was good enough. But now, when our economic work has grown to an enormous extent and has become more complicated, and when it is no longer necessary, nor possible to inspect it from one centre, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection must be reorganized. What we need now is not an inspectorate, but the supervision of the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre—what we need now is the control of the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre. We now need

an organization that will not set itself the universal aim of inspecting everything and everybody but which will concentrate its attention on the work of control, on the work of supervising the fulfilment of the decisions of the central bodies of the Soviet Government. The only organization that can fulfil this function is a Commission of Soviet Control of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., which shall work under the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars and have its representatives in the districts who will be independent of the local authorities. And in order that this organization may have sufficient authority and be able, in the event of necessity, to take proceedings against any responsible worker, the candidates for the Commission of Soviet Control must be nominated by the Party Congress and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. I think that only such an organization can tighten up Soviet control and Soviet discipline.

This statement brings out clearly the close connection between an accurate reporting on the operation of the government departments and the formulation of ultimate political policy.

Thus by applying the principle of function, we may evolve a theory of organization in which one may differentiate between the regular line organization, the auxiliary technical staff service, and the general administrative staff service. Do these terms imply any hierarchy of authority, or do they suggest that it is the task of the staff services to plan and think, and of the first to execute loyally? Not if we follow carefully the implications of the principle of function or reflect upon essential contributions to be made by the line official, no matter how humble, to an understanding of the problems of realizing the purposes of the organization. Thinking and planning are a part of the task of every individual, if the policies that are evolved in order to realize the purposes of the organization are to be reflected in the day-to-day decisions. Let us examine this point in terms of a specific example, in view of the loose and careless employment of the term "planning" in general discussions of government.

It is frequently assumed that a plan is to be evolved by a special agency with research facilities at its command and that

this plan is then to be executed by the various line departments with the auxiliary technical staff agencies assisting in providing the necessary personnel and similar arrangements. Anyone familiar with, let us say, the problem of developing a land plan and policy will realize at once that such a procedure would be fatal to any satisfactory results. In the first place, every government has some powers and functions relating to land problems scattered about in several departments. Thus at Washington we have many bureaus in the Department of Agriculture, such as the United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, directly concerned with land policy, as are the National Park Service and the Land Office in the Department of the Interior, and the Engineering Corps of the Army. Sometimes there will be important differences in outlook and emphasis among these. For example, the United States Reclamation Service in the Department of the Interior may strongly favor the extension of an irrigation program by one method, the Engineering Corps may be skeptical of the project with its bearing upon navigable streams, while the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the Department of Agriculture may feel that both points of view fail to take adequate account of many important factors in agriculture. Even if it were possible for some agency, not related to any of these mentioned, to outline a land policy to be executed by them, it is perfectly obvious that the lack of sympathetic and co-ordinated effort on the part of those who would have to do the detailed work would be fatal to the plan.

It is equally true that each one of these agencies in its everyday activities takes steps which in themselves should represent or reflect important decisions of policy and which, therefore, should be related to some commonly agreed-upon land program. It is clear, therefore, that all these agencies should participate in formulating such a program in order to insure its effective execution. It is also true that essential as this experience and information are to the formulating of such a program, there will, nevertheless, be inadequacies and gaps which must

be supplemented by those not committed in their outlook by reason of membership in one of these organizations. For example, there may be inadequate attention to possibilities of industrial development through the provision of cheap power supplies or the development of new transportation facilities. Again, the officials experienced in various types of land administration may not have had occasion to note certain trends in population or in the organization of public finance with ultimate important effect upon the use of land and the location of settlement and industry. All this must be brought to bear along with the experience of the various officials scattered in many departments. It is here that the general administrative staff assistant can be of great importance in serving, so to speak, as both a catalyst and as a precipitant. He must be a catalyst in breaking up and dissolving, as genially as his personality will permit, the rigidity of the departmental outlook so familiar to students not only of government departments but of universities or professions. He must be a precipitant in supplying a point about which these various atoms of experience and knowledge can recrystallize in a new program embracing the contributions not only of many departments but of a number of governmental interest groups and civic organizations possessing a special interest in or relationship to the problem at issue. Thus the administrative staff assistant is not a "fifth wheel," nor does he have exclusively the task of planning. He is helpless and unnecessary without the intimate knowledge and practical observation available to the line official, and the latter is only half-wise unless this function of bringing other related experience and knowledge from every possible source is capably performed.

The number of these general administrative staff aids which a chief executive will require naturally will vary with the extent of the functions undertaken by the unit of government over which the chief executive presides. He will certainly require—for the general ordering of the business of the Cabinet, the preparation of agenda, and the following-up in the departments

concerned with the decisions arrived at—a general secretary. If we take the government of the United States as an example, he will need also a staff officer for co-ordinating materials relevant to physical-resource planning, another for the co-ordination of materials relating to defense, a third for transport, a fourth for money, credit, and finance, and a fifth for social welfare. Their task requires that they familiarize themselves with the work done in the various line departments which relates to their respective fields, and that they present to the chief executive and the Cabinet a comprehensive conspectus of this work, its interrelations and its overlappings. This is a difficult and delicate business. It is easy for each to become another and a rival source of policy in an already overpopulated area. Unless they can convince the respective departments that they genuinely facilitate access to the chief executive for policies in the early stages of their formulation, they are hindrances and not helps to the improvement of central co-ordination and administration. The function of planning, in short, is not to be relegated to a separate class of officials; nor is it to go by default for lack of steady responsible initiation and follow-up. Each member of the line department should be stimulated to see his task in the light of relevant operations in other units, and this is to be encouraged and facilitated by the staff officer—and his assistants—in the field of activity concerned, with an assurance, by reason of his position, that the resultant plans will not languish in the files and reports, but will be brought within the current of business flowing up to the desk of the chief executive.

Incidentally the rise of these staff services, both technical and general, may help us to answer the complaint that is sometimes made that modern specialized organization destroys initiative and turns every occupation into a narrow routine. Actually it enormously widens the number of opportunities and increases the number of positions which call for the use of intelligence, imagination, training, and intellectual effort generally. Taylor himself once remarked that “almost all shops

are under-officered." Lord Haldane records that he used to tell his army officers that "thinking is very cheap."

Some observers have rightly pointed out that the problem of organization will be greatly affected—and that favorably—by a devolution of functions and responsibilities, now so numerous as to overburden most departments, to other governmental areas or to economic groups on the principle of "self-government in industry." I accept the view that there is much promise in this tendency toward regionalism and its economic counterpart, but I must point out that while this may supply some relief, it creates new problems of control which the central organization must solve if the devolution is to be successful. Self-government in industry raises, as we are beginning to appreciate, very serious problems such as the nature of the organization and the representation, for example, of the interests of finance, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, members of different labor organizations, and large units within the industries as against small units. It raises difficult questions of the power of self-governing groups to fix prices, define qualities, weights, and measures, and adopt procedures and practices which may affect non-members. We are also aware of the complex relationship between a central government and a local regional government to which authority has been delegated. There is, therefore, no royal road which avoids these complicated traffic points in organization. Our principle of function indicates a general possibility in this matter of devolution rather than provides a concrete solution whereby relief may be secured for the overburdened central governments. The most hopeful possibility is that through these regional and economic units we may obtain more numerous points at which statesmanship may be recruited. It may be possible to tap greater resources in the way of ability and public spirit through, for example, the principles suggested in the National Industrial Recovery Act, and through the stimulation of regional and local governmental policies, than is possible in the single national center and system.

A theory of organization must include some answer to the question, "What keeps the people in this organization working together?" If the theory is adequate, it will include a recognition of the fact that in no human organization will you get a complete co-ordination and coherence of human effort. The wellsprings of human activity are too deep and difficult to discern to enable us to provide a formula which will arouse the active and positive effort and loyalty of every individual. Certain generalizations may, however, be hazarded. We have no example of a system in which coercion by physical force has provided, over any considerable length of time, an efficient system of administration. We do know that coercion through the attraction of financial rewards is more satisfactory, but it has certain inadequacies and risks which must be recognized. If there develops a feeling that the award of recognition of individual effort through the assignment of financial advance or prestige is not based upon fair and just measurements, the incentive is rapidly transformed into something destroying any possible hope of success. It is largely for this reason, therefore, that the auxiliary technical staff service, providing objective standards in matters of personnel, is so important. There is here another illustration of the fact that what may appear to be an inhuman standardization is actually the best safeguard of decent human relationships in a large organization. Flexibility in making adjustments for the unusual case one must naturally accept as necessary and inevitable; but the maintenance of scientifically measurable standards is, in the long run, more humane than leaving personnel relationships to be determined by the whim or caprice of a fallible individual.

But even with the most just administration of the personnel policy so far as financial rewards are concerned, there still remains the problem of appealing to that final source of energy and power in each individual, not to be discovered easily or casually. Let one of our most experienced and most honored administrators speak on this point. In an address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science Joseph B.

Eastman, the Federal Co-ordinator of Transportation, remarked:

It is a tenet held by many that the desire for financial gain is the only motive which will impel men to their best endeavors. I challenge that tenet wholeheartedly. I was brought up in a minister's family; I have enjoyed the friendship of doctors, school teachers, and professors; and I have had some opportunity to observe men in public life, as well as many engaged in business. My very profound belief is that the best things which have been done in the world have been impelled by higher motives than the desire for financial gain, that these higher motives have an influence much more widespread than is commonly supposed, and that the desire for gain, while it may impel to certain valuable endeavors, never impels the best and often impels the worst.

One may shift the point of view from the individual to whose finest qualities one is appealing to that of the organization as a whole and point out that here, too, the need for formulating some appeal supplementary to the financial is important. As Tead remarks, "In group thinking the new ideas evolved are more than the sum of individual ideas." This means that the organization cannot even formulate its fullest and richest purpose unless there is a sense of belonging and of participation widely diffused among all its members.

If it be objected that the concept of administration, which is here set forth, offers a standard far beyond what is viewed by the man in the streets as the nature of government (which he is likely to label "just politics"), one answer is that it was only a short fifty years ago that the first major personnel policy was written into law in the United States. And one should add, by the way, that this important beginning of a personnel policy antedates the effort to substitute measurable standards for subjective judgment so far as private industry and business are concerned. We have, perhaps, dwelt too long over the dangers and evils of organization in government and been too slow to think out its possibilities and its opportunities. Indeed, it is the most practical thing in the world that we should do so now when the sheer pressure of population upon resources and the opening up of opportunities permissible only through inter-

dependent, large-scale economic enterprises are major factors in our life.

A theory of organization should note the relationship of the organization to the citizen who is not a member, although this topic should have an extended treatment by itself. That relationship also is to be found in the principle of function, and in the application of that principle by means of education and consultation. In the last analysis, the efficacy of an administrative system is dependent upon the understanding by the persons affected that the public official is an instrument of convenience, a kind of magnified Book Club secretary. Where this is appreciated by the great majority of citizens, the policy may be partly applied by the individual. This is amusingly exemplified sometimes when late at night, in deserted streets, a lone motorist waits patiently for the red light to change to green, so strong is the habit pattern of enforcing upon himself a code essential to his safety and convenience in busy times of the day. The administration of more complex functions which are affected by the controversies of powerful groups raises far more difficult problems of civic education. An alliance of the least ably conducted of the food industries with advertisers and publishers of magazines and newspapers may suppress the presentation of the case for public standards of honest labeling, weights, and measures. The public may not be aware of its stake in the controversy. Freedom of the press may represent an invasion of the integrity of truthful reporting. One would be surprised to find the financial editor of a newspaper reporting adequately to his readers the case for the public regulation of solicitation in investment banking. The civic life—the standard of living—of the vast majority of citizens in our interdependent economic system requires truthful accounts concerning the operation of our institutions and the proper use of public administration.

If our present agencies of news-gathering and reporting are inadequate, responsible civic leaders and public officials will have to invent new ones whereby positive civic participation

by the public may be utilized both to acquaint citizens with the usefulness of the service and to keep that service in touch with the needs and outlooks of the citizen. The use by the United States Department of Agriculture of county committees of farmers, co-operating with the county agents in working out the local application of the national policies, and by various government departments of committees of employees, employers, and technicians to prepare regulations defining safety and other standards for factories illustrates the enlistment of those affected by legislation in administrative procedure. The network of committees established by the National Recovery Administration was a necessary supplement to traditional forms of civic organization in the pioneer effort to bring home to the individual in industry his interdependence with millions of his fellows. Much of the effort of public administration to-day is rightly expended upon establishing procedures and agencies whereby the general policy enacted in the law is given precision and application with the active collaboration of groups of citizens most affected. A theory, a "special interest" that must be subjected to effective exposition by its proponents and critical examination by its rivals, is headed for modification. The participants are educated in citizenship in the process.

The clumsiness, delay, and effort which this requires are cited as some of the fatal defects of democratic government. Actually only this process of conference, adjustment, statement and restatement of facts and opinions will bring any widespread conviction to a substantial group of citizens that the resulting policy is their policy and that the administrators of it are their officials. The apparently successful direct action of the dictatorship, of the arbitrarily ruled machine, either does not solve the problem at all and for a time conceals the failure by various devices of showmanship, or gives way to a similar process of adjustment through new institutions whereby interests are once more consulted and the dictatorship liquidated.

This problem of integrating the citizen with administration

which is supposed to serve him has special importance in the United States because of the variety of cultural groups characteristic of our population. In their early bewilderment immigrant communities naturally follow either some of their own members, who are most assertive of their separate outlook at the expense of valuable contributions to the solving of pressing civic problems such as housing, or leaders in the older political machines who offer tangible rewards in jobs or influence, but also at the cost of giving them genuine civic representation. Their political assimilation begins when they learn to be proud of members of their group who are honored for their civic achievement, for their genuine public service. So long as their votes are sold to party machines in return for a handful of jobs for some of the more aggressive of their people, they are not citizens. The conventional views of good government have no urgency to them, because the conventional view has failed to include the need for associating the citizen directly with the day-to-day application of government. He is treated as an inert subject or as an aggressive person eager to outwit law or obtain some private advantage. An immigrant community which is invited by the municipal officials to participate in the planning of school, park, housing, health, and similar functions for their neighborhood in collaboration with the local administrative officers will develop civic standards far more rapidly than by the more conventional processes of electing a local alderman.

Thus this theory of organization, whether considered from the point of view of the member of the organization or of the person outside it to whom its policy may be applied, is in essence a theory of administration as education. Organization is viewed not as a mechanical arrangement of groups and individuals, although there should be present the application of fixed and measurable standards. It is rather a relating of individuals so that their efforts may be more effective in the accomplishment of some purpose. This is the major justification for their being assembled in the organization at all. It determines

the fact, therefore, that each person in the organization has meaning, significance, and importance through the function which he performs, but this function cannot be well performed unless the person who performs it understands the function and hence understands the relation of his portion of the task of realizing the purpose to that performed by others. The purpose cannot be performed unless there is some understanding of it and of the organization, for whom, indeed, in the last analysis, government is established. Herein lies the significance of Farquhar's phrase "instructional organization."

Such a theory of organization, whatever the inadequacies of its statement in these pages, is the only one which fits the fact of the contemporary delegation of wide discretionary powers by electorates, constitutions, and legislatures to the administrators. They must, of necessity, determine some part of the purpose and a large part of the means whereby it will be achieved in the modern state. Again, it is the only theory which will fit the facts concerning the motive forces of human behavior which are gradually being revealed to us by the psychologist and the physiologist—facts, it may be remarked, long discerned intuitively and by flashes of insight by the novelist and poet. It is not a theory which promises a ready and rapid solution of the world's difficulties, because it requires for its application infinite patience and sympathy with all sorts and varieties of men. But that, it may be, is the foremost of its virtues.

VI
AMERICAN SOCIETY AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

By JOHN M. GAUS

AMERICANS distrust government, yet steadily heap more tasks upon it. This is the paradox upon which Frankfurter dwells in his lectures entitled *The Public and Its Government*. Such a paradox, he continues, reveals "some unresolved inner conflict." The same clue to the conduct of public affairs in the United States is found by Dewey. In *The Public and Its Problems* he enlarges upon the cost to this country of what he terms "the eclipse of the public"—the paradox that the very forces which in the eighteenth century created a need and philosophy of freedom of the individual from external coercion, exercised through various political restrictions, have subsequently created other and equally powerful institutions which now coerce in their turn. When, therefore, the citizen seeks to protect himself by collective action through the state or otherwise, he is confronted by a deeply rooted philosophy which once made for revolt and freedom, to which allegiance has been given for two centuries, but which now protects and makes respectable institutional controls as irresponsible and arbitrary as those of the Sun King.

From the implications of the arguments advanced by Frankfurter and Dewey much of a philosophy of public administration can be developed which is needed if American society is to understand itself and deal adequately with its problems. "Can anything good come out of Washington?" a business executive, trained in one of our best engineering colleges, asked me recently in the course of an argument. "How about the Bureau of Standards?" I asked. "Oh, that doesn't count. Why, we use them in my own business!" was his reply. All

administration doesn't count to us, except that little sector which is so vital to our own interests. That, of course, must "be kept out of politics." Yet even a brief analysis of what is happening to American society will show—with proper allowance for the half-truth dimly gleaming through the mist of that phrase—that we suffer from too little realization that a healthy and satisfactory life for the individual can be obtained only through varied and extensive political arrangements, and that these arrangements are largely administrative in nature.

This apparently perverse and shocking conclusion is, of course, as old as Aristotle and as new as the child guidance clinic. Nor will it seem so shocking if we note the warnings of discerning students of American society of the eighties and nineties—let us say, Bryce, F. J. Turner, R. A. Woods—and check against them present fulfilment of their prophecies. This is not enough, satisfying though it be to find one's shocking conclusion verified. The theory of administration which rests upon this diagnosis must be so framed that it will divert present barren and sterile controversies—barren and sterile because superficial in assumptions—into channels whereby the forces employed can be harnessed to useful and relevant inquiry.

Even the present apparent "radical" approach of some to social problems is at least as naïve and inadequate as that of the defenders of Coolidge prosperity. The slogans of "Production for Use" and "An Economy of Plenty," the appeal to despise a society in which goods and services want a market while some people are in need—these slogans and appeals do not make a political philosophy. Of course it is stupid to be capable of producing vast quantities while leaving many people in want! But a still small voice inquires, "Isn't it so very stupid that probably there must be some more adequate explanation of the phenomenon than Original Sin?" What has been left out of the argument, of course, is precisely the problem which we face—that of organizing and administering a system whereby goods and services can be produced and distributed without waste, in the quantities and qualities and at

the precise times desired, and with a minimum of friction and clash.

The essence of administrative direction is the fixing of priorities. What comes first, then, in our present search for the true basis of public administration in American society? It is an examination, necessarily brief, of change and its incidental consequences—change, so to speak, in the abstract. The direct consequences of any given and specific change do not concern us here. The development of the bicycle, and later of the automobile, are direct causes, for example, of the wide adoption of hard-surfaced roads. But the point is that such changes in general, in the unpremeditated, seldom predicted, and subtle influence which they have upon the tastes and resulting daily life of individuals, strike at two vital points: the individual's sense of security, and his sense of purpose.

An idea of the indirect consequences of change is basic to an understanding of the United States. As J. F. Jameson remarks:

The movement of westward expansion is one of the most familiar facts of American history. But perhaps we do not always remember how peculiar it is, nor take notice of all its consequences. Is there any other great country whose center of population moves over the country many miles each decade, as does ours, which in a hundred and thirty years moved westward from the Chesapeake to Illinois? But what are the social results? A nation's center of population is, in a way, its center of gravity. A shifting center of gravity forces a nation into perpetual readjustment of its life. That which was the center of the merchant's particular branch of business ten years ago is no longer its center now; the farmer, the commercial traveller, the engineer, the speculator, must learn anew, every ten years, the social geography of his country. Restless change, increasing adaptation to new conditions, will be the characteristic of such a nation.

But this will not be the only characteristic, nor is the westward movement of population the only major factor illustrating and comprising change in American society. At least, these others deserve mention as of equal importance: the changing cultural mixtures due to immigration from so many nations; the rise of great urban centers and their repercussion on rural life; the great mobility of life within a locality, within the United States, and from employment to employment.

The clash of cultures in this country which immigration from so many nations has produced is familiar. It was noted in the Colonial period, when there was worry over the influx, for example, of the Germans; in the middle of the last century, when a strong political movement arose in protest against the new Irish immigration; and in the more recent decades, when we had first the Americanization movement, and then the movement which resulted in the immigration-restriction laws. We cannot estimate the cost, concealed in many ways, of what these attitudes have been and continue to be to the national life. But one of the most serious results has been the wiping out, for millions of people, of the support and protection given by a culture which their parents brought from the Old Country before any adequate provision of the culture of the new country had been made. This is not to despise or neglect the existence and development of a new culture in this country. Indeed, many critics of what was conceived to be Puritanism, the Old South, the Frontier, or the way of life of substantial middle-class business families in the United States in the past century, for example, reveal a costly ignorance of these matters, and exercise a wholly evil influence. We need very much to discover, reveal, and develop our "usable past" for the enhancement of our own future, despite the dangers thus offered of an ossified conception of it present in the travesties associated with some "patriotic" societies. But deliberately to create both contempt for an Old World culture and to frustrate the reception of newcomers into that which is native to this land is to court—and win—disasters long noted by social workers in our great cities.

Not only is such an absence of a supporting cultural medium responsible for individual maladjustments, but it also is a cause of degradation of political life. The cultural group whose Old World traits are despised, but whose members have had no initiation into a wholesome American tradition, turn to the kind of racial leader whose chief appeal is the prostitution of racial or national pride, and whose chief activity is the use of his power for private gain.

But the disruption of the neighborhood, the ebb and flow of population from country to city and back again, from one industry or job to another, is also costly. The hillbilly who comes to Detroit to work in the automobile plants at wages beyond his reach at home, who is cast off in slack times to wander back to the hills to live off the relatives; the country boys and girls who dwell in the vast impersonal lodging-house districts of our great cities; the crowds of unskilled or semi-skilled workers who now have a brief job in a city factory and now turn back to the submarginal farms exhausted by the tenancy of submarginal farmers—these only casually and by accident come to participate easily and naturally in anything that can be called a community life. The history of the settlement movement in this country supplies eloquent testimony of the need for some network of institutions to replace, for the time being, those aids to the individual and family in critical moments of their lives which were supplied as a matter of fact in the old self-contained stable neighborhood of the countryside or town. Sickness, death, accident, unemployment, the terrors of the unknown when among strangers in faith, custom, and language—all destroy security and the sense of purposefulness in life.

The destruction of neighborhood stability and all that it implies both reflects and is caused by the dependence upon a sensitive interdependent economic system in which far-flung ties of communication, extreme division of labor, large-scale organization of financing, and a complex price system play their parts. Nor are the prices equally flexible; some stick, others give. To manipulate the system, increasing proportions of paper-workers are required, situated at increasing distances from the source of ultimate wealth production in mine, field, forest, and shop. The objective becomes blurred, the place of the individual part in the organism obscured. The counters in the game—money and credit—seem to behave, too, in terms of other disturbing factors incidental to their own genius.

This problem of insecurity has been well stated by a student of urbanization, Arthur Pollard, as follows:

The man who does not live on a farm must in general have money every day to live, while the man on a farm can go for days and sometimes weeks without money. In the past he has needed money only for a very few days in the year. Back in 1800 only 15 per cent of the population did not live on farms. The great majority then did not need to save much money in the form of cash or liquid credits, but saved it rather in the form of land and equipment. To-day 77 per cent do not live on farms. The only security that this city population can have must be provided largely in the form of cash or liquid credits. The difference is enormous, and it has a bearing on our social and financial organization that has scarcely been appreciated, and certainly has received far too little attention. How to provide real security for an urban population such as ours is probably the most difficult problem that civilization faces.

Social instability and insecurity are by no means confined to the cities. With increasing specialization in agriculture the farmer has become more directly influenced—through the markets, the banks, transport, and communication—economically and culturally by the forces affecting the city dweller than formerly. As his soils become exhausted from a process of “mining” the fertility, as his fixed charges continue despite the fluctuations of prices and the value of money, aids from the larger political units have to be pumped into the rural areas to maintain roads and schools; proposals are advanced for zoning land to prevent further agricultural use of areas less fitted for agriculture, to encourage the growing of forest crops, and to develop recreational uses. With the shrinking of markets overseas, with shifts in consumer tastes and declines in urban purchasing power, an emergency program to enable commodity growers to adapt their output to available markets is devised. We have hitherto thought that the problems of government and control in our industrial and urban world were of great importance and complexity; but the administrative aspects of the new rural policies now rival them in the challenge to foresight, accurate analysis, comprehensiveness, and administrative capacities generally. The researches of John Ferris and others on the staff of the Tennessee Valley Authority relate significant political and economic institutional factors to the soil cycle in the search for security.

Thus both in city and in country the only hope which the individual can have today for securing some stable basis from which to survey his world and set about making something of his capacities is that he can, with his fellows, organize institutions through which the arbitrary forces which affect him may be in some degree mitigated or controlled.

Change, resulting in the kind of obvious and surface insecurity mentioned above, has deeper consequences. It forces itself upon the attention of the psychologist and psychiatrist. They have had to search beyond the individual to isolate the causes of his maladjustments. Thus Elton Mayo has traced, in his studies of employees of a Chicago factory, their problems into the city neighborhoods in which these workers reside, and has drawn upon analyses of these neighborhoods made by sociologists. He finds the primary social disruptions of family and neighborhood life of basic importance in the problems that arise in working life in the factory. He concludes:

Just as our political and economic studies have for two hundred years tended to take account only of the economic functions involved in living, so also in our actual living we have inadvertently allowed pursuit of economic development to lead us into a condition of extensive social disintegration. . . . One suspects that the Chicago researches are significant not only for criminal and suicide inquiry, but significant for students of industrial relations, of psychoneurosis and of education.

This truth was strongly stressed at least fifty years ago by the settlement pioneers in the United States such as Jane Addams, Robert A. Woods, and others. Mayo continues:

The imposition of highly systematized industrial procedures upon all the civilized cultures has brought to relative annihilation the cultural traditions of work and craftsmanship. Simultaneously the development of a high labor mobility and a clash of cultures has seriously damaged the traditional routine of intimate and family life in the United States. Generally the effect has been to induce everywhere a considerable degree of social disorganization; the comfortable non-logic of every social code has been reduced, at least in part, to irrational exasperation—without any prospect of development towards a better understanding for the average citizen.

Frankwood Williams, diagnosing the ills of the college youth, records also the devastating effect upon the individual student of the social forces, reflected in the home, which Mayo has found to be so influential also in the factory. After describing conversations with students whose parents had become alarmed at their waste of the college years, he remarks:

But what underlay all these things, as one sees it now, and what I believe is more important now for the youth of the country generally than the immediate difficulties due to the "depression," and accountable not only for the symptomatic behavior mentioned here, but for the deep cynicism that seems to pervade both the universities and the secondary schools, is that youth, full of energy and idealism, finds no purpose (except as he may have a personal ambition which represents the working out of a conflict within him) to which he can tie, and lacks, therefore, motivating power. He finds no purpose to take over from us. Insofar as he finds a purpose in us at all, he finds it without sense. The very lives of his parents are evidence of the senselessness of their purposes.

Change which we have found to be so characteristic of American life, change that has disrupted neighborhoods, that has destroyed cultural stabilities, that has reflected a sweep across the continent, the restless migration to city and back to farm, from one job to another, has brought its widely hailed merits. Its merits have been of so spectacular a nature, indeed, that we speak of it as progress. Striking individuals emerge. Vast works are accomplished. Excitement and stimulus are in the atmosphere. All things are possible to some men. Its costs are also becoming clearer, registered in the great dramatic collapses of the depression, more subtly in the defeat, disintegration, and frustration of individuals, the sense of void where once, in the conquering of a continent, there was purpose. The very challenge of the continent is reflected in Emerson and Whitman. Can it be recaptured?

We seem to have wandered far from the topic of public administration. Yet my thesis is that through public instruments some new institutional basis which will enable the individual to find development and satisfaction can be created, and some sense of purpose may again flower. In the total drift of social

institutions during a century, indeed, a new institutional pattern can be discerned, and watchful eyes already make it out. As Gardiner Means says:

Economic developments during the past hundred years have played an outrageous trick on the economic fraternity. Gradually but steadily great segments in the organization of economic activity have been shifted from the market place to administration. . . . In 1929 approximately 49 per cent of all corporate wealth—excluding the duplication of financial corporations—was controlled by two hundred corporations. The controls of nearly half of industrial activity had become an administrative matter for two hundred great administrative units. . . . This shift from organization through the market place to organization by administrative action has gone so far that the market place appears to have become rather a disorganizing than an organizing influence. . . . Either we must make the market place a satisfactory coordinator or supplement the market place by other coordinating devices.

In the efforts to find some new sense of control, of opportunity for the individual to assert some influence on the situation in which he finds himself, the individual has associated his efforts with others in like predicament. As investor, he has pressed for collective instruments wherewith he may offset his incapacity alone in dealing with banking, insurance, credit, and the issuance and exchange of securities. As worker, he has devised public and collective instruments for bargaining or regulations concerning hours, wages, and other factors; he has similarly grappled with problems of industrial accident and disease, and unemployment. As consumer, he secures agents wherewith to investigate the quality of his milk supply. As resident and citizen, he has established collective services such as paved roads that are cheaper than he could supply individually, or that could otherwise not be provided at all yet are essential for life in crowded urban centers, such as water supply, sewage and waste disposal, or fire prevention. He presses for new services as their value to him in preserving or enhancing his way of life is demonstrated; thus he attempts to preserve the amenities of his home by zoning land, by parks, and by traffic controls. His wife is told that her place is in the

home. She agrees. But she points out that the functions thus assigned her have moved from the farmhouse of 1800 to the playground, nursery school, food industry, movie, and many other places today; that she must, for duty's sake, follow the home there; and that to do the job properly she must hire adequate agents such as health officers, playground directors, factory inspectors, movie censors, or else the home is left defenseless. Both husband and wife may find, indeed, that these neighborhood services which extend their effectiveness to something approaching the scope of the forces which they must control must sometimes extend very far indeed into the state, the region, the nation.

Nor is this all. When Chicago set out to provide itself with an adequate water supply, geography required it to establish some means of disposing of its sewage also; this involved it with disputes with other cities in the state, then other states, and finally with a foreign state. We are learning in an expensive school that arms are not a problem that can be solved by a single state; adequate armaments are relative to what the others have, and they in turn are relative to the kinds of disputes which may call for their use, and thus we find our local issues leading into the international society of which we are a part, and requiring here, also, agents to serve us all. Here the task of breaking through commitments to old symbols is most difficult of all—yet must be solved if we are to achieve what our interdependent system makes possible. Despite our absence from the League of Nations we contribute a Jeremiah Smith, a Howland, and a Rice to the civil service of the emerging world-government, just as a half century ago a Bliss was serving a similar purpose in Syria.

To speak of these new organizations as extending the range of individual effort in some degree proportionate to the otherwise irresponsible coercive power of the natural forces and human organizations with which the individual must deal may seem evasive. It may be more intelligible to say that we are submerging the individual, and theories of his place in society,

beneath the state and theories of socialism. This is to forget that these, too, are tested ultimately by their enrichment of the individuals who comprise the state. It is true that to speak of the individual as investor, producer, and consumer is to overstress one aspect of his life. Despite theories of economic interest he is first of all a person, a human being, whose needs are first supplied in the family circle and then in the community whose degree of civilization influences the quality of family life directly. Hence it is primarily the citizen, the member of the public, whose place in the new society demands greatest consideration. If during the critical years of infancy the family surrounding the child is characterized by poverty and insecurities of all sorts, and presents an environment of conflict, worry, and strain; if during childhood the provision of schooling, of play, of group life, prohibits the kind of development of the individual through which good habits are formed and potential capacities developed—the basis of a citizenship adequate for thinking through its challenging problems is never provided.

The task of predicting the consequences of contemporary actions, of providing the requisite adjustments, is immensely difficult in individual or family life. The difficulties increase with the size and complexity of the unit and the expansion of the range of variables. Nevertheless, the large organization of commanding authority may be able to reduce the variables by inserting dikes which canalize future action. True, if the dikes break, the loss to those who have built homes assured of their protection is the greater. When a price-fixing agreement in an industry collapses, the ruin is more devastating for the industry than the losses in competition spread over a long period. But other dikes—if properly cared for—may release the energies of people for more constructive tasks than the fighting of floods. A fairly enforced system of weights and measures, of regulation of utility rates, or of banking standards eliminates the waste effort harmful to the consumer, the shipper, or the depositor. The business man, indeed, constantly presses upon govern-

ments for too great an extension of planning, of dike-building, of elimination of uncertainties than is good for the rest of us. He has come to take these government policies favorable to him so much for granted that they no longer appear to him to be special favors. Thus the establishment by law and administration of a system of property (not really private, but essentially created by a public act) and of tariffs are creative acts of government that establish certainty in some activities and eliminate the uncertainties, for example, arising from brute force or foreign goods.

All such certainties—whether property rights, tariffs, labor laws—are, we have seen, possible shock absorbers against the excessive costs of change. They are dangerous instruments to use; yet we constantly expand their range as one interest presses to obtain a counterbalancing protection against another, and as the uncertainties inherent in our interdependent price system increase. The task which falls upon the administrator, whether in political or financial, commercial or industrial government, is therefore steadily growing more difficult and important. Can we obtain administrators who will be competent to undertake these tasks? What qualities must they possess? Can they be developed through education? Is there, indeed, a common, public interest for which we require such agents and trustees? Must we, to be honest, accept the spoils system and the pressure group as the complete, and the essential, theory of political society?

No American family has contributed more to a solution of this central problem of using the public services so that the citizen may realize his best self than the Adams family. J. Q. Adams was one of the few members of the governing class of the early years of our republic who had some imaginative conception of what our natural resources might do for us. His grandson, Henry, saw how decisive a public service of good quality would be in the new America, and worked mightily to achieve it. Charles Francis Adams, another grandson, was a founder of the public utility regulation movement, and with

the younger Charles Eliot invented a metropolitan planning and park system for Boston. Brooks Adams, brother of Henry and Charles, in his writings analyzed penetratingly the rôle of the administrator in a world of social change. In his *The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma* he interpreted the teachings of his grandfather and revealed the dream—and disappointment—of that amazing man. In his *The Theory of Social Revolutions* he remarks:

It is in dealing with administration, as I apprehend, that civilizations have usually, though not always, broken down, for it has been on administrative difficulties that revolutions have for the most part supervened. Advances in administration seem to presuppose the evolution of new governing classes, since, apparently, no established type of mind can adapt itself to changes in environment, even in slow-moving civilizations, as fast as environments change. . . . The most distressing aspect of the situation is that social acceleration is progressive in proportion to the activity of the scientific mind which makes mechanical discoveries, and it is therefore a triumphant science which produces those ever more rapidly recurring changes in environment to which men must adapt themselves at their peril.

The requisite quality for directing the necessary readjustments to new scientific application so that social change due to material developments will not be too great is to be found, he urges, in administrators with "a high order of generalizing mind—a mind which can grasp a multitude of complex relations." Do we attempt to secure such minds for our public services, and do we attempt to develop them in our educational system?

As to recruiting, quite deliberately, men and women with the administrative qualities which are suggested in Adams' analysis—qualities of imagination, ability to co-ordinate complex factors, ability to direct, to plan and to time and give exact priority to a multitude of enterprises—there is a fresh interest and spirit of inquiry abroad among personnel administrators and students of public administration in this country today. A by no means minor aspect of the activities of governments the world over in the present depression (activities that

are very similar, under whatever philosophy attempted) is the rich experience we are accumulating on this question. Two types of positions that call for administrators of the kind characterized by Adams as requiring "a high order of generalizing mind" are the administrative staff assistant to the chief executive and the director of planning staffs. The first position is sometimes performed, unnoticed, by private secretaries; its importance cannot be overstressed. Through it the mass of reports, memoranda, and more ephemeral data surge toward the executive, pressing for decision; from it issue the decisions. The second position requires a similar channeling of materials, with their subsequent interpretation and reduction to order, illustrated, for example, in natural-resource planning of a region with data from several types of land experts, water experts, mineralogists, foresters, agriculturists, transportation experts, experts in public finance, and many others. No man can hope to have a thorough training in more than one of the many fields of administration which require interpretation and co-ordination in the final conspectus that must be evolved. Yet, clearly, he cannot be an amateur. He must have had experience in these very processes, he must, as a historian once remarked to me concerning the training of historians, "have had his fingers dirty from the documents" and, indeed, his shoes muddy from trampling over the region, his patience tried by many frustrations from departmental jealousies. In this not clearly marked area, discussed elsewhere in these essays, the place for the general administrative staff worker is plotted.

It is significant that this problem of the division of labor reflects a parallel issue in university education and, indeed, education generally. Shall it be liberal or technical? Preferably both. In a society which is relatively fluid, in which educational opportunity may be kept open with some offset to financial disability, it is possible to achieve something of both. The traditional liberal education can profitably be made more significant in terms of content drawn from the problems of citizenship and human living. The work in literature and his-

tory can thus be utilized; and I have elsewhere urged the use in the general course of study, probably in the first two years of college, of the regional survey as a device whereby each student works out a total picture of his home community and the natural and social forces upon which its life is dependent, from the soil and rainfall to its market and cultural relations with the rest of the globe. We can take a leaf from the book of the regional planner, and enable each student to see both the accomplishments of his region and the challenges which confront it. He will have some more direct motivation leading to his own participation, through some line of career, in a solution of its problems upon which his own future depends. He will have a substantial and concrete foundation for his studies, in later years, of some narrower phase of its life, whether in political science, economics, literature, or law. He will proceed into his professional course or to immediate employment with a more adequate "frame of reference." Similarly, the opportunities for continuing adult education, whether in the form of "in-service" training for the civil servant, the banker, the journalist, or the worker in any field will indicate some relationship to the larger problems of the surrounding community.

From those who have thus been oriented, we may expect to find a wider range of choice for higher posts, and it will matter less whether they have entered the administrative services of state or industry as technicians or in some general administrative class positions, important though this question is. Even the technician will have been given some indication of the relationship of his own place in the organism to the larger purposes and the interdependent activities which require his co-operative effort. The problem of relating the line departments with the auxiliary services and of co-ordinating them all is, therefore, by no means a personnel problem in the narrower sense, but has its roots in the whole educational system, from the nursery school to adult education, and its influence upon civic training.

We have been too defeatist, in the United States, about our

administrative class. We have looked too longingly, perhaps, across the ocean at the British and German civil service, until our eyes have lost their focus for seeing a better type of public servant close at hand. We have had, as we may learn increasingly from such recent explorations of ourselves as the new *Dictionary of American Biography*, many men and women, recruited widely from classes and races and sections in this country, who have combined both a humane sense of obligation to ideals and to their fellow-men with the very best intellectual qualities, so that they have done pioneer work in major fields in which the public needs agents to act on its behalf. I refer not only to unnoticed pioneers in the public scientific services of health, natural-resource development, or local government. In the ranks of private industry and business from the days of Peter Cooper and earlier to the present we have had, even more than other people and despite the more spectacular rôle of the speculators and those benefiting by sheer pressure of increasing population or paper profits on the stock market, a type of industrial and business manager and technician or labor leader whose major drive has come from the challenge of the task, the desire to do creative work in his field, the satisfactions which come from some civic duties well performed. They are the salt of the country. They have, with Taylor, founded a science of management. They have re-defined the American ideal of the early days of the republic in terms of the changes of a century later. They have moved to create some security, some amenities, in our great cities, helped to preserve some of the peace and beauty of wilderness areas for the enjoyment of future generations. Within their own businesses, industries, and professions they have cultivated, against the opposition of the careless or the greedy, a sense of trusteeship for the responsibility of providing commodities and services.

The real fight in this country is not between verbal philosophies of collectivism and individualism, but between those who follow these goals, these implications of what a man might do creatively, and those whose satisfactions come from the advan-

tageous speculation in the product of the creative effort of others. This has been termed a war between industry and finance. Veblen, one of our most original and stimulating thinkers, called it a clash between "the engineers and the price system." Peter Cooper, himself a creative man of business of a century ago, had already discerned the issue by the 1830's, and in his old age turned to discussing the issue more formally in his writings on currency. A century before him Franklin was aware of the issue; and indeed in one sense the colonial struggle with the mother country carries interesting implications of the natural conflict between those who are creating wealth by the physical provision of goods and services and those, at some remove, who profit by manipulation.

The problems of government are, therefore, not to be found exclusively in the state, or those of the economic order in the market and price system alone. The older concept of a political economy is still valid and useful. There is a striking similarity among the major policies of the states throughout the world in dealing with the depressions. They reflect the rise of cartels, trade associations, trade-unions and syndicates, economic councils, and similar organizations which have been established to serve as rudimentary organs of industrial government. It is significant that, once established, they have had to turn to political government to become effective. The hearings before a Senate Committee on the bill introduced by Senator LaFollette to establish a National Economic Council revealed the naïve belief of many industrialists that power could be given to trade associations whereby they might establish industrial governments, without any intervention by the political government being required. More experienced industrial leaders, such as H. P. Kendall, rightly pointed out, on the other hand, that voluntary organizations of this kind were ineffective even in attempting to secure policies obviously beneficial to the industry as a whole, and that the borrowing of coercive power from the political government would necessarily involve also the right of the political government to intervene to protect

interests outside the industry, such as other industries and the consumer generally. All the characteristic problems of the modern state through its long evolution from the king's private household to the legislative reference library reappear in these embryonic efforts to regularize the emerging economic governments in trade associations and trade-unions.

Within the individual corporation the same tendencies appear also. The planning and staff work of the central administration required for co-ordinating and integrating the transformation of raw materials into finished commodities delivered to the consumer is closely comparable to the central administration of a city or national state. There is the similar problem of integrating the ideas and efforts of many specialists, of the heads of many line departments, of determining priorities, of planning campaigns, of winning consent. With one agency, the ultimate voting is by dollars; if the policy, translated into commodities or services, does not win consent, a rival gets the dollar vote. With the other, the voting is by ballot; if the policy, translated into services or commodities, does not win consent, the rival gets the ballot vote. Both systems are liable to distortion and frustration in operation by advertising or political appeals whereby the quality of the service or commodity is hidden by a manipulation of symbols more satisfying to the consumer and citizen.

Thus we must consider government today as meaning more than has conventionally been understood by the term. We must conceive of the whole body of citizens of a state—eventually, a world-state—as requiring goods and services in order to achieve the life which they desire, and securing these through the kind of agency and organization which offers the best product at the least cost. One of these costs, sometimes hidden, is the strain put upon human beings by having to play an active part in civic life. The indifference and apathy of the voter are a major check upon extending considerably the tasks of government unless its focusing of responsibility is simplified to the utmost, so that the act of the individual citizen can be within

the reach of his interest and understanding. But the important point is that the subject matter of the student of administration, the materials which throw light on his problems, center at points of co-ordinating and directing the efforts of human beings who must perforce co-operate through various devices in order to retain some freedom, as individuals, against coercion from without. Whether their co-operation comes through the consumer co-operative organization, a municipal government, a trade-union or trade association, or a selection in purchasing whereby their choices can be registered is secondary to the common administrative process, with comparable problems and devices, which may be found in them all. Where a simple exchange of goods and services has given place to complex and interdependent exchange in which some movements are less flexible than others, the study of economics, based upon an analysis of an automatically operating market and price system, is inadequate either for an understanding of the system or for attempting its repair or improvement. Nor is the study of political science, narrowly conceived, especially in terms of law, adequate for the diagnosis or improvement of the political system which has had to carry the burden placed upon it by the failure of the economic system. The two must, for certain purposes, be utilized together in public administration, since it is here that the problems of management which arise in the provision of goods and services appear.

The theory of public administration which emerges from this conception of society, which, in my opinion, is a most useful instrument for us today, is substantially that indicated by Dewey in *The Public and Its Problems* and by George Russell in *The National Being*. When many individuals are affected by, and without opportunity to participate directly in, the actions of other individuals, they should organize themselves in such a way as to protect their interests. The chief limitation or qualification, perhaps more exactly a warning, which I would suggest here is that sometimes such an organization is more trouble, or more costly, to the individuals seeking protection

than the consequences of the acts which they wish to control would be. But Dewey's analysis is substantially correct. It follows from it that the agents of the individuals whom we may, with Dewey, term the "public" are public officials. Collectively, with the procedures established by the public to select and authorize them, they are the "government." The whole—public, government, officials—are the state. Be it noted that the individual citizen himself, when acting as a member of this public in voting, for example, is for that purpose an official. The consequence of all this is that "the state is as its officials are."

The further consequence is that the sole, the basic, criterion for selecting officials and judging their public acts is their ability to accomplish the public purpose. To select them for any reason other than their equipment for that purpose, to select them, for example, because they are jobless, or former soldiers, or because they helped win an election, is to select them for a private and distorting, not public and fulfilling, reason. It is to destroy utterly the very reason for their existence. If the Poles or Irish or Germans in Ward X are prevailed upon to elect a Pole or Irishman or German as alderman and are repaid by a Pole or Irish or German building inspector without experience, if in consequence they fail to get enforcement of the building codes, and thus continue to exist in tenements which are a threat to their health, they have not gained the public service which was intended, but have actually injured themselves. It would have been better for them if there had been no building codes authorized, for they are now subject not only to bad housing but to official guaranty of it. Hence it is not enough to "socialize"—to wave the wand of governmental control, regulation, or ownership over a sector of human activity. The public may obtain better service through non-governmental means such as a neighborhood recreation society, an individual or corporate business, or other ways in which the service is more responsive to the public need and interest than an inadequate governmental service would be. But experience

indicates that on the whole, and in the long run, the whole body of citizens must at some point establish some ultimate controls.

Clearly such a theory of public administration as this concentrates upon personnel the greatest importance of government. The implications reach far and wide, of course: to the importance of the public recognizing itself as a public, amidst the distractions of life; to effective formulation of its aims and objects in programs, policies, and laws; to adequate protection of its interests from abuse; but always, at the center, is the question: Is the John Jones who is serving as Health Inspector, or Director of the Water Department, competent to perform his task, in terms of general education, innate abilities, experience, and training in the field?

There are other theories of public administration. The one of greatest acceptance, on the surface at least, is the spoils theory. It is thought to be realistic. It does not stand analysis. If we really thought government appointments should be the prize of those who have by bribery, corruption, and influence of the electorate gotten political power, it would be far greater and richer spoils for the vast majority of us who have not obtained the relatively few jobs to disestablish government entirely. The theory proves too much to explain adequately the facts. It is popular only because too few people have stopped to consider sufficiently why they permit government to exist. Because they have not stopped to consider, it is possible for some of their agents to establish spoils systems without entirely destroying the public services for which government was established, and thus to give color to the charge that the whole system is a spoils system. But let the person who holds the spoils theory test his allegiance to it in this way: Let him ask himself, if he is a city dweller, whether he would give up the water system, and sink his own well (let us say from his Park Avenue apartment); dispose of his sewage and garbage by himself, his neighbors doing likewise; permit his neighbor to put up a slaughter-house next door; or do his own policing for his jewelry store; or, if he is a country dweller, let him hard-

surface his own share of the highway to market, fight his own freight rates on wheat, corn, hogs, and milk with the railroad, and if a member of his family goes insane or is tubercular, keep him at home.

The important half-truth in the spoils theory is this: that we have been content to indicate services which we would like to have performed as public services, and have authorized them; but we have been too lazy, too incompetent mentally, to follow up these pious wishes to insure the provision of such services. The actual organizations established have been private, not public. The public has been eclipsed, as Dewey says. The heavy price which it is paying in consequence, in such a matter, for example, as world-interdependence without world-government, is well illustrated by the World War. In domestic life a similar price is seen in the depression.

It may be thought that a more adequate theory is to be found in the view that the civil service is the agent of the dominant economic class. This is only a variation of the spoils theory, and subject to its inadequacies. Both Communist and speculative financier doubtless continue to drink Catskill water in New York, and profit from health department quarantine regulations elsewhere. More seriously, Communism has left out, so far as its founder and its chief expounder in practice are concerned, any treatment of this vital question. Marx refers briefly to the transformation of the state and government, as instruments of the exploiting class, into "simple administration"; Lenin, in an equally casual reference, speaks of the withering-away process leading finally to "mere accounting." "Simple administration"! "Mere accounting"! At this moment the greatest hero in the U.S.S.R. is apparently a coal miner who is most successful in applying to his job some of Taylor's more elementary rules. And what must the planning authorities at Moscow, as they try to balance industrial production with agricultural production, as they plan the location of new factories with such items as coal supply, supply of raw materials, transport, possible invasion from East, West, or

South in mind, think of such a dismissal of the central problem of government! One suspects that they would agree with Mayo that the search for solutions of the administrative problem is equally relevant to plants on the bank of the Charles or the Volga, and that they would like to study what the staffs of General Motors or the American Telephone and Telegraph or the committees of the Taylor Society are doing with problems of priority, forecasting, consumer response to varying types and styles, allocation of man power, and the training of apprentices.

The really important half-truth which emerges from a spoils theory, whether one based on personal, factional, party-machine or class-interest basis, only reinforces the need for scrutinizing any given public service as to whether it really is the supply of a commodity or service with a view to adding to the total wealth of the individuals for which it is presumably provided, whether the organization and its personnel, for example, are competent to do the assigned job. Here the most useful contributions are being made by students of management and psychology and administration generally. From them comes an important part of the raw materials—sometimes the finished products—of which the political theorist must take account if his theory is to be useful.

Perhaps the efforts of men to predict, to guide, even to control change must remain the theme of specialists in irony, of such works as Hardy's *Dynasts*. Perhaps any effort to persist in the enterprise must rest upon an animal faith that it is man's task, as man, to make the effort. We should remember, to be just, that there was no more adequate foundation for the faith of those who, in the eighteenth century, found that man's selfishness was rooted in a natural law, and that from private vices public virtues emerge. I believe that the achievement of substantial additions to the good things of life for the individual which the intervening century was able to provide through co-operative and collective services gives us evidence on which to proceed. We do have more information than man has ever

had before concerning the means of improving the conditions of life. We know that this information, to be applied effectively, requires many and varied forms of public administration. To free this knowledge from the philosophies which entangle it requires a revision of our long-accepted theory of the nature of the individual.

It is for this reason that I have attempted here to relate the findings of the contemporary sociologist, the student of individual psychology, and of the public administrator. The consequences of social change as rapid and as unforeseen as that which characterizes the twentieth century constitute the area of their common task.

VII

THE CRITERIA AND OBJECTIVES OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By MARSHALL E. DIMOCK

ACCORDING to American standards and values, the highest compliment that a government can be paid is to be called "efficient." It is no exaggeration to say that, particularly in the last fifty years, American citizens have developed an attitude toward the term "efficiency" which is nothing short of worshipful. In common conversation many sweeping generalizations about efficiency may be heard. Thus, for example, it is said that industry in America is more efficient than anywhere else in the world; that the comforts and high standards of living which we enjoy in the United States are attributable to the efficiency of our machines and our business executives; and that the highest goal to which government can aspire is business efficiency.

All of this sloganizing and sermonizing sounds very well, but on closer examination it is usually very difficult to discover what a person has in mind when he proclaims that efficiency is the ultimate value. What we need, therefore, is a critical examination of the concept. Having taken this initial step, we should proceed to a fuller consideration of the criteria, objectives, and values according to which governmental administration is to be tested, criticized, and improved.

Although the intensive emphasis upon efficiency in government came at a later time than it did in the business community, there can be no question that for at least a generation there has been an uncritical acceptance of the efficiency slogan. In the minds of most people efficiency and economy are interchangeable terms; those who demand fewer governmental activities and smaller tax bills, therefore, make efficiency their

rallying cry. Those who have made it a business to specialize in public administration have, for the most part, given general acceptance to this point of approach. Thus an outstanding writer in the field of public administration has prefaced his *magnum opus* with the statement, "The great political problem now confronting us is that of securing economy and efficiency in the actual administration of governmental affairs." Another well-known writer introduces his treatise on public administration with the observation, "The objective of public administration is the most efficient utilization of the resources at the disposal of the officials and employees." It is only fair to say that both of these writers, particularly the latter, point out later in their discussion that they have a broader vision of what is meant by the term "efficiency" than is held by the great mass of people who uncritically pay lip service to this ideal.

When we consider the pervasive influence of "our business civilization," it is clear that no one in America is entirely free from the assumption that the exact kind of efficiency which is prescribed for business should be applied indiscriminately to government. This generally accepted belief would not be so significant were it not for the fact that the concept and implications of efficiency, as practiced in the United States, have a peculiar quality which is typically American. In this country the connotation of efficiency definitely conveys the mechanical, utilitarian meaning. Efficiency becomes tantamount to economy, penny-pinching, and profit-making. Let it not be thought that all of our business leaders, much less those in academic posts, subscribe to this mechanized view. We are simply anxious to drive home the point that this limited, "hard-boiled" interpretation of efficiency has been generally accepted for a considerable period of time and that its influence has been one of the most dominant forces in the development of American ideology and institutions.

It must be admitted that at an earlier time there was a great deal of truth in the advice of a British official who, referring to American experiments in scientific management, counseled:

"It would be one of the greatest mistakes that could ever be made in this country. It is machine-like in concept and inhuman in its operation." Should American students of governmental administration similarly conclude that efficiency, so conceived, is an outworn and inadequate objective? In the latest textbook which has been contributed to the field the author says in no uncertain terms that public administration "must by its very nature have a social concept of efficiency rather than that of scientific management relative to the productivity of the individual plant or person." And again, "Governmental management has had to depart from the efficiency criteria of private management."

Can efficiency, the yardstick and goal of public administration, be redeemed by construing it more broadly? Or should we seek new criteria and ends for systematic public administration, thereby rejecting this timeworn symbol? Before we can attempt to answer this question, we need to consider another one, namely, why public administration should be concerned with criteria and values at all.

In every country and in every age has not the bureaucracy been merely the helpless pawn which unhesitatingly carried out the will of its master, namely, the élite in control of the government? Well-known writers on political science have made so sweeping a statement. Moreover, there is a great deal of historical evidence which seems to support this analysis of the situation. If we view the matter in the long historical perspective beginning with the huge civil service of Babylon, Egypt, and China, which rested heavily upon slaves, coming down to the professionalization and flowering of an official service in the Roman Empire, through the Feudal Period in which public business was greatly minimized, bringing us to the emergence of the state system and strong national sovereigns who laid the secure foundations of an official bureaucracy, and ending with the strong currents of democratic reform which established civil service on a legally recognized basis—is it not apparent that bureaucracy's function was the loyal execution

of policies determined by someone else and over which the permanent administrative corps had little or no influence?

If, then, one is driven to the conclusion that the values and purposes which administration seeks are nothing more and nothing less than those which its masters cherish and enforce, may we not as well conclude our analysis of the criteria and objectives of public administration at this point? Yet, a moment's reflection on the influence which the permanent administrative corps possessed in some of the world's leading countries before the War and which it has today will readily indicate the error of accepting so sweeping a generalization.

Even if we assume for the sake of argument that bureaucracy serves largely as a tool, is an administrative corps so devoid of will and of a sense of objective and purpose as the foregoing historical glimpses might make us believe? Is the only common factor unquestioning loyalty? Were fidelity, valor, and discipline the only virtues impressed upon the minds of the Roman soldier-civil servants? Or were there other incentives which have controlled and stimulated the execution of public business through the ages? Is it not safe to assume that public employees from the earliest times have speculated on the ends of the state, have done what they could to fulfil them, and have been actuated by professional and humanitarian instincts which were quite apart from the demands placed upon them by their masters?

It may even be asked whether the efficiency criterion does not extend back a long way into the misty past. As early as the Greek philosophers we find it recognized that a monarchy cannot survive, much less flourish, unless it be guided and controlled by the honor of the Prince. In the history of Europe and of the British Isles there is considerable historical evidence that the better monarchs recognized the necessity of recruiting permanent administrative corps wherein ability, honor, and fixed principles of conduct were actively sought and given appropriate recognition. It is not a perversion of history to say that the professionalized and disciplined bureaucracy of the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the forerunner of the modern emphasis upon efficient administration. We are not interested in showing that there was a definite ideological connecting link. Nor do we assume that all of the modern attributes of the efficiency movement can be explained by historical analysis. What does seem to be important is that the recognition of certain criteria or values tantamount to the modern-day emphasis upon efficiency is to be found in the institutional developments of the early modern state. Hence, we have rounded the circle and have come back again to our original inquiry concerning efficiency.

We have already pointed out that efficiency is a very comprehensive term. It is a mendicant—it begs the question until the auditor can discover the particular connotations the user has in mind. Because of this expansive adaptability which the word possesses it can be made to satisfy the desires even of those who take the broader, more social view of the criteria and objectives of governmental functioning. Let us, therefore, consider the recent revolt against the narrow interpretation of efficiency, and let us then project a broader and more humane concept which might be made to gain wider acceptance.

The mechanical view of efficiency cramps the style even of those who are responsible for management. Machine-like efficiency is to the responsible executive of an enterprise as chilly aloofness is to an orator. Successful administration is warm and vibrant. It is human. Mechanical efficiency is coldly calculating and inhuman. Hence it cannot be expected to produce morale and enthusiastic co-operation. It relies upon the instincts of fear and survival rather than upon "associatedness" and creativeness. Mechanical efficiency may appear to succeed for a time, but ultimately it will prove disappointing. If it be assumed that true efficiency consists in the securing of the optimum social and human results which are possible in a given situation, then mechanical efficiency may be very inefficient. This is not simply a confusion of terms; it represents a distinction which has meaning and significance.

More and more among experienced administrators, at least among those who possess deep insight and perspective, it is recognized that machine-like efficiency is the foe of satisfactory results. This is a negative way of saying that administration should not become overly orthodox, rigidified, stereotyped, or grooved, and that what may appear to be theoretical perfection may be the undoing of progressive, vibrant management. Consider, for example, the counsel of the directing head of the world's largest municipal transport system, the London Passenger Transport Board. In a recent article Mr. Frank Pick, with great discernment, dealt with the forces which make or break large-scale enterprises. To the orthodox proponent of scientific management his words are undoubtedly shocking.

Efficiency practiced as a fine art can be lethal. . . . Perfection is the enemy of sound administration. A spice of vice, a spark of irrationality, a fondness for inconsistency, a flash of genius—are they not all desirable, even essential, to the good conduct of administration?

There is no doubt in Mr. Pick's mind that such flexibility, artistic temperament, and fondness for experimentation are the very core of great administration. What this outstanding executive had in mind, particularly, becomes clear on careful reading of his analysis: Mechanized efficiency kills the life and the spirit of management, as well as the *esprit* of the employees and the gratification of the users. Over and over again we are brought back to the brilliant insight of Lord Haldane, who concluded that, in the success of an administrative enterprise, atmosphere is everything.

Among men of great administrative capacity there is a striking awareness that stereotyped and rigidified management is as inadequate as individual conduct which is based upon nothing more than the fear of the law. Sir Henry Bunbury, another administrator-statesman, has expressed one of his deepest convictions as follows:

But there are in the world of administration regions in which orderliness can be bought at too high a price and is not a primary desideratum. These are the regions in which we want, above everything else, enterprise,

invention, foresight, far-seeing judgment, a high standard of personal efficiency of performance; and these things an excess of control tends rather to impair than to create.

This world-famous administrative official has pointed out that rigid control is a costly thing, not only to those controlled, but also to the authority controlling; and that efficiency can be promoted best by resort to compelling incentives.

Efficiency is a matter of quality, and hence quantitative and mechanical methods of measurements must perforce be far from complete. Morale and satisfaction can be felt and enjoyed, but few people think seriously of attempting to codify or meter them. Efficiency, like happiness, is subtle. This qualitative view of the matter has been forcefully expounded by the late Lord Haldane. At the peak of his administrative career he observed that public service's "real purpose must be the defined one of rendering the highest amount practicable of service to the state, and service of the highest quality." Efficiency, he said, is the product of "strong motive."

The observations we have made concerning efficiency in government apply with almost equal force to the domain of business. Some so-called "hard-boiled" persons may disagree with this statement. According to the traditional difference between government and business, the only test of the latter is profits, whereas government's criterion is social satisfaction. In the realm of business the revolt against mechanized efficiency is accompanied by similar protests against the mere monetary yardstick. As evidence of the recent social view of efficiency we need but quote the words of Harvard's Dean Donham. The head of the Business School has said:

The test of administrative efficiency we need cannot be the last dollar of profits or the last pound of production. Administrative efficiency must play over the whole range of social values, for profit and stability of business are dependent on the widest social advances.

In increasing measure there is general dissatisfaction with the classical view of capitalism, which held that the main difference between a Public Service and a private enterprise is that the former is, or ought to be conducted primarily for the benefit of

the public in the form of services rendered; the latter is conducted for the benefit of its owners or shareholders in the form of dividends.

There is no true efficiency which is not also social efficiency. The mechanical concept and the simple profit-making yardstick are both inadequate. So likewise is the narrow view of efficiency which holds that the seeming success of the small unit is conclusive evidence of efficiency, even when the direct and measurable larger result causes social damage, and the seeming success proves to be only short-lived. To be sure, it is frequently difficult to be certain about these things; our techniques of social measurement are not always adequate. However, one thing seems certain, namely, that the acceptance of the social and long-range view of efficiency clearly demands the more effective integration of business and governmental processes and the planning of the whole in such a way that waste and lost chances can be obviated. Stuart Chase has pointed out:

In studying the problem of administration one must keep one's sense of proportion. We are dealing here not with the best method to file correspondence, collect bad accounts, or blow in a blast furnace, but with the best method to keep effective human demand from falling short of the proved and available supply.

But the over-all view of efficiency has not yet been grasped by the majority of people. Popular education and concrete instrumentation will have to develop gradually. However, if it be realized at the outset that efficiency is a social concept rather than one which can be calculated with a slide rule, there is much more likelihood of an ultimately satisfactory solution.

It is probably much more timely and practical at this juncture to apply the criteria and objectives of efficiency to individual administrative enterprises and establishments. Underlying the recognition that ultimate efficiency is to be judged in the light of the totality of social considerations is the corresponding truth that administrative efficiency encompasses all the persons and results involved in operating an individual enterprise. A machine-like precision may be an indispensable

part in the whole process; a net-income showing may be as indispensable to a public undertaking as in a private business; customer satisfaction may result from a particular governmental activity; but even all these results may still fail to produce total efficiency. One cannot say with assurance that a thing is efficient until all elements have been considered, and until indirect as well as more obvious criteria have been weighed in the balance.

Fair treatment of employees engaged in an enterprise and resulting vocational satisfactions are indispensable considerations in judging the efficiency of a governmental or business unit. Reminiscent of the profound psychological observations of Ordway Tead is this statement by a post-office clerk:

I feel strongly that we shall never be able to get the ideal of efficiency until the individual worker feels that his task is one on which he can concentrate his very best, and that by accomplishing it successfully he is rendering the best service to himself and to the community.

You need not be a member of a labor union to recognize that efficient administration means vastly more than mechanical perfection. You can produce the most up-to-date machine, you can examine all the factors regarding material and everything that goes into production, but unless you get down to the human factor and provide for the complete functions it has to perform and the conditions under which it is to discharge them, you will still be inefficient. One of the most encouraging recent social developments is that executives in increasing numbers not only recognize the truth of this observation, but are seeking concrete means whereby these mainsprings of human action can be given adequate release.

It is to be expected that in the future the greatest strides toward enduring efficiency will be made in the field of human relations, in the field of personnel. More than any other people we Americans have been enamored of the machine. Instead of mastering it we have worshiped it. There will have to be a change in the American theory and practice of values. Efficiency must be re-defined in terms of employees and consumers

rather than in terms of maximum production by machines and the highest possible profit from the industrial process. One of the foundations for such a reshaping of public policies and attitudes is to be found in the American emphasis upon the psychological method. The American scholar or business man when traveling abroad is almost inevitably told, "One thing that impresses us about you is that you are everlastingly thinking about motivations and psychological satisfactions; you are always thinking about the effect upon people." There is much truth in the observation, and it is not to be doubted that our captains of industry have moved rapidly in this direction within very recent years.

Efficiency is personnel satisfactions. First of all, the employees of the enterprise must be happy in their work. This is an end in itself. After all, society is simply the totality of all the bodies of persons who do the work of the world. Therefore, if to be efficient you must produce satisfaction, it is obvious that a prerequisite of efficiency is work-satisfaction. But this is not the whole of the matter. What usually impresses "hard-boiled" executives to a greater extent than this discovery is that customers are more likely to be satisfied and to find gratification in dealing with a concern when from the employees of that undertaking they can absorb the friendliness, consideration, and good-will which come from the right kind of working relations and vocational satisfactions. Ultimately consumer satisfaction depends upon employee satisfaction. In a recent conversation with an executive of one of the largest and most far-flung corporate enterprises in the world, the writer was told that, in the experience of this progressive undertaking, the principal producer of efficiency is the right kind of spirit among all of the employees. "It is the core of our policies regarding internal management and public relations," said he. We do not infer that such insights are by any means universal, but there is much evidence of the fact that the potentialities of the human factor as the only permanent producer of social efficiency are coming to be much more widely grasped.

Efficiency is also customer satisfaction. "Good-will" is a vague and undefined term, but broadly interpreted it is any enterprise's most desirable objective. In saying this we are not complimenting high-powered advertising and some of the questionable techniques of public-relations experts. We are simply observing what every enlightened administrator knows and attempts to put into practice, namely, that the customer's estimate of the enterprise and the satisfaction he receives from the service constitute the acid test of over-all efficiency.

The customer-satisfaction criterion applies with as much force to government as to business. In the past the failure of public enterprises generally to pay sufficient attention to customer attitudes and citizen relations has been the aspect of public administration which is most inefficient and open to criticism.

The matter may be put in the following manner: If the administrator keeps his eyes constantly on the end result, namely, customer satisfaction, then the steps which need to be taken in order to improve the internal administration are usually self-apparent. Among such necessary reforms one is likely to find the need for greater dispatch, courtesy, and the simplification of provoking regulations and procedures. When administration is considered merely a technique, when there is too much emphasis upon methods, the user of the service is likely to be overlooked, with the result that grooving, red tape, and stagnation fasten themselves upon the administrative organism.

Our discussion thus far has indicated that efficiency, socially and humanly interpreted, is an adequate major objective of public administration. We have attempted to point out the limitations of the mechanized view of efficiency. We cannot subscribe to the notion that administration is merely a matter of proper procedures, stereotyped skills, machine-like precision. Great administration is pulsating with life. Outstanding institutional successes have relied upon clearly defined objectives which were capable of capturing men's best efforts, with the resulting production of a vigorous morale among the employees

of the organization, and finally with constant solicitude for the satisfaction of those who were to use the service. To define efficiency narrowly would be to rob it of its life and usefulness. Social efficiency has many connotations and implications. Efficiency is contented personnel, satisfied customers, co-ordinated processes, a balanced economy.

No matter how broadly construed, however, efficiency is only one of the criteria and objectives of public administration. The execution of the law is not the only responsibility of the modern-day administration. Therefore, efficiency is not the only desideratum. Those who view administrative action as simple commands, "Do this," "Refrain from doing that," fail to comprehend the extent to which administration is called upon to help formulate policy and to fashion important realms of discretion in our modern democracies. Legislation and administration are not separable into nicely divided compartments. It is this fact with reference to the realities of governmental processes that those who would take a simple view of the ends of public administration all too frequently overlook. And because they are not separable, the philosophies of public servants and their ideas concerning the ends of the state score heavily in the shaping of public policy.

Are we, therefore, to assume that one of the recognized and proper functions of public administration is to deal consciously and deliberately with the fulfilment of social objectives and the accomplishments of the ends of the state? It is difficult to see how this conclusion can be avoided.

Within the broad limits of social policy enunciated by statute there are in many important instances large ranges of discretion within which the desires and views of administrative officials shape the course of development. The very inception and drafting of many of our most important laws occur in an administrative office rather than in the inner sanctum of the legislator's chamber. All of this is familiar enough, and we have already commented upon it in the essay dealing with administrative discretion. At this juncture it is important that we

should emphasize the fact that the administrator is more than the tool, the unquestioning servant of whatever party happens to be in power. Administration plans. Administration is not merely a lifeless form. It is an active, originating, inventing, contriving element in the body politic. Is it not clear, then, that one of the necessary and legitimate objectives of public administration is the consideration of socially desirable ends? The person who knows what he is doing, and hence makes provision for it, usually does a more adequate job.

Administration involves planning, and planning is essentially the choice of objectives. To be sure, the planning function includes a great deal more, being concerned with the methods by which ends may be reached and also involving a choice between alternative procedures. However, the important points to observe are that planning is implicit in administration, and second, that planning involves choice. To some persons these observations will appear self-evident, trite. On the other hand, there can be no question that the planning function of public administration has been almost completely neglected by the writers and theorists who have dealt with its systematic formulation. It seems to have been assumed that to execute or to enforce automatically precludes the possibility of planning or contriving, but such an assumption is far from the truth and far from what actually takes place in our day and age. Public administrators need to recognize that planning is as much a responsibility of the governmental administrator as it is of the business executive. When we refer to the term "planning," we do not have in mind merely the more obvious planning activities evidenced by city, state, and federal planning boards which have grown up, for the most part in fairly recent times, but in addition the less clearly defined planning functions of everyday administration.

The administrator's planning activities may be divided into two natural categories, namely, his concern with policy and his duty to work out methods whereby policies can actually be effected. By the planning of a policy we have reference not

only to the close collaboration of administrators in the drafting of legislation, but also to that wide range of discretionary acts which adds to social policy, inevitably extending, modifying, or limiting it. There is no sharp line between this aspect of the matter and the formation of administrative techniques according to which policies will be carried out in detail. Before any important program can be carried out, the methods, priorities, controls, techniques of execution need to be planned. This is the work of the co-ordinator, the director, the executive head. Failure to plan adequately the steps of administrative execution frequently means failure, or at best, mediocre results. Moreover, in the discharge of detailed duties there is inevitably room for decision, invention, ingenuity. As we have pointed out in an earlier essay, discretion applies to the housekeeping functions of government as well as to the broader ranges of social policy.

If, then, it be recognized that the planning function is the first and most important aspect of higher administration, certain obvious deductions concerning the objectives and criteria of public administration appear. In the first place, those of our permanent administrative officials who have large responsibilities should be competent to weigh social policies. They have to choose courses of conduct which will redound to the public benefit. It also means that the field of public administration must emphasize the theory, the philosophy, the social problems of modern collective living instead of being content with the teaching of techniques of execution which appear to be effectual. If the planning activity is as central, as indispensable, as important as we say, then our administrators should be first of all philosophers.

Administrators who are responsible for suggesting and supplementing governmental policies—and they are in a better position to do so than anyone else because they know the practical problems of carrying out policies decided upon—should be thoroughly grounded in the principles of governmental administration. Even if it be impossible at the present time to

isolate a large number of valid rules which have more or less universal applicability, even if only a small number of time-tested verities can be relied upon, it must be insisted that an objective of public administration is to follow such principles as consistently as possible and constantly to be on the lookout for the testing and enunciation of new ones. An official of great administrative capacity once said to the writer:

The difference between a great executive and a mediocre one is that the former will follow principle, whereas the latter relies upon precedent. The former will be progressive, inventive, original, the latter's actions will be stodgy, unimaginative, shot through with red tape.

It is believed that this observation has universal applicability in all realms of management, whether they be public or private.

Principled administration will aim to safeguard the rights and liberties of the individual. In administrative procedure, for example, the citizen will be assured a right to be heard, impartiality, and an appeal from one man's decision whenever legally protected rights are at stake. Administration should not only be inwardly effective, but must also be outwardly just and considerate.

To search continually for the best principles of public administration and to act in accordance with such principles, then, is one of the objectives and criteria deserving of emphasis. It may be placed alongside the others which we have discussed, namely, the securing of the largest degree of efficiency and emphasis upon planning and progressivism.

Administration is more likely to be effective and distinguished when the purpose or purposes of the enterprise are clearly apprehended by everyone. Ordway Tead, one of the most significant contributors to the body of knowledge bearing upon scientific management, has written an essay entitled, "Purpose as a Psychological Factor in Management." In this discussion, and also in his books, he has made clear a point which badly needs to be recognized and to be acted upon by those who are concerned with the growth of public administration. The question may be raised in the form of an interro-

gation: Can first-class administration be expected from government, can the best responses be expected from the rank and file of public servants, unless the purposes of particular activities are well understood and unless they are vital and stimulating? A tentative answer to this question has already been given in the essay on organization in which it was said that effective co-operation is impossible unless there is a general awareness on the part of the employees of the purposes of the enterprise and of the contribution which even the most unimportant of them makes to the accompanying processes and the undertaking as a whole.

Some radical persons have suggested that the ideology of the civil service militates against the cultivation of such a propelling force. Anonymity is a symbol, perhaps the principal characteristic of the civil servant. Permanent officials who have opinions of their own are, for the most part, supposed to keep them to themselves. A good civil servant should not talk out of turn. Like a child, he should speak only when spoken to. This is patent exaggeration. We have consciously indulged in it in order to bring out what appears to be an important point. In contrast with the anonymous civil servant, the business man is characteristically a blunt, outspoken individual. To be sure, the type is changing. Very few executives nowadays pound on desks. Most of them are quiet, unassuming, strong, and deep rather than high-strung and irritable. Nevertheless, an important difference between the two patterns is readily observable.

The meek, anonymous civil servant alongside of the forceful, outspoken business executive—who will make himself the judge of which of these two renders the highest social contribution? Certainly not the writer. But is it not possible that the civil servant should have more of the characteristics of independence, force, and “old roguery” which we find in our more successful business executives? If, as we have assumed, good administration is warm and vibrant, then an excess of anonymity and timidity would hardly seem to produce the warm-

blooded response which is to be desired. We will raise the issue, but we cannot pretend to solve it. This is one of the moot questions. In a representative democracy can civil servants be anything else but an anonymous, loyal, and some would even say colorless, body of public servants? Private business is more of a monarchy than a democracy. Are the social values to be secured from the administrative qualities and psychological propulsions which we have mentioned so desirable that the people will willingly choose a form of government in which, from the point of view of experience, these strong, emotional drives and psychological releases are to be found? Or can these qualities be sufficiently attained in a progressive democracy?

Quite a few writers have thought that they had discovered "a public service philosophy" which is engendered by service in behalf of the community. It is sometimes said that a most important consideration in the philosophy of the administrator is to seek constantly for the community "the good life." This analysis of the situation probably comes pretty close to what is actually in the minds and spirits of our outstanding public administrators. In progressive schools, modern playgrounds, public libraries, garden cities, and all of the other social efforts which a progressive government affords are found the opportunities and influences which make life better, richer, and more secure. Certainly the sense of community well-being and the belief in the efficacy of common effort and co-operation constitute essential ingredients of the philosophy of the devoted public servant. In this philosophy we also find, no doubt, the virtue of loyalty, as well as honesty, enthusiasm, humility, and all the other attributes of character and conduct which contribute to effectual and satisfying service.

A rational, spirited, forward-looking philosophy may be counted as one of the most necessary and desirable objectives of public administration. Some would disagree with this conclusion. To them it might appear that creeds in any form are an orthodoxy which no liberal could countenance. Others claim to see in a public-service philosophy a threat to individual

liberty. A prominent business leader has gone so far as to state that an enthusiastic and first-rate government administrator is more dangerous than a mad dog—because “he eats holes in our liberties.” Fortunately, however, there are very few citizens who would take so extreme a view of the matter. If, as we have assumed, a philosophy of some kind is the lot of every person; if also, as is clearly the case, a constructive philosophy of government can do much to improve the honor, spirit, and alertness of administration—then it would appear that the development of a consistent, rational, and self-disciplining public-service philosophy is a desirable objective of public administration.

In the last analysis, of course, the several criteria and objectives of public administration which have been noted can be resolved more or less into a unity. Efficiency, planning, principle, philosophy—all of these are involved in the provision of service for the community’s wants. Government servants should never lose sight of the fact that the public is their master and that the fulfilment of communal wants is the ultimate test of all their activities. But administration is more than a lifeless pawn. It plans, it contrives, it philosophizes, it educates, it builds for the community as a whole.

[illegible]

APPENDIX

NOTES ON BOOKS AND AUTHORS

As no footnotes have been provided in this book, we are here listing, in the order in which reference is made in each essay, the writers and the books or articles in which the arguments or points cited in the text are further developed. Reference is also made in this list of books and authors to a few not cited in the text but particularly relevant to some important aspect of the question under discussion.

THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

KIPLINGER, W. N. "What's Ahead in Washington," *Nation's Business*, Vol. XXI (December, 1933).

GOODNOW, FRANK G. *Politics and Administration*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1900.

———. *Comparative Administrative Law*. Student's ed. New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1893.

WILLOUGHBY, W. F. *Principles of Public Administration*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1927.

———. *Principles of Judicial Administration*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1929.

WHITE, LEONARD D. *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, pp. 1-22. New York: Macmillan Co., 1926.

PFIFFNER, JOHN M. *Public Administration*, pp. 3-20, 388-434. New York: Ronald Press, 1935.

DIMOCK, MARSHALL E. "What Is Public Administration?" *Public Management*, Vol. XV, No. 9 (September, 1933).

WALKER, HARVEY. "An American Conception of Public Administration," *Public Administration*, XI, No. 1 (January, 1933), 15-19.

STEWART, A. C. "The Approach of British Universities to Public Administration," *Public Administration*, XI, No. 1 (January, 1933), 20-35.

WATSON, B. W. WALKER. "The Elements of Public Administration, a Dogmatic Introduction," *Public Administration*, X, No. 4 (October, 1932), 397-408.

TAYLOR SOCIETY. *Scientific Management in American Industry*. H. S. PERSON (ed.). New York: Harper & Bros., 1929.

DEWEY, JOHN. *The Public and Its Problems*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927.

WILSON, WOODROW. "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, II, No. 2 (June, 1887), 197-222.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

MCILWAIN, C. H. *The Growth of Political Thought in the West*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1932.

BURKE, EDMUND. *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*. (Many reprints.) London, 1770.

WHITLOCK, BRAND. *On the Enforcement of Law in Cities*. Indianapolis, 1913.

LANCASTER, LANE. "Private Associations and Public Administration," *Journal of Social Forces*, XIII, No. 2 (December, 1934), 283-91.

FOLLETT, MARY P. *Creative Experience*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924.

COMMONS, JOHN R. *Labor and Administration*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1923.

Dictionary of American Biography. New York: Charles Scribner, 1928-36.

TURNER, JENNIE M. "Democracy in Administration," *American Political Science Review*, XVII (May, 1923), 216-30.

DEWEY, JOHN. *The Public and Its Problems*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927.

THE RÔLE OF DISCRETION IN MODERN ADMINISTRATION

CARR, CECIL T. *Delegated Legislation*. Cambridge: University Press, 1921.

Committee on Ministers' Powers, Memoranda of, Minutes of Evidence of (2 vols.), and *Report of*. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1932.

LASKI, HAROLD. "The Growth of Administrative Discretion," *Public Administration*, I (April, 1923), 92-100.

DIMOCK, MARSHALL E. "The Development of American Administrative Law," *Journal of Comparative Legislation*, XV, Part I (February, 1933), 35-46.

POUND, ROSCOE. "The Administrative Application of Legal Standards," *Reports of the American Bar Association*, XLIV (September, 1919), 445-65.

———. "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harvard Law Review*, XXIV (1910-11), 591-619; XXV (1911-12), 140-68, 489-516.

- LLEWELLYN, KARL N. "A Realistic Jurisprudence—the Next Step," *Columbia Law Review*, XXX (1930), 431-65.
- . "Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound," *Harvard Law Review*, XLIV (1930-31), 1222-64.
- FREUND, ERNST. "The Substitution of Rule for Discretion in Public Law," *American Political Science Review*, IX, No. 4 (November, 1915), 666-76.
- FRANK, JEROME. *Law and the Modern Mind*. New York: Brentano's, 1930.
- SHARFMAN, I. L. *The Interstate Commerce Commission*. 4 vols. New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1931—.
- McFARLAND, CARL. *Judicial Control of the Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933.
- DICKINSON, JOHN. *Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of the Law*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927.
- BLACHLY, F. F., and OATMAN, M. E. *Administrative Legislation and Adjudication*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1934.
- ROBSON, WILLIAM A. *Justice and Administrative Law*. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1928.

A THEORY OF ORGANIZATION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

- TEAD, ORDWAY. *The Art of Leadership*. New York: Whittlesey House, 1935.
- URWICK, L. *Management of To-morrow*. London: Nisbet & Co., 1933.
- . *Organization as a Technical Problem*. Geneva: International Management Institute, 1933.
- LLOYD GEORGE, DAVID. *The Parliamentary Debates* (5th ser.), LXXXVIII, 1342.
- Great Britain War Cabinet, Report of* (1917), p. 3. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1918.
- GAY, EDWIN F. Letter to author, April 26, 1934.
- STALIN, JOSEPH. "Report of the Work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," reprinted in *International Conciliation*, No. 305 (December, 1934), p. 447. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- EASTMAN, JOSEPH B. Address before American Academy of Political and Social Science. Philadelphia, November 7, 1931.
- FARQUHAR, A. A. "Functional Organization," *Scientific Management in American Industry*. H. S. Person (ed.). New York: Taylor Society, 1929.

AMERICAN SOCIETY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

- FRANKFURTER, FELIX. *The Public and Its Government*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930.
- DEWEY, JOHN. *The Public and Its Problems*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927.
- WOODS, ROBERT A. *The City Wilderness*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1899.
- TURNER, F. J. *The Frontier in American History*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920.
- JAMESON, J. F. *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement*, p. 70. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1926.
- POLLARD, ARTHUR L. "The Economic and Social Effects of Urbanization," *Mechanical Engineering*, January, 1933, pp. 30 and 31.
- MAYO, ELTON. *The Human Problem of an Industrial Civilization*, pp. 136, 137, and 166. New York: Macmillan Co., 1933.
- WILLIAMS, FRANKWOOD. *Russia, Youth and the Present-Day World*, p. 122. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1934.
- MEANS, GARDINER C. "The Distribution of Control and Responsibility in a Modern Economy," *Government Control of the Economic Order*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935.
- ADAMS, BROOKS. *The Theory of Social Revolutions*, pp. 204 and 205. New York: Macmillan Co., 1913.

CRITERIA AND OBJECTIVES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

- WILLOUGHBY, W. F. *Principles of Public Administration*, pp. 1-8. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1927.
- WHITE, LEONARD D. *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, p. 2. New York: Macmillan Co., 1926.
- "Efficiency as an Alternative to Control—Summary of Discussion," *Public Administration*, VI, No. 2 (April, 1928), 112-15.
- PFIFFNER, JOHN M. *Public Administration*, p. 14. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1935.
- PICK, FRANK. "Some Reflections on the Administration of a Public Utility Undertaking," *Public Administration*, XIII, No. 2 (April, 1935), 144-45.
- BUNBURY, Sir H. H. "Efficiency as an Alternative to Control," *Public Administration*, VI, No. 2 (April, 1928), 97.
- HALDANE, VISCOUNT. "An Organized Civil Service," *Public Administration*, I, 10.

- DONHAM, WALLACE BRETT. *Business Looks at the Unforeseen*, p. 13.
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1932.
- CLARKE, SIR GEOFFREY. "Business Management of the Public Services,"
Public Administration, VIII, No. 1 (January, 1930), 11.
- CHASE, STUART P. "How Can the State Do Business?" *Current History*,
XLII (May, 1935), 135.
- FERGUSON, HOMER. "A Plea for Inefficiency in Government," *Nation's*
Business, November, 1928, p. 20.

[illegible]

INDEX

- Abuse of power, 29
- Adams, Brooks, 104, 138
- Adams, Charles Francis, 21, 103
- Adams, Henry, 104
- Adams, J. Q., 103
- Addams, Jane, 98
- Administration. *See* Public administration
- Administrative:
 - control and supervision, 80
 - courts, 29
 - discretion, 29, 33-35, 37, 39, 42, 45-65, 129
 - law, 29, 31
 - leadership, 104
 - staff, 75-85, 119, 129
 - staff officers, 71
 - tradition, 107
 - tribunals, 34
- American Association of Social Workers, 41
- American government, 75
- American Management Association, 23
- American Municipal Association, 41
- Americans, 92, 116-18, 124, 125
- Apathy, 109
- Aristotle, 93
- Authority, 39
 - line of, 71, 72
- Auxiliary services, 71-73, 82, 86. *See also* Staff
- Babylon, 27, 118
- Bentham, Jeremy, 55
- Berlin, 23
- Blachly, F. F., 137
- Bliss, H. S., 101
- Bois, Pierre du, 44
- Bologna, 36
- Brandeis, Justice, 53
- British Empire, 74
- British government, 75
- Brussels, 23
- Bryce, Lord, 93
- Budapest, 23
- Budget officer, 74
- Bunbury, Sir Henry, 121, 138
- Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 82
- Bureau of governmental research, 23, 24
- Bureau of Standards, 92
- Bureaucracy, 118, 119
- Burke, Edmund, 21, 26, 30, 136
- Business. *See* Private enterprise
- Cabinet, 73, 76, 77, 83
 - meetings, 78
 - responsibility, 36
 - secretariat, 76
 - secretary, 79
- Cameralism, 36
- Carr, Cecil T., 136
- Cartels, 108
- Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, 78
- Central government, 85
- Central Statistical Board, 78
- Change, social, 94-103
- Chase, Stuart, 123, 139
- Chicago, 98, 101
- Chief administrative services, 71
- Chief executive, 30, 31, 78, 83
- Citizen participation, 88-90
- Civic education, 88, 89
- Civil servant, 13, 29, 31, 36, 39, 43, 47, 51
- Civil service, 118, 131, 132
 - reform, 40
- Clark, Sir Geoffrey, 139
- Code of Hammurabi, 27
- Coke, Justice, 55
- Committee on the Machinery of Government, 22
- Committees, 78, 89
- Common law, 53, 56
- Commons, John R., 40, 44, 136
- Communism, 113
- Congress, 33

- Connecticut, 54
 Consent, 69, 131
 Constitutional law, 30
 Consumer, 38, 125, 126
 Consumers' Advisory Board, 37
 Control, 29, 85
 Cook, Walter W., 61
 Cooper, Peter, 107, 108
 Co-operation, 110
 Co-ordination, 5, 69, 74
 Council of National Defense, 77
 Courts, 29, 34, 35, 47, 52
 Cultural assimilation, 90
 Cultural stability, 95
 Customary law, 27
 Cutting, Senator Bronson, 43

Degradation of the Democratic Dogma, The, 104
 Delegation of power, 34-37, 54
Democracy in Administration, 43
 Democratic government, 89
 Dennison, Henry S., 78
 Deutsches Institut für wirtschaftliche Arbeit in der öffentlichen Verwaltung, 23
 Devolution, 85
 Dewey, John, 8, 44, 92, 110, 111, 136, 138
 Dickinson, John, 57, 137
 Dictamen, 36
Dictionary of American Biography, 44, 107, 136
 Dimock, Marshall E., 135, 136
 Discretion. *See* Administrative discretion
 Discretionary act, 51
 Discretionary power, 36
 Division of labor, 69, 70
 Donham, Dean, 122, 139
Dynasts, The, 114

 Eastman, Joseph B., 87, 137
 Economic Adviser, 78
 Economic Advisory Council, 77
 Economic councils, 108
 Economy of plenty, 93
 Education in administration, 90, 105.
 See also Training for the public service

 Efficiency, 116-27
 American conception of, 116, 117, 124
 customer satisfaction as, 126
 machine-like, 116, 117, 120-24, 126
 personnel and, 124, 125
 qualitative, 123, 124, 126
 social, 118, 120, 122, 123, 126, 127
 Electorate, 32
 Eliot, Charles, 104
 Elite, 118
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 99
 Empire, medieval, 28
Enforcement of Law in Cities, The, 35
 Engineering Corps, U.S. Army, 82
 England, 29, 31
 Executive Council, 78

 Farquhar, A. A., 72, 91, 137
 Fascism, 25
 Fayol, Henri, 21
 Federal Trade Commission, 57, 61
Federalist, The, 26
 Ferguson, Homer, 139
 Ferris, John, 97
 Feudal system, 28, 118
 Finality of decisions, 34
 Finance, 71, 73
 Financial control, 31
 Finer, Herman, 19
 Follett, Mary P., 38, 136
 France, 29, 30
 Frank, Jerome, 60, 137
 Frankfurter, Felix, 92, 138
 Franklin, Benjamin, 108
 Freund, Ernst, 54, 55, 57, 65, 137
 Friedrich, Carl J., 16
 Function, principle of, 39, 68, 72, 73, 81, 88, 91
 Functions of government, 1, 100, 103

 Gay, Edwin F., 78, 137
 General administrative staff, 71, 83, 106
 General staff service. *See* General administrative staff
General View of a Complete Code of Laws, 55
 Geneva, 23
 German universities, 36

- Germany, 25
Getting Out the Vote, 21
 God, responsibility to, 27, 28, 31
 Goodnow, F. J., 6, 135
 Gosnell, Harold F., 21
 Government, 109
 business and, 122, 123, 126
 functions, 1, 100, 103
 Governmental research, bureaus of, 24, 41
 Graicunas, A. V., 75
 Great Britain, 24, 33
 Committee on Ministers' Powers, 136
 Ministry of Reconstruction, 22
 War Cabinet, 75, 76, 137
 Great Seal, 29
 Gulick, Luther, 15

 Haldane, Lord, 21, 22, 85, 121, 122, 138
 Hall, Arnold B., 19
 Hamilton, Alexander, 21, 26
 Harding administration, 33, 78
 Hardy, Thomas, 114
 Harrington, James, 55
 Harvard University, 122
 Holmes, Justice, 56, 57
 Hoover, President, 78
 House of Commons, 75
 Howland, Charles P., 101
 Hungarian Institute of Public Administration, 23
 Hungary, 23

 Illinois, 54
 Immigration, 94, 95
 Incentives, 86, 87, 119, 122, 124, 125
 Individual, 101
 citizen, 109
 Industrial Advisory Board, 37
 Institut International des Sciences Administratives, 23
 Institute of Public Administration, 22
 Instructional organization, 72, 91
 Integration, 109. *See also* Co-ordination
 Interdepartmental committees, 78
 Interest representation, 89, 108

 Interior, Department of, 82
 International City Managers' Association, 14, 41
 International organization, 101
 International Scientific Management Institute, 23
 International systems, 28
 International Union of Cities, 24
 Interstate Commerce Commission, 44, 57
 Interstate Legislative Reference Library, 24
 Ireland, 24
 Israel, 27
 Italy, 25

 Jackson, President, 42
 Jameson, J. F., 94, 138
 Japan, 24
 Jewish tradition, 27
 Jones, J. Catron, 15
Journal of Public Administration, 16, 22
 Judges, 52, 55, 57
 Judicial legislation, 61
 Judicial review, 29, 30, 32, 46. *See also* Administrative discretion, Courts

 Kendall, H. P., 108
 King of England, 30
 King's household, 3, 28, 29, 35, 79, 109
 Kiplinger, W. N., 2, 135

 Labor, 38, 125
 Labor Advisory Board, 37
 La Follette, Senator, 108
 Lancaster, Lane, 38, 136
 Land Office, U.S. Department of the Interior, 82
 Land policy, 82
 Laski, H. J., 45, 53, 136
 Law, 6, 14, 127
 Leadership, 2, 68
 League of Nations, 101
 Leagues of municipalities, 41
 Legislatures, 30, 33, 43
 Lenin, Nikolai, 25, 113
 Licensing, 49

Line:

- of authority, 71, 72
- department, 73, 82
- functions, 10, 11
- services, 71
- Llewellyn, Karl N., 53, 61, 137
- Lloyd George, David, 75, 137
- Lloyd George Coalition, 75-78
- London Passenger Transport Board, 121
- Low, Seth, 40
- Lowrie, S. Gale, 15
- McFarland, Carl, 57, 137
- Machine, political, 31, 89
- Magyary, Zoltan, 23
- McIlwain, C. H., 28, 136
- Management, 7, 11, 23, 120, 121
- Marx, Karl, 113
- Material, service, 71
- Matschek, Walter, 15
- Mayo, Elton, 98, 99, 138
- Means, Gardiner, 100, 138
- Measurement, 79, 86
- Middle Ages, 28
- Middle class, 28
- Mill, John Stuart, 21
- Ministerial act, 51
- Ministerial powers, 79
- Ministerial responsibility, 36
- Ministry of Research, 22
- Missouri, 59
- Mobility, 94, 96
- Monarchy, 3, 28, 36
- Moscow, 111
- Moses, 27
- Mosher, William E., 15
- Murray, 26
- National Being, The*, 110
- National Economic Council, 108
- National Federation of Federal Employees, 41
- National Industrial Recovery Act, 36, 85
- National Park Service, 82
- National Recovery Administration, 37
- National Socialism, 25
- National state, 28
- Nation's Business*, 2
- Nazification, 25
- Neighborhoods, 96
- New Deal, 25
- New English Dictionary*, 17
- New York, 40, 113
- Oatman, M. E., 137
- Officials, 111
- Olson, Emory E., 15
- Organization, 66-91
 - defined, 66, 69
- Oriental Institute, 27
- Papacy, 27, 28, 31
- Parliament, 76
- Party system, 30, 31, 43
- Perlman, Selig, 44
- Persia, 27
- Personnel, 2, 60, 63, 71-73, 87, 103, 124, 125. *See also* Civil Service
- Pfiffner, John M., 135, 138
- Philosophy, 129, 132, 133
- Pick, Frank, 121, 138
- Planning, 12, 81-83, 109, 127-29
 - director of, 105
- Policy, 3, 32, 82, 127-29
 - co-ordination, 79
- Political science, departments of, 41
- Politics, 3, 93
- Politiques*, 29
- Pollard, Arthur, 96, 138
- Popular election, 30, 31
- Pound, Dean, 45, 58, 60, 61, 136
- President, 33, 73, 78, 79
- Presidential system, 77
- Prime Minister, 73, 79
- Principle, general, in statutes, 34
- Principles in public administration, 13-25, 129-32
- Principles of Public Administration*, 13
- Priorities, 94, 109, 129
- Private enterprise, 122, 123, 126, 131, 132
- Procedural rules, 63, 64, 130
- Production for use, 93
- Professional standards, 39
- Professionalism in civil service, 29, 36, 39-44, 119

- Property rights, 59
 Psychiatrist, 98
 Psychologist, 98
 Public administration:
 defined, 1, 6, 9
 education in, 90, 105
 humanizing of, 10, 121
 ignorance of, 53
 institutional approach to, 7
 instrumentalist view of, 8
 legal approach to, 6
 practical approach to, 7
 research in, 22, 23
 study of, 2, 3
 theory of, 90, 93, 112, 132
 theory and invention in, 8, 128, 130
Public Administration, Journal of, 16, 22
 Public Administration Clearing House, 24
Public and Its Government, The, 92
Public and Its Problems, The, 92, 110
 Public participation, 88
 Purpose, 3, 12, 68, 71, 94, 119, 127, 130-32
 "Purpose as a Psychological Factor in Management," 130
Regicide Peace, The, 26
 Regional surveys, 106
 Regionalism, 85
 Reporting, 71, 80, 81, 88
 Representation of interests, 37
 Research, Ministry of, 22
 Responsibility, 26-44, 71, 72
 political, 33
 Rice, W. G., 101
 Richelieu, Cardinal, 21
 Ridley, C. E., 14
 Riefler, W. H., 78
 Robson, William A., 137
 Roman emperors, 27
 Roman republic, 27
 Romans, 26, 128
 Roosevelt, President F. D., 45, 78
 Rosenberry, Chief Justice, 53
 Royal household, 3, 28. *See also* King's household
 Rural instability, 97
 Russell, George, 110
 Russia, 25
 Scientific management, 23, 25, 117, 121
 Seckendorff, Ludwig von, 24
 Secretariat, 76-85
 Security, 94
 Senate, 37
 Separation of powers, 56, 58
 Sharfman, I. L., 57, 137
 Size of organization, 74
 Smith, Jeremiah, 101
 Socialism, 102
 Society of Civil Servants, 22
 Sovereignty, 28
 Soviet administration, 80, 81
 Span of attention, 75
 Span of control, 75
 Spoils system, 112
 Staff, 109
 officers, 84
 services, 71
 See also General administrative staff, Auxiliary services
 Stalin, Joseph, 80, 137
 Standards:
 administrative, 61, 62, 86, 118
 in administrative discretion, 34, 35, 37, 54
 State, 12, 102, 111, 127
 Steward, Luther, 41
 Stewart, A. C., 135
 Supreme Court, 32, 34, 37, 46
 Syndicates, 108
 Tariff Commission, 33
 Taylor, F. W., 72, 78, 84, 113
 Taylor Society, 7, 23, 114, 135
 Tead, Ordway, 68, 87, 124, 130, 137
 Technical staff service. *See* Auxiliary service
 Technicians, 106
 Tennessee Valley Authority, 40, 97
Teutscher Fürsten Stat, 24
 Theory of organization, 86
Theory of Social Revolution, The, 104
Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, 30
 Trade associations, 108
 Trade unions, 40, 108, 124
 Training for the public service, 36, 103-7

- Turner, F. J., 93, 138
 Turner, Jennie, 43, 136
 Ulpian, 27
 Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, 74, 80, 113
 Unions, 40, 108, 124
 United States, 23-25, 30, 33, 42, 66, 74, 90, 95, 106
 Department of Agriculture, 82, 89
 Forest Service, 82
 Public Health Service, 41
 Reclamation Service, 82
 Supreme Court, 32, 34, 37, 46
 University of Chicago, vii, 27
 Urbanization, 94, 95
 Urwick, L., 71, 75, 137
 Value, 116, 119
 Veblen, Thorstein, 108
 Voting, 109
 Walker, Harvey, 135
 Wallas, Graham, 21, 22
 War Cabinet, 75, 76, 137
 War Industries Board, 77, 78
 Waring, Colonel George, 40
 Watson, B. W. Walker, 135
 White, Leonard D., 135, 138
 Whitlock, Brand, 35, 136
 Whitman, Walt, 99
 William of Wykeham, 44
 Williams, Frankwood, 99, 138
 Willoughby, W. F., 7, 13, 14, 135, 138
 Wilson, Woodrow, vii, 77, 136
 Wisconsin, 53, 54
 Woods, R. A., 93, 98, 138
 World War, 75, 113
 Yahweh, 27

KASHMIR UNIVERSITY

Iqbal Library

Acc No

Dated

 212641
 22.5.89


ALLAMA IQBAL LIBRARY



212614

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

**THE JAMMU & KASHMIR UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY.**

DATE LOANED

Class No. _____ **Book No.** _____

Vol. _____ **Copy** _____

Accession No. _____

--	--	--	--

**THE JAMMU & KASHMIR UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY.**

DATE LOANED

Class No. _____ **Book No.** _____

Vol. _____ **Copy** _____

Accession No. _____

--	--	--

[illegible]